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Thesis	  Abstract	  	  This	  thesis	  explores	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  changing	  composition	  of	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  by	  examining	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  creating	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  widespread	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West	  can	  be	  contextualized	  and	  reviewing	  a	  variety	  of	  possible	  arguments	  in	  secondary	  literature	  for	  the	  decline	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  within	  this	  theoretical	  framework.	  I	  assert	  that	  the	  constructivist	  concept	  of	  security	  communities,	  although	  originally	  focused	  on	  interactions	  between	  states	  in	  the	  community,	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  states	  respond	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  threats	  outside	  of	  the	  community,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  there	  has	  been	  a	  systemic	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West.	  	  The	  past,	  current	  and	  future	  peacekeeping	  engagements	  of	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  thesis.	  These	  countries	  have	  historically	  had	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  UN,	  and	  been	  champions	  of	  its	  ultimate	  authority	  to	  sanction	  international	  responses	  to	  conflict.	  Both	  countries	  have	  a	  history	  of	  significant	  troops	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  but	  have	  decreased	  these	  contributions	  in	  the	  last	  10-­‐15	  years.	  Understanding	  why	  these	  two	  internationalists	  all	  but	  abandoned	  UN	  peacekeeping	  can	  provide	  clues	  as	  to	  why	  other	  Western	  militaries	  have	  done	  the	  same,	  and	  concentrated	  their	  resources	  in	  other	  peace	  support	  operations.	  These	  cases	  also	  exemplify	  how	  the	  security	  community	  concept	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  understanding	  troop	  contributions	  to	  peace	  operations.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  main	  sections.	  In	  the	  introduction	  I	  present	  the	  research	  question	  and	  discuss	  its	  relevance	  and	  importance,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  two	  case	  studies,	  followed	  by	  the	  explanation	  of	  my	  theoretical	  framework,	  a	  review	  of	  secondary	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  and	  the	  details	  of	  my	  research	  methodology.	  In	  chapter	  one	  I	  explore	  a	  variety	  of	  arguments	  that	  have	  been	  made	  by	  academics	  and	  practitioners	  regarding	  the	  decline	  in	  troop	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contributions	  from	  the	  West.	  Chapter	  two	  covers	  my	  first	  case	  study	  –	  Canada	  –	  and	  chapter	  three	  covers	  New	  Zealand.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  although	  the	  factors	  that	  determine	  countries’	  troop	  contributions	  are	  unique	  and	  shaped	  by	  domestic	  as	  much	  as	  international	  circumstances,	  the	  wider	  trend	  in	  the	  West	  of	  decreasing	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  while	  increasing	  troop	  contributions	  to	  non-­‐UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  building	  on	  the	  security	  community	  concept.	  As	  such,	  any	  return	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  throughout	  the	  West	  or	  not	  at	  all.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  West	  to	  re-­‐engage	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  both	  Western	  governments	  and	  the	  UN	  must	  take	  steps	  towards	  redefining	  the	  parameters	  of	  troop	  participation	  in	  UN	  peace	  operations.	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Introduction	  	  This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  changing	  composition	  of	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  by	  examining	  the	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West.1	  It	  will	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  Western	  states	  no	  longer	  believe	  that	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  serves	  their	  national	  interests,	  and	  a	  theoretical	  context	  through	  which	  the	  current	  Western	  preference	  for	  contributing	  troops	  to	  alternative	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  understood.	  	  Each	  troop-­‐contributing	  country	  has	  a	  unique	  relationship	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  to	  contribute.	  However	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  there	  has	  been	  an	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  decrease	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  Western	  countries.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  contributions	  from	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  West	  began	  to	  decline	  rapidly	  while	  contributions	  from	  South	  Asia	  and	  Africa	  ballooned.2	  Although	  the	  UN	  has	  more	  peacekeepers	  around	  the	  world	  today	  than	  ever	  before,	  Western	  countries	  contribute	  only	  six	  percent	  of	  blue	  helmets.3	  	  There	  are	  many	  obvious	  explanations	  for	  the	  decline	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions:	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  ‘global	  war	  on	  terror’	  (including	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq);	  the	  low	  UN	  troop	  reimbursement	  rate;	  and	  the	  larger	  number	  of	  organizations	  involved	  in	  peacekeeping	  beyond	  the	  UN.	  However,	  although	  these	  factors	  are	  important	  to	  consider	  and	  do	  influence	  every	  contributor’s	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  the	  fact	  that	  contributions	  have	  decreased	  all	  across	  the	  Western	  world	  points	  to	  more	  systemic	  issues.	  Almost	  every	  Western	  contributor	  sent	  more	  contingent	  troops	  and	  military	  experts	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Annex	  1	  for	  a	  complete	  list	  of	  countries	  comprising	  ‘The	  West’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis.	  2	  Chris	  Perry,	  "New	  Dataset	  Shows	  Trends	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping,"	  (2013),	  http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/520-­‐new-­‐dataset-­‐shows-­‐trends-­‐in-­‐un-­‐peacekeeping.html.	  3	  Based	  on	  November	  2014	  data	  from	  United	  Nations,	  "United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	  and	  Police	  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard,"	  	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.	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UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  from	  1990-­‐2001	  than	  they	  have	  since	  then.	  4	  	  Even	  states	  that	  were	  once	  firm	  believers	  in	  internationalism	  have	  all	  but	  abandoned	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  providing	  the	  most	  striking	  illustration	  of	  this	  decline.	  	  	  Twenty-­‐five	  years	  ago	  Western	  countries	  contributed	  seventy-­‐three	  percent	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  troops.	  The	  majority	  of	  these	  troops	  came	  from	  states	  with	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  Internationalism:	  a	  “political	  ideology	  that	  advocates	  greater	  cooperation	  among	  nation-­‐states	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  peace	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  international	  law	  and	  institutions.”5	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  1990s	  these	  countries,	  including	  Canada,	  Sweden,	  Finland,	  Denmark,	  Ireland	  and	  New	  Zealand	  were	  known	  as	  ‘Internationalists’,	  and	  maintained	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  ability	  of	  the	  UN	  to	  ensure	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  to	  uphold	  international	  law	  and	  order.	  Contributions	  from	  these	  countries	  tended	  to	  be	  relatively	  consistent	  over	  time	  and	  made	  to	  UN	  operations	  across	  the	  globe.	  	  	  Some	  internationalists	  were	  also	  known	  at	  the	  UN	  as	  ‘middle	  powers’	  –	  a	  status	  pursued	  by	  Canada	  after	  World	  War	  II	  to	  recognize	  the	  military	  and	  financial	  contributions	  it	  had	  made	  to	  the	  allied	  victory	  and	  to	  solidify	  its	  rank	  and	  the	  rank	  of	  other	  similar	  countries	  below	  the	  P5,	  but	  above	  other	  states.6	  In	  addition	  to	  Canada,	  self-­‐identified	  Western	  middle	  powers	  included	  Australia,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Belgium	  and	  Sweden.7	  Canada	  argued	  that	  middle	  powers	  “could	  be	  entrusted	  to	  use	  their	  power	  responsibly	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  world	  community.”8	  When	  examining	  the	  decline	  in	  contributions	  to	  UN	  operations	  from	  the	  West,	  the	  decline	  from	  internationalist	  middle	  powers	  is	  particularly	  notable.	  A	  decrease	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  countries	  that	  had	  for	  decades	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  most	  notable	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Italy,	  currently	  the	  highest	  ranked	  Western	  troop	  contributor.	  However	  Italy,	  which	  contributes	  around	  one	  percent	  of	  total	  UN	  troops,	  and	  the	  few	  other	  exceptions	  who	  contribute	  in	  small	  numbers,	  made	  insignificant	  contributions	  or	  no	  contributions	  at	  all	  during	  the	  1990-­‐2001	  period,	  and	  currently	  contribute	  almost	  all	  of	  their	  troops	  to	  only	  one	  or	  two	  missions.	  5	  "Internationalism,"	  in	  International	  Encyclopedia	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  ed.	  William	  A.	  Darity,	  Jr.(Detroit:	  Macmillan	  Reference	  USA,	  2008).	  6	  Laura	  Neack,	  "UN	  Peace-­‐Keeping:	  In	  the	  Interest	  of	  Community	  or	  Self?,"	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  
Research	  32,	  no.	  2	  (1995).	  7	  Bernard	  Wood,	  The	  Middle	  Powers	  and	  the	  General	  Interest(North	  South	  Inst,	  1988),	  9.	  8	  R.	  A.	  MacKay,	  "The	  Canadian	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  Middle	  Powers,"	  in	  Empire	  and	  Nations,	  ed.	  H.L.	  Dyck	  and	  H.P.	  Krosby(Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1969),	  137.	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been	  ideologically	  aligned	  with,	  and	  dedicated	  to	  the	  organization’s	  purpose	  begs	  further	  examination.	  	  The	  past,	  current	  and	  future	  peacekeeping	  engagements	  of	  two	  such	  countries	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  this	  thesis.	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Canada	  have	  historically	  had	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  UN,	  and	  been	  champions	  of	  its	  ultimate	  authority	  to	  sanction	  international	  responses	  to	  conflict.	  Both	  countries	  have	  a	  history	  of	  significant	  troops	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  but	  have	  decreased	  these	  contributions	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  to	  fifteen	  years.	  But	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Canada	  also	  have	  their	  differences:	  Canada	  has	  a	  medium	  size	  military	  of	  66,000,	  whereas	  New	  Zealand’s	  defence	  forces	  number	  only	  8,500.	  In	  addition,	  Canada	  is	  a	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  member,	  whereas	  New	  Zealand	  is	  not,	  despite	  participating	  in	  various	  NATO	  operations	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  These	  dissimilar	  relationships	  with	  NATO	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  commitment	  and	  responsibility	  each	  country	  has	  to	  the	  alliance.	  An	  examination	  of	  these	  two	  cases	  will	  reveal	  that	  their	  reasons	  for	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peace	  operations	  differ	  in	  some	  ways,	  however	  their	  contributions	  have	  followed	  the	  same	  trajectory	  as	  other	  Western	  countries.	  Understanding	  why	  these	  two	  internationalists	  all	  but	  abandoned	  UN	  peacekeeping	  can	  provide	  clues	  as	  to	  why	  other	  Western	  militaries	  have	  done	  the	  same,	  and	  diverted	  their	  resources	  to	  non-­‐UN	  operations.	  	  Realist	  commentators	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  internationalism	  exhibited	  by	  middle	  powers	  is	  rooted	  in	  self-­‐interest.9	  But	  Alex	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  Williams	  point	  out	  “the	  balance	  of	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  these	  states	  were	  primarily	  guided	  by	  the	  internationalist	  idea	  that	  UN	  peace	  operations	  could	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  prevention,	  management,	  and	  resolution	  of	  violent	  conflict.”10	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  Laura	  Neack	  argued	  that	  although	  middle	  powers	  were	  the	  most	  likely	  states	  to	  engage	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  to	  protect	  the	  international	  system,	  they	  did	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Sean	  M.	  Maloney,	  Canada	  and	  UN	  Peacekeeping:	  Cold	  War	  by	  Other	  Means,	  1945-­‐1970(St	  Catharines,	  Ontario:	  Vanwell,	  2001);	  Donald	  Puchala	  and	  Roger	  Coate,	  "The	  Challenge	  of	  Relevance:	  The	  United	  Nations	  in	  a	  Changing	  World	  Environment,"	  in	  Annual	  Meeting	  of	  the	  
Academic	  Council	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  System(Ottowa,	  Ontario,	  Canada1989).	  10	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams,	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations,"	  Journal	  
of	  Peace	  Research	  46,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  40.	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so	  because	  their	  national	  interests	  were	  “served	  by	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  international	  status	  quo	  because	  in	  the	  status	  quo	  they	  have	  achieved	  relative	  affluence	  and	  influence.”11	  Neack	  therefore	  contended	  that	  sometimes	  it	  is	  in	  a	  state’s	  interest	  to	  pursue	  an	  internationalist	  foreign	  policy.	  If	  this	  still	  holds	  true,	  the	  current	  composition	  of	  UN	  troops	  indicates	  that	  the	  states	  once	  committed	  to	  providing	  peacekeepers	  no	  longer	  believe	  this	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  their	  national	  interests.	  	  Realist	  arguments	  do	  not	  dispute	  the	  possibility	  that	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  1990s	  internationalists’	  conviction	  and	  commitment	  to	  peacekeeping	  was	  real,	  however	  it	  also	  served	  them	  well,	  earning	  them	  a	  respected	  place	  in	  the	  international	  system:	  Ireland,	  for	  example,	  used	  its	  involvement	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  to	  assert	  its	  separation	  from	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  international	  stage;12	  and	  Canada	  enjoyed	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  influence	  over	  UN	  peacekeeping	  issues,	  and	  a	  chance	  to	  differentiate	  itself	  from	  the	  US.13	  Today,	  these	  countries	  still	  trade	  on	  their	  reputation	  as	  internationalists,	  however	  their	  small	  troop	  presence	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  suggests	  that	  their	  interpretations	  of	  internationalism	  has	  changed.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  explore	  some	  possible	  arguments	  for	  why	  and	  how	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  longer	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  of	  Western	  countries,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  case	  studies	  will	  look	  at	  if	  and	  how	  these	  arguments	  apply	  to	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  	  The	  timing	  of	  this	  research	  is	  fitting,	  as	  most	  Western	  nations	  have	  now	  completely	  or	  partially	  withdrawn	  large	  contributions	  to	  the	  US	  and	  NATO-­‐led	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan,	  theoretically	  freeing	  up	  capacity	  to	  contribute	  to	  peace	  operations	  elsewhere.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  UN	  peacekeeping	  has	  been	  expanding,	  with	  several	  sizeable	  missions	  mandated	  since	  2011	  (e.g.	  in	  South	  Sudan,	  Mali,	  and	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic)	  and	  large	  established	  missions	  continuing	  to	  require	  significant	  military	  components	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  Democratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Laura	  Neack,	  "UN	  Peace-­‐Keeping:	  In	  the	  Interest	  of	  Community	  or	  Self?,"	  ibid.32,	  no.	  2	  (1995):	  184.	  12	  Norrie	  MacQueen,	  Peacekeeping	  and	  the	  International	  System(Oxon:	  Routledge,	  2006).	  13	  Alistair	  D.	  Edgar,	  "Canada's	  Changing	  Participation	  in	  International	  Peacekeeping	  and	  Peace	  Enforcement:	  What,	  If	  Anything,	  Does	  It	  Mean?,"	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy	  Journal	  10,	  no.	  1	  (2002).	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Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Darfur,	  and	  Lebanon).	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand	  are	  both	  contributing	  historically	  low	  numbers	  of	  military	  personnel	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  and	  along	  with	  many	  of	  their	  Western	  counterparts	  now	  face	  the	  decision	  of	  how	  and	  where	  to	  contribute	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  efforts	  in	  the	  post	  Afghanistan	  era.	  	  Theoretical	  Framework	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  useful	  analysis	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  ‘the	  West’	  is.	  In	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  political	  sense,	  ‘the	  West’	  describes	  an	  interstate	  political	  space	  comprised	  of	  states	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	  and	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  possibly	  Japan	  in	  the	  Pacific.14	  	  But	  constructivists	  argue	  that	  rather	  than	  a	  geographical	  area	  or	  group	  of	  states	  united	  by	  a	  common	  cultural	  heritage,	  the	  West	  is	  a	  socially	  constructed	  political	  space.15	  	  Hellman,	  Herborth,	  Schlag	  and	  Weber	  argue	  that	  ‘the	  West’	  has	  been	  “shaped	  by	  security	  semantics	  in	  which	  [it]	  features	  as	  the	  threatened,	  yet	  notoriously	  vague	  referent	  object	  that	  has	  to	  be	  defended	  against	  challenges.”	  16	  The	  use	  of	  security	  semantics	  by	  state	  actors	  to	  transform	  subjects	  into	  matters	  of	  'security',	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  enable	  extraordinary	  means	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  name	  of	  security,	  is	  termed	  ‘securitization’.17	  Hellman	  et	  al.	  contend	  that	  the	  West	  has	  been	  becoming	  increasingly	  securitized	  in	  recent	  decades,	  moving	  away	  from	  a	  culture	  of	  restraint	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  towards	  self-­‐authorization.	  After	  World	  War	  II	  ‘the	  West’	  was	  a	  collection	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  states	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  peacefully	  resolving	  conflict	  between	  them.	  Today,	  with	  peace	  among	  the	  members	  of	  this	  community	  preserved	  through	  alliances	  and	  institutions,	  the	  West’s	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  external	  threats	  facing	  its	  norms,	  values	  and	  very	  existence,	  which	  results	  in	  the	  self-­‐authorized	  measures	  it	  takes	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Gunther	  Hellmann	  et	  al.,	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?,"	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Relations	  and	  Development	  17,	  no.	  3	  (2014).	  For	  a	  complete	  list	  of	  Western	  countries	  see	  Annex	  I	  15	  Emanuel	  Adler	  and	  Michael	  Barnett,	  Security	  Communities(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998);	  Hellmann	  et	  al.,	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?."	  16	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?,"	  367.	  17	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Ole	  Wæver,	  and	  Jaap	  De	  Wilde,	  Security:	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Analysis(Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  1998).	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protect	  itself.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  9/11	  terror	  attacks,	  which	  were	  seen	  as	  targeting	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  Western	  democracy	  and	  freedom,	  political	  rhetoric	  further	  securitized	  the	  West	  and	  produced	  a	  discursive	  shift	  towards	  “self-­‐reinforcing	  processes	  of	  dramatization	  and	  escalation.”18	  	  For	  some	  scholars	  of	  international	  relations	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  in	  the	  West	  involves	  conceptualizing	  Western	  states	  as	  a	  security	  community.	  This	  concept,	  pioneered	  by	  Karl	  Deutsch	  in	  1957,	  is	  defined	  as	  “A	  group	  of	  people	  who	  have	  become	  integrated	  to	  the	  point	  where	  there	  is	  real	  assurance	  that	  the	  members	  of	  that	  community	  will	  not	  fight	  each	  other	  physically,	  but	  will	  settle	  their	  disputes	  in	  some	  other	  way.”19	  Deutsch	  argued	  that	  security	  communities	  are	  formed	  when	  the	  members	  of	  a	  community-­‐region	  “posses	  a	  compatibility	  of	  core	  values	  derived	  from	  common	  institutions	  and	  mutual	  responsiveness	  -­‐	  a	  matter	  of	  mutual	  identity	  and	  loyalty,	  a	  sense	  of	  ‘we-­‐ness’,	  or	  a	  ‘we-­‐feeling’	  among	  states.”20	  This	  concept	  is	  unique	  in	  its	  focus	  on	  processes	  and	  interactions	  between	  states	  to	  understand	  trends	  in	  international	  relations,	  rather	  than	  attributing	  historical	  change	  and	  trends	  to	  structure.	  The	  security	  community	  approach	  allows	  international	  relations	  scholars	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  West	  as	  “a	  political	  space	  characterized	  by	  transnational	  processes	  of	  political	  association	  and	  integration…	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  transformative	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  collective	  identities	  through	  social	  learning.”21	  This	  suggests	  that	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand	  are	  part	  of	  a	  Western	  security	  community	  not	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  former	  British	  colonies,	  but	  rather	  because	  of	  how	  their	  interactions	  with	  other	  Western	  states	  have	  influenced	  their	  values,	  norms	  and	  institutions.	  	  Michael	  Barnett	  and	  Adler	  refined	  the	  concept	  of	  security	  communities	  in	  the	  1990s	  as,	  “transnational	  regions	  comprised	  of	  sovereign	  states	  whose	  people	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Hellmann	  et	  al.,	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?,"	  390.	  19	  Karl	  W.	  Deutsch	  et	  al.,	  Political	  Community	  and	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Area(Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  5.	  20	  Emanuel	  Adler,	  "Imagined	  (Security)	  Communities:	  Cognitive	  Regions	  in	  International	  Relations,"	  Millennium-­‐Journal	  of	  International	  Studies	  26,	  no.	  2	  (1997):	  255.	  	  21	  Hellmann	  et	  al.,	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?,"	  370.	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maintain	  dependable	  expectations	  of	  peaceful	  change.”22	  Barnett	  and	  Adler’s	  definition	  of	  security	  communities	  builds	  on	  Deutsch’s	  by	  providing	  further	  criteria	  with	  which	  to	  identify	  a	  security	  community,	  however	  it	  also	  moves	  away	  from	  Deutsch’s	  focus	  on	  transformative	  processes	  by	  assuming	  “community	  exists	  at	  the	  international	  level.”23	  Despite	  Barnett	  and	  Adler’s	  refocusing	  of	  the	  concept,	  all	  three	  scholars	  agree	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  security	  community	  does	  not	  contradict	  self-­‐interested	  behavior	  by	  states.	  The	  benefits	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  security	  community,	  such	  as	  avoiding	  conflict	  with	  other	  community	  members,	  are	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  of	  all	  states.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  having	  shared	  expectations	  for	  peaceful	  change,	  Adler	  explains	  that	  people	  in	  security	  communities	  “institutionalize	  commonalities	  running	  through	  the	  whole	  region,	  including	  shared	  perceptions	  of	  external	  threats.”24	  The	  shared	  perception	  of	  external	  threats	  is	  central	  to	  this	  thesis’s	  theory	  that	  Western	  states’	  tend	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  outside	  their	  borders.	  Although	  the	  focus	  of	  security	  community	  literature	  has	  been	  on	  the	  interactions	  and	  processes	  between	  the	  states	  within	  the	  community,	  this	  thesis	  builds	  on	  this	  concept	  to	  understand	  how	  security	  communities	  respond	  to	  external	  threats.	  Constructivist	  theory	  posits	  that	  national	  interests	  are	  formed	  through	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction:	  “transactions	  and	  interactions…generate	  reciprocity,	  new	  forms	  of	  trust,	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  interests,	  and	  even	  collective	  identities.”25	  Thus	  through	  their	  interactions	  and	  transactions	  states	  within	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  have	  developed	  similar	  conceptions	  of	  their	  broad	  national	  interests,	  and	  therefore	  take	  similar	  approaches	  to	  protecting	  or	  promoting	  these	  interests	  outside	  of	  the	  community	  as	  much	  as	  within.	  	  The	  common	  national	  security	  interests	  of	  communities	  of	  states	  are	  often	  defended	  by	  collective	  or	  cooperative	  security	  arrangements.	  Multilateral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  "Governing	  Anarchy:	  A	  Research	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Security	  Communities,"	  Ethics	  and	  
International	  Affairs	  10(1996):	  73.	  23	  Adler	  and	  Barnett,	  Security	  Communities,	  3.	  24	  Adler,	  "Imagined	  (Security)	  Communities:	  Cognitive	  Regions	  in	  International	  Relations,"	  254.	  25	  Adler	  and	  Barnett,	  Security	  Communities,	  14.	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institutions	  are	  a	  way	  to	  formalize	  collective	  or	  cooperative	  security	  arrangements,	  and	  “can	  help	  diffuse	  and	  internalize	  norms	  and	  knowledge	  about	  how	  to	  peacefully	  resolve	  conflict	  –	  the	  norms	  and	  knowledge	  which	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  security	  communities	  –	  that	  can	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  these	  communities.”26	  The	  Western	  security	  community	  has	  been	  reified	  through	  widespread	  membership	  of	  and	  affiliation	  with	  collective	  security	  organizations	  like	  NATO.	  In	  addition,	  collective	  historical	  experiences	  can	  bind	  states	  into	  a	  security	  community.	  British	  hegemony	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  American	  hegemony	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  number	  of	  states	  who	  feel	  they	  share	  historical	  experiences	  and	  culture.	  Through	  continuous	  interaction	  and	  exchange,	  including	  on	  a	  military	  level,	  members	  of	  the	  community	  “may	  gain	  the	  ability	  to	  more	  or	  less	  predict	  one	  another’s	  behavior	  and	  come	  to	  know	  each	  other	  as	  trustworthy,”27	  resulting,	  among	  other	  things,	  in	  increased	  interoperability	  at	  the	  military	  level.	  	  NATO	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  major	  institutional	  framework	  binding	  and	  identifying	  states	  within	  the	  Western	  security	  community,	  who	  are	  all	  either	  members	  or	  partners	  of	  the	  organization.28	  While	  realists	  might	  see	  the	  alliance	  as	  “an	  institutional	  solution	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  multifaceted	  set	  of	  threats	  and	  risks,”29	  within	  the	  security	  community	  context	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  shared	  values	  built	  on	  “mutual	  sympathy,	  trust,	  and	  consideration,”30	  and	  reflective	  of	  a	  political	  culture	  of	  liberal	  democracy.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  foundation	  is	  reflected	  in	  NATO’s	  approach	  to	  adding	  members	  and	  partners:	  emphasizing	  that	  states	  are	  inducted	  first	  and	  foremost	  into	  a	  community	  of	  shared	  values,	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  collective	  security	  arrangement.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  New	  Zealand,	  which	  became	  an	  official	  NATO	  partner	  in	  2012,	  participating	  in	  NATO-­‐led	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  demonstrate	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Adler,	  "Imagined	  (Security)	  Communities:	  Cognitive	  Regions	  in	  International	  Relations,"	  250.	  27	  Ibid.,	  254.	  28	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  EU	  member	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cyprus.	  The	  Island’s	  disputed	  status	  and	  Turkey’s	  refusal	  to	  recognize	  the	  (southern)	  Republic	  of	  Cyprus	  has	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  Cyprus	  to	  join	  NATO.	  Judy	  Dempsey,	  "Between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  NATO,	  Many	  Walls,"	  	  The	  
New	  York	  Times(2010),	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/europe/25iht-­‐letter.html?_r=0.	  29	  Hellmann	  et	  al.,	  "The	  West:	  A	  Securitising	  Community?,"	  372.	  30	  Thomas	  Risse-­‐Kappen,	  "Collective	  Identity	  in	  a	  Democratic	  Community:	  The	  Case	  of	  NATO,"	  
The	  culture	  of	  national	  security:	  Norms	  and	  identity	  in	  world	  politics	  (1996):	  368.	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common	  values	  to	  the	  organization.	  Having	  shared	  values	  and	  norms	  is	  not	  only	  an	  important	  element	  of	  NATO	  membership,	  but	  also	  of	  security	  community	  membership.	  	  Until	  the	  1990s,	  the	  UN	  was	  seen	  by	  most	  states	  as	  the	  primary	  legitimate	  vehicle	  for	  responding	  to	  the	  breakdown	  of	  peace	  and	  security,	  as	  there	  were	  few	  other	  institutions	  or	  organizations	  taking	  on	  neutral	  peacekeeping	  roles.	  NATO’s	  raison	  d’être	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  the	  containment	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  which	  precluded	  it	  from	  taking	  on	  any	  kind	  of	  peace	  enforcement	  role.	  However	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  NATO	  mounted	  its	  first	  peace	  support	  operation	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  the	  UN-­‐mandated	  Implementation	  Force	  (IFOR)	  made	  up	  on	  60,000	  troops.	  Since	  then	  NATO	  has	  continued	  to	  conduct	  crisis	  management	  operations,	  providing	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  with	  a	  mechanism	  for	  more	  robust	  responses	  to	  conflict.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  taking	  on	  a	  peace	  enforcement	  role,	  since	  9/11	  NATO	  has	  replaced	  its	  geographical	  understanding	  of	  security	  with	  a	  functional	  one,	  allowing	  it	  to	  conduct	  operations	  outside	  of	  its	  traditional	  space	  (Europe	  and	  North	  America).	  The	  NATO-­‐led	  operation	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  functional	  expansion.	  Western	  states	  rallied	  to	  the	  cause,	  feeling	  that	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  attacks	  and	  Taliban	  activities	  were	  a	  threat	  not	  only	  to	  their	  security,	  but	  also	  to	  Western	  values.	  Constructivist	  arguments	  contend	  that	  it	  is	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  NATO	  members	  and	  key	  partners	  like	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Japan	  (i.e.	  the	  West)	  that	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  collective	  threats,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.31	  Essentially	  by	  being	  part	  of	  the	  security	  community	  and	  assuming	  the	  community’s	  collective	  identity,	  a	  state	  not	  only	  has	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  community,	  but	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  threats	  it	  faces.	  This	  argument	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  West	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  reacted	  in	  relative	  concert	  to	  terrorist	  threats	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  –	  because	  these	  threats	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  directed	  against	  the	  entire	  Western	  security	  community.	  Terrorist	  attacks	  in	  the	  US,	  UK	  and	  against	  Westerners	  around	  the	  world	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Cooperation	  among	  Democracies:	  The	  European	  Influence	  on	  US	  Foreign	  Policy(Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  32.	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reshaped	  the	  security	  priorities	  of	  Western	  states.	  As	  a	  result,	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  has	  become	  a	  much	  lower	  priority	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  The	  shifting	  security	  environment	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  seen	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  the	  West	  chooses	  to	  contribute	  troops	  to	  peace	  support	  operations.	  That	  and	  other	  factors	  that	  have	  brought	  about	  the	  decline	  in	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  from	  the	  West	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  however	  it	  is	  ultimately	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  (involving	  shared	  values,	  norms,	  and	  trust	  in	  each	  other),	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  their	  similar	  approaches	  to	  maintaining	  and	  restoring	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  	  	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature	  The	  decline	  specifically	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  academic	  literature.	  Where	  the	  decline	  in	  Western	  peacekeeping	  troops	  has	  been	  recognized,	  it	  is	  usually	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  examination	  of	  top	  or	  emerging	  contributors,32	  or	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  normative	  implications	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  that	  has	  occurred	  between	  financial	  contributors	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  troop-­‐contributing	  countries.33	  Some	  scholars	  have	  used	  the	  available	  data	  on	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  to	  outline	  the	  demographic	  trends	  that	  have	  emerged	  in	  peacekeeping	  contributions,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Danielle	  Beswick,	  "Peacekeeping,	  Regime	  Security	  and	  ‘African	  Solutions	  to	  African	  Problems’:	  Exploring	  Motivations	  for	  Rwanda's	  Involvement	  in	  Darfur,"	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  31,	  no.	  5	  (2010);	  Katharina	  P.	  Coleman,	  "Innovations	  in	  'African	  Solutions	  to	  African	  Problems':	  The	  Evolving	  Practice	  of	  Regional	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  African	  
Studies	  49,	  no.	  4	  (2011);	  Kabilan	  Krishnasamy,	  "Pakistan's	  Peacekeeping	  Experiences,"	  
International	  Peacekeeping	  9,	  no.	  3	  (2002);	  Marc	  Lanteigne	  and	  Miwa	  Hirono,	  China's	  Evolving	  
Approach	  to	  Peacekeeping(New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012);	  Theo	  Neethling,	  "International	  Peacekeeping	  Trends:	  The	  Significance	  of	  African	  Contributions	  to	  African	  Peacekeeping	  Requirements,"	  Politikon	  31,	  no.	  1	  (2004);	  Alan	  Bullion,	  "India	  and	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Operations,"	  
International	  Peacekeeping	  4,	  no.	  1	  (1997);	  Kabilan	  Krishnasamy,	  "The	  Paradox	  of	  India's	  Peacekeeping,"	  Contemporary	  South	  Asia	  12,	  no.	  2	  (2003);	  Wu	  Zhengyu	  and	  Ian	  Taylor,	  "From	  Refusal	  to	  Engagement:	  Chinese	  Contributions	  to	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Africa,"	  Journal	  of	  
Contemporary	  African	  Studies	  29,	  no.	  2	  (2011);	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams,	  Providing	  
Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  
Contributions(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  33	  Philip	  Cunliffe,	  Legions	  of	  Peace:	  UN	  Peacekeepers	  from	  the	  Global	  South(London:	  Hurst	  Publishers,	  2014);	  Sharon	  Wiharta,	  Neil	  Melvin,	  and	  Xenia	  Avezov,	  "The	  New	  Geopolitics	  of	  Peace	  Operations,"(Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute,	  2012).	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have	  not	  offered	  any	  theoretical	  explanations	  for	  why	  these	  trends	  have	  occurred.34	  Most	  of	  this	  literature	  tends	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  the	  political,	  economic,	  security,	  institutional	  and	  normative	  factors	  that	  motivate	  or	  inhibit	  countries	  from	  contributing	  troops	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations.35	  Case	  studies	  of	  Western	  contributors	  have	  been	  lacking	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  with	  a	  notable	  exception	  being	  the	  International	  Peace	  Institute’s	  ‘Providing	  for	  Peacekeeping	  Project’.	  This	  project	  has	  made	  some	  progress	  in	  examining	  Western	  contributors	  by	  compiling	  profiles	  of	  troop-­‐contributors	  outlining	  recent	  trends,	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  rationales	  for	  and	  barriers	  to	  contributing,	  current	  challenges	  and	  issues,	  key	  champions	  and	  opponents,	  and	  capabilities	  and	  caveats	  of	  troop	  contributions.36	  	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  have	  produced	  significant	  work	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions,	  with	  a	  primary	  focus	  on	  the	  rationales	  and	  inhibitors	  behind	  countries’	  decisions	  to	  contribute	  or	  not	  contribute,	  and	  the	  UN’s	  push	  to	  broaden	  the	  troop-­‐contributing	  base.	  37	  Their	  book	  Providing	  
Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  
Contributions	  provides	  excellent	  insights,	  however	  case	  studies	  are	  of	  countries	  who	  already	  contribute	  significant	  numbers	  of	  troops	  and	  the	  five	  permanent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Donald	  C.F.;	  Taft	  Daniel,	  Patricia;	  Wiharta,	  Sharon,	  Peace	  Operations:	  Trends,	  Progress,	  and	  
Prospects(Georgetown:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Birger	  Heldt,	  "Trends	  from	  1948	  to	  2005:	  How	  to	  View	  the	  Relation	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  Non-­‐UN	  Entities,"	  in	  Peace	  
Operations:	  Trends,	  Progress,	  and	  Prospects,	  ed.	  Donald	  C.F.;	  Taft	  Daniel,	  Patricia;	  Wiharta,	  Sharon(Georgetown:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Neethling,	  "International	  Peacekeeping	  Trends:	  The	  Significance	  of	  African	  Contributions	  to	  African	  Peacekeeping	  Requirements.";	  Perry,	  "New	  Dataset	  Shows	  Trends	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping";	  Chris;	  Smith	  Perry,	  Adam,	  "Trends	  in	  Uniformed	  Contributions	  to	  UN	  Peacekeeping:	  A	  New	  Dataset,	  1991–2012,"	  in	  
Providing	  Peacekeepers	  No.	  3(New	  York:	  International	  Peace	  Institute,	  2013).	  35	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  Providing	  Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  
Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions;	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,"	  in	  Providing	  Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  
Peacekeeping	  Contributions(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Davis	  B.	  Bobrow	  and	  Mark	  A.	  Boyer,	  "Maintaining	  System	  Stability:	  Contributions	  to	  Peacekeeping	  Operations,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Conflict	  Resolution	  41,	  no.	  6	  (1997);	  Vincenzo	  Bove	  and	  Leandro	  Elia,	  "Supplying	  Peace:	  Participation	  in	  and	  Troop	  Contribution	  to	  Peacekeeping	  Missions,"	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	  48,	  no.	  6	  (2011);	  Laura	  Neack,	  "UN	  Peace-­‐Keeping:	  In	  the	  Interest	  of	  Community	  or	  Self?,"	  ibid.32,	  no.	  2	  (1995);	  Wiharta,	  Melvin,	  and	  Avezov,	  "The	  New	  Geopolitics	  of	  Peace	  Operations."	  36	  "Providing	  for	  Peacekeeping,"	  International	  Peace	  Institute,	  http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/.	  37	  Providing	  Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  
Contributions;	  "Broadening	  the	  Base	  of	  United	  Nations	  Troop-­‐	  and	  Police-­‐Contributing	  Countries,"	  in	  Providing	  Peacekeepers	  No.1(New	  York:	  International	  Peace	  Institute).	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members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  Although	  the	  authors	  acknowledge	  the	  downward	  trend	  in	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  from	  the	  West	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  contributions	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  overarching	  argument	  put	  forth	  in	  this	  work	  is	  that	  all	  countries	  approach	  this	  issue	  from	  a	  different	  perspective,	  largely	  influenced	  by	  their	  individual	  strategic	  cultures.	  38	  Whereas	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams’	  work	  is	  useful	  for	  understanding	  the	  differences	  between	  contributors,	  this	  thesis	  acknowledges	  these	  differences	  but	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  
similarities	  between	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  contributors.	  	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  have	  also	  authored	  one	  of	  the	  only	  articles	  focusing	  on	  the	  West	  and	  contemporary	  peace	  operations,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  troop	  contributions.	  39	  However	  this	  article	  is	  more	  descriptive	  than	  analytical	  in	  its	  exploration	  of	  troop	  contribution	  trends,	  and	  does	  not	  suggest	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  with	  which	  to	  contextualize	  trends	  in	  Western	  contribution	  patterns.	  They	  do,	  however,	  note	  the	  important	  role	  played	  by	  other	  multilateral	  peacekeeping	  institutions,	  such	  as	  NATO,	  in	  competing	  for	  Western	  troop	  contributions.	  In	  the	  following	  chapters	  the	  role	  that	  regional	  organizations	  and	  alliances,	  especially	  NATO,	  have	  had	  in	  changing	  peacekeeping	  troop	  demographics	  will	  be	  discussed.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  also	  unique	  in	  its	  examination	  of	  two	  reputed	  internationalists	  whose	  former	  commitment	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  has	  waned.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Canada,	  although	  some	  academics	  have	  tackled	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  country’s	  UN	  troop	  contribution	  decrease,	  most	  have	  looked	  primarily	  at	  domestic	  concerns	  and	  factors	  leading	  to	  the	  decline,	  and	  not	  considered	  how	  this	  issue	  fits	  into	  a	  greater	  Western	  trend.40	  In	  New	  Zealand	  there	  has	  been	  considerably	  less	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions."	  39	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations."	  40	  Duane	  Bratt,	  "Niche‐Making	  and	  Canadian	  Peacekeeping,"	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy	  Journal	  6,	  no.	  3	  (1999);	  Michael	  Byers,	  "After	  Afghanistan:	  Canada's	  Return	  to	  UN	  Peacekeeping,"	  Canadian	  
Military	  Journal	  13,	  no.	  1	  (2013);	  Jocelyn	  Coulon,	  Michel	  Liégeois,	  and	  Canadian	  Defence,	  
Whatever	  Happened	  to	  Peacekeeping?:	  The	  Future	  of	  a	  Tradition(Canadian	  Defence	  &	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Institute,	  2010);	  A.	  Walter	  Dorn,	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy	  Journal	  12,	  no.	  2	  (2005);	  Walter	  Dorn,	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  A	  Proud	  Tradition,"	  Peace	  Magazine,	  Jul-­‐Sep	  2006;	  Edgar,	  "Canada's	  Changing	  Participation	  in	  International	  Peacekeeping	  and	  Peace	  Enforcement:	  What,	  If	  Anything,	  Does	  It	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discussion	  surrounding	  the	  decline	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  contributions,	  although	  it	  has	  been	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  last	  year	  in	  policy	  and	  academic	  circles,	  and	  in	  the	  media,41	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  country’s	  successful	  2015-­‐2016	  Security	  Council	  bid.	  There	  has	  been	  little	  analysis	  of	  the	  domestic	  factors	  and	  attitudes	  contributing	  to	  this	  decline,42	  and	  no	  discussion	  of	  how	  New	  Zealand’s	  choices	  on	  this	  issue	  are	  influenced	  by	  international	  relations.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  fill	  these	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  	  By	  examining	  Canadian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  peacekeeping	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  general	  decline	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  this	  thesis	  provides	  an	  original	  perspective	  on	  the	  issue.	  These	  two	  cases	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  completely	  understand	  the	  behavior	  of	  all	  Western	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  UN	  troop	  contributions,	  as	  every	  country’s	  reasons	  for	  contributing	  are	  molded	  by	  a	  myriad	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  factors.	  They	  can	  however,	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  why	  despite	  the	  different	  motivations	  and	  inhibitions	  every	  troop	  contributor	  or	  potential	  troop	  contributor	  has,	  troop	  contributions	  from	  Western	  countries	  have	  followed	  a	  similar	  trajectory.	  This	  thesis	  is	  unique	  in	  using	  specific	  cases	  as	  a	  means	  to	  explore	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  contextualizing	  the	  systemic	  decline	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mean?.";	  Martin	  Fischer	  and	  Maria	  Derks	  Normandin,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  Canada,"	  	  Providing	  
For	  Peacekeeping(2013),	  www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/;	  Martin	  Patriquin,	  "'Bogus'	  Peacekeeping?	  It	  Wasn't	  Long	  Ago	  That	  Ignatieff	  Had	  Harsh	  Words	  for	  Canada,"	  
Maclean's,	  27	  July	  2009;	  Brian	  Stewart,	  "Time	  for	  Canada	  to	  Get	  Back	  to	  Peacekeeping,"	  (2012),	  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brian-­‐stewart-­‐time-­‐for-­‐canada-­‐to-­‐get-­‐back-­‐to-­‐peacekeeping-­‐1.1223081.	  41	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review,"	  ed.	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Police(Wellington2013);	  Radio	  New	  Zealand	  News,	  "NZ	  Advised	  to	  Contribute	  More	  to	  UN	  Missions,"	  (2013),	  http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/135789/nz-­‐advised-­‐to-­‐contribute-­‐more-­‐to-­‐un-­‐missions;	  "More	  Peacekeeping	  Missions	  Advocated,"	  (2014),	  http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/247457/more-­‐peacekeeping-­‐missions-­‐advocated.	  42	  The	  exception	  being	  Dr.	  Bethan	  Greener,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  New	  Zealand,"	  	  Providing	  For	  
Peacekeeping(2013),	  www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/profiles/.	  This	  profile	  outlines	  recent	  trends	  in	  New	  Zealand	  troop	  contributions,	  rationales	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  for	  contributing,	  and	  challenges	  and	  issues	  associated	  with	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	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Research	  Methodology	  	  This	  research	  relied	  heavily	  on	  UN	  and	  national	  military	  data	  to	  review	  and	  illustrate	  trends	  in	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  and	  to	  understand	  countries’	  levels	  of	  commitment.	  One	  of	  the	  greatest	  problems	  with	  data	  on	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  presented	  by	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  organizations,	  and	  with	  the	  analysis	  offered	  by	  academics	  based	  on	  this	  data,	  is	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  rank	  contributing	  countries	  based	  on	  the	  aggregate	  number	  of	  troops	  they	  have	  provided,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  contribution	  relative	  to	  each	  country’s	  standing	  capabilities.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  contributor	  with	  a	  200,000	  strong	  military	  that	  contributes	  10,000	  peacekeepers	  is	  actually	  contributing	  less	  of	  its	  available	  capacity	  than	  a	  contributor	  with	  a	  15,000	  strong	  military	  that	  deploys	  1,000	  peacekeepers.	  UN	  rankings	  would	  rank	  the	  latter	  country	  as	  a	  lower	  contributor	  than	  the	  former,	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  far	  easier	  to	  present	  data	  based	  on	  aggregate	  numbers	  than	  to	  calculate	  the	  percentage	  of	  national	  forces	  dedicated	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations	  for	  every	  troop	  contributor.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  major	  and	  complex	  exercise	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  provide	  statistics	  based	  on	  the	  percentage	  of	  national	  forces	  dedicated	  to	  peacekeeping,	  and	  would	  require	  each	  contributor	  to	  submit	  data	  on	  the	  size	  of	  their	  armed	  forces.	  However,	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  troop	  contributions,	  academics	  should	  at	  the	  very	  least	  make	  this	  observation,	  and	  consider	  if	  and	  how	  looking	  at	  contributions	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  national	  military	  capabilities	  could	  benefit	  their	  research.	  When	  looking	  at	  percentages	  or	  total	  numbers	  of	  national	  armed	  forces	  provided	  to	  peacekeeping	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  total	  commitment	  of	  a	  country	  is	  in	  reality	  usually	  three	  times	  larger;	  for	  each	  unit	  deployed,	  another	  is	  in	  pre-­‐deployment	  mode,	  and	  another	  has	  just	  returned	  from	  deployment.	  	  This	  thesis	  focused	  on	  troop	  deployments	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  explore	  at	  length	  the	  other	  types	  of	  contributions	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  efforts	  countries	  make.	  Training	  and	  capacity	  building,	  fighting	  organized	  crime,	  arms,	  drug	  and	  people	  smuggling	  are	  all	  useful	  efforts	  that	  contribute	  to	  preventing	  or	  managing	  conflict,	  however	  the	  efficacy	  of	  these	  measures	  is	  not	  easily	  quantifiable.	  In	  addition,	  while	  some	  states	  have	  the	  technology,	  capacity	  and	  resources	  to	  provide	  these	  alternative	  efforts,	  many	  do	  not.	  What	  makes	  
	   15	  
troop	  contributions	  politically	  significant	  is	  that	  any	  country	  with	  armed	  forces	  can	  make	  one,	  but	  it	  requires	  a	  government’s	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  lives	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  its	  armed	  forces	  to	  protect	  civilians	  and	  keep	  the	  peace	  in	  a	  foreign	  conflict.	  This	  sacrifice	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  non-­‐combat	  contributions.	  Although	  the	  concentration	  of	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐troop	  contributions	  that	  countries	  make,	  the	  focus	  on	  troop	  contributions	  is	  a	  more	  effective	  and	  realistic	  benchmark	  for	  comparing	  commitment	  to	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  conflict	  management.	  	  In	  addition,	  while	  police	  contributions	  are	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  this	  thesis	  and	  the	  data	  provided	  focus	  solely	  on	  military	  personnel	  –	  contingent	  troops,	  and	  military	  experts,	  including	  observers.	  The	  UN’s	  process	  of	  generating	  formed	  police	  units	  and	  individual	  police	  is	  separate	  from	  its	  military	  force	  generation	  process,	  and	  in	  many	  countries	  the	  procedures	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  for	  contributing	  police	  are	  different	  as	  well.	  Police	  also	  make	  up	  a	  significantly	  smaller	  portion	  of	  personnel	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  and	  several	  missions	  don’t	  have	  any	  police	  at	  all.43	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  police	  contributions	  from	  the	  West	  have	  followed	  similar	  patterns	  as	  troop	  contributions;	  however	  excluding	  police	  contributions	  from	  this	  research	  has	  allowed	  this	  thesis	  to	  remain	  cohesive	  and	  concise.	  	  	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  research	  processes	  for	  the	  two	  case	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  differed	  in	  their	  approach.	  Given	  its	  illustrious	  and	  well-­‐documented	  history	  as	  a	  peacekeeper,	  there	  is	  substantial	  scholarly	  work	  about	  Canada’s	  peacekeeping	  involvement	  and	  troop	  contributions,	  particularly	  from	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s.	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  conversely,	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  have	  not	  received	  as	  much	  scholarly	  or	  media	  attention.	  However	  given	  that	  this	  research	  was	  conducted	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  a	  number	  of	  military	  and	  government	  officials	  familiar	  with	  the	  issue	  were	  interviewed	  and	  consulted.	  Members	  of	  the	  academic	  community	  also	  provided	  useful	  insights	  into	  New	  Zealand’s	  peacekeeping	  past	  and	  present.	  The	  research	  for	  this	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  United	  Nations,	  "United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	  and	  Police	  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard";	  United	  Nations,	  "UN	  Police:	  Sustainable	  Peace	  through	  Justice	  and	  Security,"	  	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/index.shtml.	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was,	  therefore,	  based	  on	  more	  primary	  sources	  than	  the	  research	  for	  the	  Canada	  case	  study,	  and	  although	  both	  cases	  have	  received	  thorough	  coverage	  and	  analysis	  in	  this	  thesis,	  given	  the	  difference	  in	  research	  methods,	  the	  presentation	  and	  analysis	  of	  these	  cases	  differs	  slightly.	  	  A	  final	  note	  is	  that	  although	  the	  UN	  is	  not	  the	  only	  organization	  conducting	  peacekeeping	  operations,	  operations	  conducted	  by	  NATO	  and	  Western	  coalitions	  often	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  peacekeeping	  per	  se.	  They	  may,	  however,	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  peace	  enforcement,	  or	  peace	  support	  operations,	  and	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  such	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Although	  the	  ultimate	  goals	  of	  wider	  peace	  support	  operations	  may	  not	  differ	  greatly	  from	  those	  of	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  their	  means	  do;	  the	  three	  basic	  principles	  of	  peacekeeping	  –	  consent	  of	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict,	  impartiality,	  and	  non-­‐use	  of	  force	  except	  in	  self-­‐defence	  and	  defence	  of	  mandate	  –	  are	  often	  all	  or	  partially	  lacking	  in	  non-­‐UN	  peace	  support	  operations.	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Chapter	  1	  Why	  the	  West	  Won’t	  Contribute	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  outline	  the	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions,	  and	  explore	  a	  set	  of	  possible	  arguments	  for	  why	  the	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West	  has	  occurred.	  Although	  these	  factors	  have	  undoubtedly	  driven	  the	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  to	  some	  extent,	  when	  considered	  within	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  systemic	  decline	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  can	  begin	  to	  be	  understood.	  Some	  of	  these	  arguments	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  studies	  explored	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  and	  facilitate	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  individual	  Western	  states	  are	  affected	  by	  wider	  troop	  peacekeeping	  trends.	  	  Overview	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  there	  was	  a	  divide	  in	  the	  West	  between	  the	  Western	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  P3:	  US,	  UK	  and	  France)	  who	  largely	  abstained	  from	  contributing	  troops	  to	  peacekeeping	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  organization’s	  commitment	  to	  neutrality,44	  and	  Western	  countries	  actively	  participating	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  However,	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  in	  particular	  the	  P3,	  contributed	  significant	  troops	  and	  equipment	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  Cambodia,	  Bosnia,	  Somalia	  and	  Latin	  America.	  The	  divide	  between	  the	  countries	  that	  had	  been	  devoted	  contributors	  for	  decades	  and	  the	  P3,	  who	  had	  been	  kept	  out	  of	  peacekeeping	  for	  fear	  they	  would	  use	  it	  as	  a	  tool	  pursue	  national	  interest,	  began	  to	  erode.	  However	  even	  when	  the	  P3	  were	  making	  considerable	  contributions	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  the	  1990s,	  their	  contributions	  tended	  to	  be	  made	  to	  regions	  in	  which	  they	  had	  political	  or	  strategic	  interests,45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations."	  45	  Adam	  C.	  Smith,	  "United	  States	  of	  America,"	  in	  Providing	  Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  
and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,	  ed.	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Paul	  D.	  Williams,	  "The	  United	  Kingdom,"	  in	  
Providing	  Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Futue	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  
Contributions,	  ed.	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Thierry	  Tardy,	  "France,"	  in	  Providing	  Peacekeeping:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  
Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,	  ed.	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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whereas	  other	  Western	  countries,	  particularly	  those	  with	  a	  strong	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  contributed	  to	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations,	  both	  geographically	  and	  politically.	  But	  as	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West	  began	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  major	  powers’	  troop	  contribution	  patterns	  and	  those	  of	  other	  Western	  countries	  faded	  even	  further.	  	   	  The	  decline	  in	  contributions	  from	  Western	  internationalists,	  such	  as	  Canada,	  New	  Zealand,	  Ireland	  and	  the	  Scandinavian	  states,	  may	  seem	  surprising	  as	  for	  decades	  they	  had	  made	  consistent	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  shown	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  Organization’s	  principles.	  However	  Adler	  and	  Barnett	  contend	  that	  the	  norms,	  identities	  and	  interests	  of	  a	  security	  community	  are	  often	  driven	  by	  its	  more	  powerful	  members:	  “power	  can	  be	  a	  magnet;	  in	  a	  community	  formed	  around	  a	  group	  of	  strong	  powers,	  weaker	  members	  will	  expect	  to	  share	  the	  security	  and	  (potentially)	  other	  benefits	  associated	  with	  the	  stronger	  ones.”46	  Although	  the	  P3	  did	  not	  contribute	  troops	  in	  great	  numbers	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  they	  were	  supportive	  of	  countries	  that	  did,	  and	  contributed	  to	  these	  operations	  in	  other	  ways,	  without	  diverting	  contributions	  to	  non-­‐UN	  peace	  operations.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  is	  that	  Western	  great	  powers	  are	  not	  only	  no	  longer	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  they	  have	  also	  established	  other	  mechanisms	  for	  conflict	  management	  and	  protection	  of	  national	  interests,	  such	  as	  coalition	  and	  NATO	  peace	  support	  operations.	  These	  stronger	  members	  of	  the	  community	  inevitably	  drew	  the	  ‘weaker’	  states	  (including	  those	  that	  had	  been	  heavily	  committed	  to	  UN	  conflict	  management	  mechanisms)	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping	  as	  their	  strategic	  priorities	  changed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  "Governing	  Anarchy:	  A	  Research	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Security	  Communities,"	  83.	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conceptualization	  of	  conflict	  resulted	  in	  significant	  troop	  contributions	  from	  Western	  countries	  to	  what	  were	  originally	  humanitarian	  focused	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  during	  the	  1990s	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Somalia,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  Rwanda.	  The	  harrowing	  experiences	  of	  Western	  peacekeepers	  in	  these	  operations	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  has	  deterred	  Western	  countries	  from	  contributing	  large	  numbers	  of	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  since:49	  “States	  are	  often	  concerned	  about	  damaging	  their	  reputation	  by	  deploying	  troops	  to	  operations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  fail.	  Negative	  experiences	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Belgium	  in	  Rwanda,	  the	  Netherlands	  in	  Srebrenica,	  and	  the	  UK	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  have	  made	  some	  states	  more	  risk	  averse	  with	  regards	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.”50	  
 It	  may	  seem	  counterintuitive	  that	  deploying	  peacekeepers	  through	  a	  multilateral	  organization	  could	  be	  detrimental	  to	  a	  country’s	  standing	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  however	  many	  Western	  contributors	  are	  haunted	  by	  these	  past	  UN	  operations	  and	  the	  negative	  impact	  they	  have	  had	  on	  their	  reputation	  as	  peacekeepers,	  or	  on	  the	  government’s	  domestic	  popularity.	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  Western	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  declined	  after	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  had	  made	  large	  troop	  contributions	  to	  notoriously	  ineffective	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  Somalia	  and	  Rwanda	  during	  the	  1990s	  (see	  Figure	  1.1).	  The	  political	  and	  military	  impotence	  imposed	  on	  troops	  by	  ineffectual	  mandates	  also	  curbed	  domestic	  appetites	  for	  peacekeeping	  involvement	  and	  in	  many	  cases,	  increased	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  UN	  in	  military	  establishments	  and	  among	  policymakers.51	  Allegations	  of	  human	  trafficking,	  torture,	  rape	  and	  other	  human	  rights	  violations	  have	  plagued	  troop-­‐contributing	  countries,	  particularly	  during	  the	  1990s,	  causing	  many	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  reputational	  risk	  of	  participating	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  	  Some	  Western	  contributors	  also	  suffered	  from	  body	  bag	  syndrome,	  finding	  that	  domestic	  support	  for	  peace	  operations	  dropped	  dramatically	  when	  fatalities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Coulon,	  Liégeois,	  and	  Canadian	  Defence,	  Whatever	  Happened	  to	  Peacekeeping?:	  The	  Future	  of	  a	  
Tradition;	  Fischer	  and	  Derks	  Normandin,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  Canada";	  Jaïr	  van	  der	  Lijn	  and	  Stefanie	  Ros,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  The	  Netherlands,"	  ibid.(2012).	  50	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,"	  420.	  51	  Ibid.	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occurred.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  United	  States	  after	  the	  ill-­‐fated	  “Black	  Hawk	  Down”	  incident	  when	  18	  US	  soldiers	  operating	  with	  the	  UN	  Operation	  in	  Somalia	  (UNOSOM	  II)	  were	  killed.	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  argue	  that	  for	  some	  countries	  the	  risk	  of	  incurring	  casualties	  is	  a	  major	  consideration	  when	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  contribute	  to	  peace	  operations,	  as	  casualties	  may	  not	  be	  tolerated	  for	  operations	  that	  are	  not	  associated	  with	  national	  defence	  or	  core	  security	  interests.52	  “In	  theory,	  this	  makes	  it	  politically	  risky	  for	  leaders	  to	  provide	  more	  UN	  peacekeepers.	  In	  practice,	  it	  often	  means	  that	  the	  question	  of	  contributing	  more	  is	  not	  seriously	  raised	  and	  debated.”53	  The	  influential	  role	  the	  media	  can	  play	  in	  disseminating	  this	  kind	  of	  information	  and	  shaping	  public	  reactions	  to	  it	  has	  prompted	  many	  governments	  to	  consider	  what	  the	  media	  response	  to	  casualties	  might	  be	  before	  committing	  to	  contribute	  troops.54	  	  The	  ghosts	  of	  peacekeeping	  operations	  past	  have	  had	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  UN	  peacekeeping	  within	  the	  military	  establishments	  of	  many	  Western	  countries,	  with	  antipathy	  towards	  UN	  peacekeeping	  burgeoning	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s.55	  In	  many	  Western	  militaries,	  including	  the	  US,	  Canada,	  France	  and	  the	  UK,	  overt	  resistance	  to	  peacekeeping	  persists,	  stemming	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  UN	  command	  and	  control	  structures	  and	  unsuitable	  mandates.	  In	  addition,	  after	  that	  period	  of	  intense	  peacekeeping	  activity	  some	  countries	  feared	  that	  continuous	  training	  and	  deployment	  of	  armed	  forces	  to	  peacekeeping	  would	  detract	  from	  their	  ability	  to	  conduct	  high-­‐tempo	  combat	  operations.	  As	  former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  famously	  put	  it	  with	  reference	  to	  peacekeeping	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  “We	  don’t	  need	  to	  have	  the	  82nd	  Airborne	  escorting	  kids	  to	  kindergarten.”56	  Some	  militaries	  that	  had	  been	  heavily	  involved	  in	  peacekeeping	  during	  the	  1990s	  felt	  ill	  prepared	  for	  the	  operational	  environment	  they	  encountered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  NATO-­‐led	  International	  Security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Bove	  and	  Elia,	  "Supplying	  Peace:	  Participation	  in	  and	  Troop	  Contribution	  to	  Peacekeeping	  Missions.";	  Lawrence	  Freedman,	  "Using	  Force	  for	  Peace	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Terror,"	  in	  Leashing	  the	  Dogs	  
of	  War:	  Conflict	  Management	  in	  a	  Divided	  World,	  ed.	  Chester	  A.	  Crocker,	  Fen	  Olser	  Hampson,	  and	  Pamela	  Aall(Washington,	  D.C.:	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  Press,	  2007).	  53	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,"	  20.	  54	  In	  New	  Zealand	  this	  is	  informally	  referred	  to	  by	  officials	  as	  ‘The	  Dominion	  Post	  test’,	  referring	  to	  a	  major	  newspaper	  circulated	  in	  the	  capital	  city,	  Wellington.	  55	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions."	  56	  Quoted	  in	  Michael	  R.	  Gordon,	  "The	  2000	  Campaign:	  The	  Military;	  Bush	  Would	  Stop	  US	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Balkan	  Fights,"	  New	  York	  Times	  21(2000).	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Assistance	  Force	  (ISAF)	  in	  Afghanistan.57	  Critics	  of	  peacekeeping	  also	  point	  to	  other	  detrimental	  consequences	  of	  peacekeeping:	  “less	  funds	  spent	  on	  weapons	  systems	  needed	  for	  fighting	  wars;	  less	  time	  for	  combat	  training;	  dependency	  on	  the	  UN’s	  ad	  hoc	  system	  of	  deployment;	  fewer	  links	  to	  their	  NATO	  colleagues.”58	  As	  a	  result,	  most	  Western	  militaries	  have	  no	  internal	  incentives	  for	  participating	  in	  peacekeeping.	  Even	  militaries	  that	  do	  not	  have	  an	  overt	  aversion	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  may	  not	  have	  factored	  UN	  peacekeeping	  into	  their	  internal	  rewards	  system,	  removing	  any	  career	  incentive	  for	  becoming	  a	  peacekeeper.59	  	  Exceptionalism	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  also	  contend	  that	  the	  ‘Politics	  of	  Exceptionalism’	  is	  another	  factor	  that	  has	  inhibited	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  motivated	  countries	  to	  establish	  alternatives	  mechanisms.	  This	  “influential	  strand	  of	  exceptionalism	  promotes	  a	  self-­‐image	  of	  possessing	  unique	  interests,	  responsibilities,	  capabilities,	  and/or	  perspectives.”	  As	  such	  “These	  states	  tend	  to	  see	  UN	  peacekeeping	  as	  somebody	  else’s	  job,	  or	  in	  instrumental	  terms	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  tool,	  a	  vehicle	  for	  advancing	  regional	  and	  global	  interests,	  or	  as	  a	  means	  of	  supporting	  diplomatic/peacemaking	  activities.”60	  States	  that	  cultivate	  this	  kind	  of	  self-­‐image	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  other	  institutions	  and	  mechanisms	  as	  viable	  conflict	  management	  options,	  and	  to	  be	  highly	  selective	  about	  where	  and	  how	  they	  do	  contribute	  to	  UN	  missions.61	  Exceptionalist	  countries	  expect	  to	  have	  greater	  influence	  over	  the	  design	  and	  planning	  of	  missions	  they	  have	  contributed	  to,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  expect	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  independence	  when	  it	  come	  to	  command	  and	  control.	  	  	  The	  US,	  UK	  and	  France	  are	  the	  three	  most	  obvious	  Western	  countries	  with	  exceptionalist	  tendencies.	  Adam	  Smith	  identifies	  exceptionalism	  as	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  low	  troop	  contributions,	  as	  the	  US	  has	  historically	  objected	  to	  foreigners	  commanding	  its	  troops.62	  The	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Kevan	  Scott	  (retd.	  Lt.	  Col.	  New	  Zealand	  Army),	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  author,	  December	  2014	  58	  Dorn,	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  22.	  59	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions."	  60	  Ibid.,	  419.	  61	  Ibid.	  62	  "United	  States	  of	  America,"	  ibid.,	  ed.	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams.	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Defence	  stated	  in	  2003	  that	  “since	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  states	  that	  can	  provide	  troops	  capable	  of	  conducting	  robust,	  ‘first	  in’	  expeditionary	  missions	  in	  ‘challenging	  circumstances’,	  it	  ‘would	  expect	  to	  play	  a	  lesser	  part	  in	  enduring	  operations	  where	  many	  other	  countries	  can	  contribute’.”63	  The	  expectations	  of	  exceptionalist	  states	  contrast	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  official	  UN	  policies	  and	  as	  such,	  often	  inhibit	  countries	  of	  this	  nature	  from	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  A	  former	  UN	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  (DPKO)	  Force	  Generation	  Service	  official	  confirmed	  the	  impact	  of	  exceptionalism	  in	  the	  force	  generation	  process,	  attesting,	  “many	  Western	  countries	  try	  to	  impose	  their	  own	  standards	  on	  the	  UN	  and	  can	  be	  very	  demanding	  of	  the	  [organization].	  Deployment	  means	  and	  times	  never	  seem	  appropriate	  [to	  them].”64	  Since	  the	  1990s	  the	  detrimental	  effect	  exceptionalism	  has	  had	  on	  UN	  peacekeeping	  has	  grown	  as	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  Western	  states	  are	  exhibiting	  exceptionalist	  tendencies.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  the	  number	  of	  organizations	  and	  coalitions	  to	  which	  countries	  can	  contribute	  troops	  has	  grown,	  the	  result	  being	  that	  Western	  countries	  that	  don’t	  like	  the	  conditions	  of	  contributing	  troops	  to	  the	  UN	  have	  alternatives.	  	  Choices	  –	  How	  to	  Contribute	  and	  What	  to	  Contribute	  To	  Although	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  have	  steadily	  decreased	  since	  the	  1990s,	  most	  Western	  countries	  have	  not	  significantly	  decreased	  the	  number	  of	  troops	  they	  send	  to	  peace	  support	  operations	  more	  broadly.	  Instead	  it	  has	  simply	  become	  more	  common	  for	  them	  to	  contribute	  to	  non-­‐UN	  missions.	  As	  Walter	  Dorn	  argues:	  	   The	  precarious	  situation	  in	  Bosnia	  from	  1992-­‐95	  led	  many	  nations…to	  believe	  that	  peacekeeping	  must	  be	  made	  more	  robust.	  When	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  were	  signed	  in	  late	  1995,	  NATO	  replaced	  the	  UN	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  peacekeeping	  forces.	  Although	  it	  was	  a	  new	  role	  for	  NATO,	  the	  military	  organization	  managed	  to	  do	  well,	  having	  far	  more	  troops,	  resources,	  and	  enforcement	  capability	  than	  the	  UN.65	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Quoted	  in	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations,"	  45.	  64	  Watters,	  email	  message	  to	  author	  65	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  14.	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At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s	  some	  40,000	  peacekeepers	  were	  deployed	  in	  NATO,	  OSCE	  and	  coalition	  operations.66	  In	  addition	  to	  operations	  conducted	  wholly	  independently	  of	  the	  UN,	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  point	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  what	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘hybrid	  missions’	  –	  non-­‐UN	  financed	  missions	  that	  work	  in	  tandem	  with	  UN	  forces.	  Hybrid	  missions	  can	  be	  conducted	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons:	  to	  prepare	  the	  security	  environment	  prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  UN	  mission;	  to	  work	  alongside	  UN	  troops	  providing	  military	  security;	  to	  provide	  on	  the	  ground	  support	  to	  a	  beleaguered	  UN	  mission;	  or	  to	  perform	  a	  deterrent	  or	  even	  enforcement	  role	  in	  support	  of	  a	  beleaguered	  mission.67	  	  	  Examples	  of	  hybrid	  missions	  include	  the	  Australian-­‐led	  multinational	  mission	  in	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET),	  which	  prepared	  the	  security	  environment	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  UN	  mission	  in	  1999,	  and	  the	  UK’s	  Operation	  Palliser	  in	  support	  of	  the	  UN	  Mission	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (UNAMSIL)	  in	  2000,	  which	  provided	  the	  UN	  mission	  greater	  enforcement	  capabilities	  against	  spoilers.	  A	  recent	  example	  is	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  mission	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  (EUFOR	  CAR)	  in	  2014,	  which	  aimed	  to	  prepare	  the	  security	  environment	  for	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  UN’s	  peacekeeping	  operation,	  MINUSCA.	  In	  most	  hybrid	  missions	  Western	  forces	  are	  commanded	  independently	  of	  UN	  command	  structures,	  either	  by	  national	  commands	  or	  Western	  commands	  within	  an	  organization	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  or	  NATO.	  Although	  the	  majority	  are	  explicitly	  authorized	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  some	  hybrid	  missions	  take	  place	  without	  this	  authorization,	  in	  which	  case	  there	  is	  usually	  host	  government	  approval	  and	  general	  consensus	  from	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  	  Hybrid	  missions	  have	  become	  more	  frequent	  and	  popular	  with	  Western	  governments	  and	  militaries	  because	  forces	  are	  commanded	  outside	  of	  UN	  command	  structures	  -­‐	  structures	  that	  many	  countries	  found	  problematic	  in	  the	  1990s.68	  Hybrid	  operations	  also	  allow	  Western	  states	  to	  “limit	  the	  scale,	  scope	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations."	  67	  Ibid.	  68	  Pearson	  Peacekeeping	  Centre,	  "Then	  and	  Now:	  Understanding	  the	  Spectrum	  of	  Complex	  Peace	  Operations,"(Ottowa2008);	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations."	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and	  timing	  of	  their	  contribution	  to	  peace	  operations.”69	  Again,	  this	  was	  popular	  after	  drawn	  out	  UN	  engagements	  in	  the	  1990s	  which,	  lacking	  clear	  exit	  strategies,	  cost	  troop	  contributors	  casualties	  and	  money	  and	  soured	  public	  opinion	  towards	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  	  The	  increasing	  Western	  preference	  for	  contributing	  troops	  to	  hybrid	  missions,	  or	  operations	  wholly	  conducted	  by	  organizations	  other	  than	  the	  UN,	  such	  as	  NATO	  or	  the	  EU,	  suggests	  that	  many	  Western	  states	  feel	  that	  their	  forces	  can	  be	  more	  efficient	  in	  these	  other	  formats.	  The	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  Defence’s	  statement	  about	  expecting	  to	  play	  a	  smaller	  role	  in	  enduring	  operations	  because	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  conduct	  robust	  expeditionary	  missions	  is	  indicative	  of	  this	  belief.	  In	  addition,	  deploying	  troops	  to	  hybrid	  or	  wholly	  non-­‐UN	  missions	  means	  that	  Western	  militaries	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  operate	  alongside	  other	  Western	  partners	  and	  militaries	  that	  have	  similar	  standards	  of	  training	  and	  equipment.	  Deploying,	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community,	  with	  which	  they	  have	  built	  a	  sense	  of	  trust	  and	  partnership,	  may	  increase	  Western	  countries’	  confidence	  in	  these	  operations.	  	  Although	  the	  rise	  in	  hybrid	  and	  non-­‐UN	  missions	  may	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  most	  Western	  countries’	  preference	  for	  working	  with	  each	  other	  has	  increased,	  this	  may	  not	  actually	  be	  the	  case.	  Before	  Western	  states	  began	  diverting	  troops	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations,	  they	  were	  largely	  contributing	  troops	  to	  missions	  that	  had	  high	  levels	  of	  Western	  participation	  in	  any	  case.	  One	  example	  is	  UNPROFOR	  where	  at	  its	  highest	  force	  levels	  in	  September	  1994	  sixty-­‐two	  percent	  of	  troops	  and	  observers	  were	  from	  Western	  countries.70	  Although	  Western	  troops	  generally	  worked	  well	  with	  non-­‐Western	  peacekeepers,	  there	  were	  some	  well-­‐publicized	  issues	  that	  negatively	  influenced	  the	  way	  some	  Western	  militaries	  felt	  about	  working	  with	  non-­‐Western	  peacekeepers	  with	  inferior	  training,	  equipment	  and	  commitment.	  	  For	  example,	  The	  Canadian	  Force	  Commander	  of	  the	  UN	  Assistance	  Mission	  in	  Rwanda	  (UNAMIR),	  Roméo	  Dallaire,	  wrote	  in	  his	  account	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  that	  he	  was	  shocked	  and	  appalled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations,"	  50.	  70	  Data	  from	  United	  Nations,	  "United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	  and	  Police	  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard".	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by	  the	  preparation	  and	  behavior	  of	  the	  mission’s	  Bangladeshi	  contingent.	  He	  claims	  the	  Bangladeshis	  were	  an	  added	  logistical	  burden	  for	  the	  mission	  and	  frequently	  sabotaged	  their	  own	  vehicles	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  duties.	  He	  was	  convinced	  “Bangladesh	  had	  only	  deployed	  its	  contingent	  for	  selfish	  aims:	  the	  training,	  the	  financial	  compensation	  and	  the	  equipment	  they	  intended	  to	  take	  home	  with	  them”	  and	  that	  the	  contingent	  could	  not	  be	  relied	  upon.71	  	  Katharina	  Coleman	  explains	  that	  Western	  countries	  that	  still	  participate	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  generally	  do	  so	  in	  two	  ways:	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  can	  either	  command	  their	  own	  troops	  or	  have	  their	  troops	  under	  the	  command	  of	  a	  like-­‐minded	  country;72	  or	  by	  making	  only	  token	  contributions	  to	  missions	  where	  they	  can	  put	  their	  personnel	  in	  key	  positions,	  such	  as	  staff	  officers	  and	  military	  observers.73	  Token	  contributions	  are	  especially	  popular	  with	  Western	  countries	  because	  they	  do	  not	  require	  committing	  high	  numbers	  of	  personnel,	  and	  they	  establish	  a	  state	  as	  a	  troop	  contributor,	  providing	  it	  access	  to	  operational	  and	  political	  information	  circulated	  within	  the	  mission,	  and	  membership	  on	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Peacekeeping	  (C34).	  As	  Canada’s	  lone	  officer	  with	  the	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Force	  in	  Cyprus	  (UNFICYP)	  noted,	  “As	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  Canadian	  contribution,	  the	  Canadian	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  goes	  to	  all	  the	  meetings,	  is	  privy	  to	  all	  the	  information,	  and	  has	  a	  say	  in	  what	  happens	  with	  the	  mission.	  Whether	  your	  contingent	  is	  a	  thousand	  or	  it’s	  one,	  you	  still	  have	  a	  voice.”74	  	  This	  popular	  Western	  contribution	  patterns	  allows	  countries	  to	  maintain	  a	  degree	  of	  influence	  and	  oversight	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  while	  contributing	  forces	  to	  operations	  outside	  of	  the	  UN	  command	  and	  control	  structures,	  allowing	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Shake	  Hands	  with	  the	  Devil:	  The	  Failure	  of	  Humanity	  in	  Rwanda(New	  York:	  Carroll	  &	  Graff	  Publishers,	  2003),	  205.	  72	  An	  example	  of	  the	  former	  is	  the	  Strategic	  Military	  Cell,	  established	  in	  2006	  when	  troops	  from	  Italy,	  France	  and	  Spain	  were	  deployed	  to	  UNIFIL.	  The	  UN	  made	  a	  special	  arrangement	  with	  the	  EU	  allowing	  for	  this	  cell	  to	  be	  staffed	  by	  troops	  from	  these	  countries	  to	  handle	  command	  and	  communications	  issues	  between	  UNHQ	  and	  the	  mission.	  73	  Coleman,	  "Innovations	  in	  'African	  Solutions	  to	  African	  Problems':	  The	  Evolving	  Practice	  of	  Regional	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa."	  74	  Capt.	  Lorne	  Cooper,	  Operational	  Intelligence	  Section,	  UNFICYP	  quoted	  in	  Katharina	  Coleman,	  "Token	  Troop	  Contributions	  to	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Operations,"	  in	  Providing	  
Peacekeepers:	  The	  Politics,	  Challenges,	  and	  Future	  of	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions,	  ed.	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  D.	  Williams(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  55. 	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most	  robust	  operations	  than	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  would	  ever	  mandate	  for	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operation,	  faster	  deployment	  and	  often	  shorter	  engagement.	  	  Peacekeeping	  in	  the	  Post-­‐9/11	  Security	  Environment	  The	  experiences	  of	  peacekeepers	  in	  the	  1990s	  undoubtedly	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  decrease	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  However	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  brought	  with	  it	  new	  security	  challenges	  and	  understandings	  of	  conflict	  that	  have	  also	  shaped	  the	  way	  the	  West	  chooses	  to	  respond	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  threats.	  Sharon	  Wiharta,	  Neil	  Melvin	  and	  Xenia	  Avezov	  argue	  that	  contemporary	  understandings	  of	  conflict	  have	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  human	  security	  focus	  and	  there	  has	  been	  a	  “downgrading	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  political	  claims	  and	  grievances	  for	  conflict	  relative	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  criminal	  dimensions	  of	  organized	  violence.”75	  Conflict	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  organized	  crime	  and	  terrorism	  and	  viewed	  as	  “taking	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘failed’	  or	  ‘failing’	  states…As	  such,	  conceptions	  of	  armed	  conflict	  have	  increasingly	  merged	  with	  the	  law	  and	  order	  agenda…provid[ing]	  the	  basis	  for	  intrusive	  peace	  operations…”76	  Key	  factors	  in	  this	  reconceptualization	  of	  conflict	  and	  intervention	  were	  the	  2001	  attacks	  on	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  2002	  Bali	  attack	  which	  killed	  over	  100	  Westerners,	  the	  2005	  attacks	  in	  London,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  fight	  against	  Islamic	  fundamentalist	  terrorist	  groups	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  consequence	  has	  been	  that	  the	  security	  priorities	  of	  Western	  countries	  have	  undergone	  major	  revision	  since	  2001,	  with	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  national	  security	  than	  on	  human	  security.77	  	  The	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  instilled	  a	  sense	  of	  vulnerability	  in	  the	  citizens	  of	  Western	  countries	  and	  led	  to	  strong	  support	  for	  participation	  in	  coalition	  combat	  operations	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia.	  Mikkel	  Vedby	  Rasmussen	  argues	  that	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  showed	  the	  “globality	  of	  security	  in	  the	  late-­‐modern	  world.	  Where	  Americans	  traditionally	  could	  safely	  assume	  that	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  "The	  New	  Geopolitics	  of	  Peace	  Operations,"	  4.	  76	  Ibid.	  77	  Mark	  Malan,	  "The	  Post-­‐9/11	  Security	  Agenda	  and	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wars	  took	  place	  beyond	  the	  horizon,78	  9/11	  brought	  the	  war	  to	  them.	  He	  also	  contends,	  “The	  events	  of	  11	  September	  were	  of	  such	  significance	  because	  they	  were	  constructed	  as	  a	  scenario	  for	  security	  threats	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,”79	  exposing	  the	  reflexive	  nature	  of	  security	  policy.	  The	  attacks	  were	  touted	  as	  a	  ‘wake-­‐up	  call’,	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  future	  the	  West	  had	  to	  protect	  itself	  against.	  This	  rhetoric	  resulted	  in	  further	  securitization	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  and	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  security	  priorities	  of	  Western	  states.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  World	  Trade	  Center	  the	  fallen	  buildings	  were	  imbued	  with	  symbolism,80	  increasing	  the	  feeling	  that	  the	  attack	  had	  been	  against	  Western	  values	  rather	  than	  just	  two	  buildings.	  This	  increased	  the	  feeling	  of	  solidarity	  in	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  and	  even	  Western	  states	  that	  were	  not	  directly	  targeted	  with	  terror	  attacks,	  including	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  were	  swept	  into	  the	  fight,	  primarily	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  Although	  the	  UN	  was	  quick	  to	  condemn	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  adopted	  resolution	  1373	  outlining	  immediate	  steps	  and	  strategies	  to	  combat	  international	  terrorism,	  it	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capabilities	  to	  lead	  a	  robust	  military	  response,	  nor	  is	  that	  its	  role.	  While	  Western	  militaries	  fought	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  the	  UN	  continued	  to	  tend	  to	  other	  intrastate	  crises	  that	  unfolded	  around	  the	  world	  in	  the	  2000s,	  particularly	  in	  Africa.	  With	  Western	  countries	  preoccupied	  by	  a	  war	  against	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Al	  Qaeda,	  African	  peacekeeping	  missions	  become	  a	  low	  priority	  for	  Western	  governments.	  Peacekeeping	  expert	  Mark	  Malan	  wrote	  in	  2002	  about	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  response	  to	  9/11	  overshadowing	  African	  peacekeeping,	  predicting,	  “peacekeeping	  and	  peace-­‐building	  in	  Africa	  must	  inevitably	  take	  a	  back	  seat	  to	  the	  war	  on	  terror.”81	  	  	  Although	  the	  number	  of	  Western	  troops	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  has	  significantly	  decreased	  in	  recent	  years,	  new	  security	  crises	  have	  emerged	  to	  take	  their	  place.	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  Rasmussen,	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  Parallel	  Globalization	  of	  Terror':	  9-­‐11,	  Security	  and	  Globalization,"	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict	  37,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  325.	  79	  Ibid.,	  327.	  80Anthony	  King,	  Spaces	  of	  Global	  Cultures:	  Architecture,	  Urbanism,	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Western	  countries	  are	  currently	  preoccupied	  with	  The	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Levant	  (ISIL),	  a	  well	  organized,	  well	  funded	  and	  well	  trained	  group	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  disorder	  of	  the	  Syrian	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  weak	  Iraqi	  state	  to	  carve	  out	  their	  own	  state	  built	  on	  fundamentalist	  Islamic	  thought	  and	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  West.	  Although	  ISIL	  presents	  a	  far	  greater	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  people	  living	  in	  the	  areas	  it	  operates	  in	  than	  it	  does	  to	  the	  West,	  terrorist	  attacks	  by	  ISIL	  sympathizers	  in	  Western	  countries	  and	  the	  group’s	  strong	  anti-­‐West	  rhetoric	  have	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  states	  in	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  to	  portray	  the	  group	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  and	  security.	  	  As	  Wiharta	  et	  al.	  suggest,	  the	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  ISIL	  is	  seen	  largely	  in	  the	  context	  of	  failed	  and	  failing	  states	  (in	  this	  case	  Syria	  and	  Iraq)	  and	  has	  resulted	  in	  Western	  coalition	  airstrikes	  as	  well	  as	  strong	  logistics,	  intelligence	  and	  training	  support	  for	  security	  forces	  in	  Iraq.	  	  Although	  the	  UN	  may	  eventually	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  play	  a	  nation-­‐building	  role	  in	  Iraq	  and/or	  Syria,	  the	  general	  consensus	  in	  the	  West	  and	  beyond	  is	  that	  ISIL	  must	  be	  combatted	  with	  swift	  and	  direct	  force.	  However	  there	  is	  also	  an	  aversion	  in	  most	  Western	  countries	  to	  another	  military	  engagement	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  Iraq	  or	  Afghanistan,	  and	  therefore	  governments	  have	  so	  far	  been	  reluctant	  to	  contribute	  ground	  troops	  to	  operations	  against	  ISIL.	  But	  as	  long	  as	  Western	  countries	  feel	  that	  their	  interests	  and	  security	  are	  threatened	  by	  unrest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  this	  could	  continue	  to	  draw	  the	  military	  resources	  of	  Western	  states	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  even	  if	  troops	  are	  not	  being	  deployed	  on	  the	  ground.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  crises	  in	  Africa	  continue	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  less	  urgent	  peace	  and	  security	  threats,	  they	  will	  be	  left	  for	  non-­‐Western	  troops	  to	  respond	  to.	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peacekeeping	  missions	  was	  higher	  in	  the	  1990s	  in	  missions	  including	  UNOSOM	  in	  Somalia,	  UNAMIR	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  ONUMOZ	  in	  Mozambique.84	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  composition	  of	  forces	  in	  the	  UN’s	  African	  peacekeeping	  missions	  that	  these	  conflicts	  are	  no	  longer	  strategic	  priorities	  for	  most	  Western	  countries.	  In	  addition,	  when	  Western	  countries	  do	  engage	  in	  African	  conflicts	  in	  any	  significant	  way,	  it	  is	  often	  through	  unilateral	  interventions	  with	  worryingly	  neocolonial	  agendas.	  France,	  in	  particular,	  has	  deployed	  unilaterally	  to	  manage	  conflicts	  in	  several	  of	  its	  former	  colonies,	  including	  Mali,	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  and	  Côte	  d’Ivoire.	  	  Since	  the	  1990s	  the	  UN	  has	  exhibited	  increasing	  willingness	  to	  authorize	  regional	  organizations	  to	  conduct	  peace	  operations	  on	  its	  behalf,	  a	  conflict	  management	  approach	  known	  as	  Chapter	  VIII	  peacekeeping.85	  This	  has	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  organizations	  involved	  in	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  in	  Africa,	  however	  despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  (AU)	  and	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS)	  the	  UN	  is	  still	  essential	  to	  African	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  often	  provide	  support	  to	  regional	  operations.86	  In	  Darfur	  the	  UN	  and	  AU	  have	  a	  hybrid	  operation,	  and	  in	  several	  countries	  including	  Liberia,	  Mali,	  and	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic,	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  replaced	  initial	  AU	  or	  ECOWAS	  missions,	  re-­‐hatting	  troops.	  Increased	  Western	  involvement	  in	  African	  peacekeeping	  would	  be	  welcomed	  by	  the	  UN,	  for	  although	  African	  troop	  contributors	  can	  provide	  manpower,	  many	  cannot	  provide	  the	  equipment	  or	  specialized	  units	  that	  these	  peacekeeping	  missions	  require,	  resulting	  in	  a	  ‘commitment-­‐capability	  gap’.87	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  For	  more	  on	  Chapter	  VII	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  Press,	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  Benjamin	  Rivlin,	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  Arrangements	  and	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  UN	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  Security	  and	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  A	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  Road	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  International	  Relations	  11,	  no.	  2	  (1992). 86	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  The	  rise	  of	  Chapter	  VIII	  peacekeeping	  has	  provided	  potential	  contributors	  with	  more	  choice	  of	  where	  and	  what	  to	  contribute	  to.	  Deploying	  with	  a	  regional	  organization	  like	  NATO,	  or	  with	  a	  regionally	  based	  multilateral	  force	  is	  often	  a	  more	  attractive	  option	  for	  Western	  contributors	  because	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  deploying	  with	  defence	  partners,	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  can	  deploy	  faster	  and	  conduct	  operations	  more	  efficiently	  than	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mission	  could.	  In	  addition,	  as	  regional	  organizations	  are	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  peacekeeping,	  particularly	  in	  Africa,	  there	  have	  been	  innumerable	  calls	  for	  ‘African	  solutions	  to	  African	  problems’,	  and	  the	  disengagement	  of	  the	  West	  from	  these	  conflicts.88	  The	  increasing	  focus	  on	  regional	  responses	  to	  conflict	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  problematic	  in	  terms	  of	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  as	  some	  potential	  troop	  contributors	  reserve	  troops	  to	  respond	  to	  regional	  conflicts	  rather	  than	  contributing	  more	  broadly.89	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Coleman,	  "Innovations	  in	  'African	  Solutions	  to	  African	  Problems':	  The	  Evolving	  Practice	  of	  Regional	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa."	  89	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  New	  Zealand	  where	  in	  recent	  years	  the	  government’s	  policies	  on	  peace	  operations	  have	  focused	  on	  maintaining	  the	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  crises	  in	  their	  immediate	  region,	  while	  contributions	  to	  missions	  elsewhere	  have	  declined.	  See	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review,"	  1.	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New	  Peacekeepers	  
Figure	  1.390	  The	  rise	  of	  new	  international	  powers	  has	  been	  reflected	  in	  UN	  troop	  contributions,	  with	  countries	  like	  India	  and	  China	  now	  sending	  significant	  numbers	  of	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.91	  According	  to	  Wiharta	  et	  al.	  “The	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  set	  of	  states	  as	  powerful	  international	  actors	  will	  probably	  constitute	  a	  challenge	  to	  existing	  international	  security	  arrangements.”92	  	  They	  also	  contend	  that	  challenges	  to	  existing	  international	  security	  structures,	  frameworks	  and	  norms	  may	  result	  in	  increasing	  separation	  between	  UN	  operations	  (that	  non-­‐Western	  countries	  contribute	  to)	  and	  Western	  coalition	  or	  regional	  organization	  peace	  support	  operations.	  Western	  powers	  have	  shown	  a	  much	  greater	  willingness	  to	  lift	  limitations	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  peace	  operations,	  whereas	  major	  UN	  troop	  contributors	  have	  been	  critical	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  Western	  powers	  are	  willing	  to	  authorize	  robust	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  “they	  are	  unwilling	  to	  deploy	  personnel	  to	  these	  missions	  and	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Data	  from	  "Providing	  for	  Peacekeeping	  -­‐	  Peacekeeping	  Data".	  91	  For	  more	  in	  India	  and	  China’s	  UN	  peacekeeping	  involvement	  see	  Dipankar	  Banerjee,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  India,"	  	  Providing	  For	  Peacekeeping(2013),	  www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/;	  Chin-­‐Hao	  Huang,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  The	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China,"	  ibid.,	  www.providingforpeacekeeping.com/profiles/;	  Bullion,	  "India	  and	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Operations.";	  Lanteigne	  and	  Hirono,	  China's	  Evolving	  Approach	  to	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reluctant	  to	  share	  or	  transfer	  necessary	  technology	  to	  Global	  South	  contributors.”93	  	  The	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  UN	  troop-­‐contributing	  countries	  in	  the	  last	  two	  and	  a	  half	  decades,	  especially	  non-­‐Western	  countries	  that	  rank	  as	  top	  contributors,	  has	  diluted	  the	  influence	  that	  many	  Western	  countries	  once	  had	  over	  peacekeeping	  issues.	  As	  with	  financial	  contributions,	  the	  larger	  a	  country’s	  troop	  contributions	  are,	  the	  more	  sway	  they	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  over	  peacekeeping	  matters.	  Even	  if	  they	  only	  have	  one	  vote	  in	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  major	  troop-­‐contributors	  can	  claim	  high-­‐ranking	  positions	  in	  peacekeeping	  missions	  and	  in	  the	  UN	  Secretariat.	  Twenty-­‐five	  years	  ago	  Western	  countries	  were	  not	  only	  the	  largest	  financial	  contributors	  but	  also	  the	  largest	  UN	  troop	  contributors,	  whereas	  today	  troop	  contributors	  with	  the	  most	  influence	  over	  peacekeeping	  matters	  are	  primarily	  from	  South	  Asia	  and	  Africa.	  Many	  of	  these	  new	  contributors	  pay	  a	  significantly	  smaller	  portion	  of	  the	  annual	  peacekeeping	  budget,	  and	  therefore	  a	  burden-­‐sharing	  arrangement	  has	  emerged	  whereby	  there	  is	  a	  division	  between	  major	  financial	  contributors	  and	  major	  troop	  contributors,	  with	  very	  few	  countries	  belonging	  to	  both	  groups.94	  The	  result	  is	  that	  today	  more	  countries	  are	  involved	  in	  deciding	  peacekeeping	  matters	  –political,	  operational	  and	  administrative	  –	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  rise	  in	  new	  peacekeepers	  has	  driven	  Western	  states	  to	  choose	  alternative	  conflict	  management	  frameworks,	  or	  whether	  the	  Western	  states’	  preference	  for	  alternative	  conflict	  management	  frameworks	  has	  made	  room	  for	  new	  peacekeepers	  to	  step	  in.	  Regardless,	  with	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  countries	  contributing	  troops	  to	  the	  UN,	  there	  is	  less	  pressure	  for	  Western	  countries	  to	  contribute.95	  However,	  the	  Secretariat	  does	  still	  seek	  support	  from	  Western	  contributors	  whose	  training,	  technology	  and	  experience	  can	  be	  critical	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  UN’s	  increasingly	  complex	  mandates.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Ibid.,	  9.	  94	  Cunliffe,	  Legions	  of	  Peace:	  UN	  Peacekeepers	  from	  the	  Global	  South;	  Hirofumi	  Shimizu	  and	  Todd	  Sandler,	  "Recent	  Peacekeeping	  Burden	  Sharing,"	  Applied	  Economics	  Letters	  17,	  no.	  15	  (2009).	  95	  Heldt,	  "Trends	  from	  1948	  to	  2005:	  How	  to	  View	  the	  Relation	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  Non-­‐UN	  Entities."	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  The	  division	  at	  the	  UN	  between	  countries	  that	  contribute	  money	  and	  countries	  that	  contribute	  soldiers	  is	  also	  to	  an	  extent	  a	  division	  between	  countries	  that	  are	  more	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  undertake	  robust	  missions	  and	  those	  that	  prefer	  traditional	  peacekeeping.96	  Not	  all	  contributors	  have	  the	  political	  will	  to	  engage	  in	  operations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  require	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force,	  however	  UN	  peacekeeping	  has	  undoubtedly	  become	  more	  robust	  since	  the	  1990s.	  As	  Wiharta	  et	  al.	  argue:	  “It	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  one	  of	  the	  central	  tasks	  of	  contemporary	  peace	  operations	  is	  POC	  [protection	  of	  civilians].	  Increasingly,	  this	  has	  meant	  providing	  UN	  missions	  with	  robust	  mandates,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  civilians.”97	  The	  most	  robust	  mandate	  to	  date	  granted	  the	  use	  of	  offensive	  force	  to	  some	  troops	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,98	  however	  despite	  these	  developments	  the	  UN	  has	  not	  come	  close	  to	  conducting	  the	  kind	  of	  peace	  enforcement	  missions	  that	  NATO	  and	  Western	  coalitions	  have	  embraced.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  the	  UN	  will	  ever	  conduct	  those	  kinds	  of	  missions,	  particularly	  given	  the	  resistance	  from	  major	  non-­‐Western	  troop	  contributors,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  Western	  countries	  that	  prefer	  more	  robust	  peace	  support	  operations	  will	  continue	  to	  contribute	  troops	  outside	  of	  the	  UN.	  	  As	  well	  as	  feeling	  a	  lack	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  UN	  to	  contribute,	  and	  preferring	  more	  robust	  peace	  support	  operation	  frameworks,	  Walter	  Dorn	  argues	  that	  Western	  contributors	  generally	  prefer	  to	  deploy	  their	  troops	  to	  NATO	  operations	  rather	  than	  UN	  missions	  because	  “the	  military	  structure	  is	  usually	  better	  defined,	  the	  number	  of	  troops	  deployed	  is	  larger,	  the	  level	  of	  support	  is	  usually	  greater,	  and	  partner	  nations	  are	  generally	  better	  equipped	  and	  trained	  than	  in	  UN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Wiharta,	  Melvin,	  and	  Avezov,	  "The	  New	  Geopolitics	  of	  Peace	  Operations.";	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "The	  West	  and	  Contemporary	  Peace	  Operations."	  97	  "The	  New	  Geopolitics	  of	  Peace	  Operations,"	  18.	  	  98	  In	  2013	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  2098	  created	  the	  Force	  Intervention	  Brigade	  (FIB)	  in	  the	  UN	  Organization	  Stabilization	  Mission	  in	  the	  DR	  Congo	  (MONUSCO)	  –	  a	  brigade	  made	  up	  of	  troops	  from	  African	  states	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  use	  active	  force	  to	  “neutralize”	  armed	  rebel	  groups.	  The	  decision	  to	  authorize	  the	  FIB	  was	  extremely	  controversial;	  many	  member	  states	  felt	  it	  violated	  traditional	  principles	  of	  peacekeeping,	  namely,	  impartiality	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force	  only	  in	  self-­‐defence.	  United	  Nations,	  "Monusco:	  United	  Nations	  Organization	  Stabilization	  Mission	  in	  the	  Dr	  Congo,"	  United	  Nations,	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml.	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missions.”99	  Although	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  peacekeeping	  there	  have	  been	  many	  cases	  of	  Western	  and	  non-­‐Western	  blue	  helmets	  working	  exceptionally	  well	  together,	  the	  distribution	  of	  Western	  troops	  in	  peacekeeping	  missions	  (i.e.	  the	  clumping	  of	  most	  troops	  in	  certain	  missions)	  could	  be	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  Western	  preference	  for	  working	  alongside	  traditional	  partners.	  By	  participating	  in	  NATO	  operations	  Western	  countries	  are	  automatically	  working	  alongside	  like-­‐minded	  partners,	  given	  the	  organization’s	  strong	  focus	  on	  shared	  values.	  And	  while	  Western	  countries	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  non-­‐Western	  contributors	  for	  command	  positions	  in	  UN	  missions,	  in	  missions	  led	  by	  NATO,	  the	  EU,	  and	  Western	  coalitions	  they	  are	  guaranteed	  these	  valued	  conditions.	  	  Economic	  Disincentives	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  political	  and	  security	  factors	  driving	  the	  West	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  the	  decline	  also	  has	  an	  economic	  component.	  The	  UN’s	  troop	  reimbursement	  rates	  are	  insufficient	  to	  cover	  the	  costs	  most	  militaries	  incur	  when	  training	  and	  equipping	  troops	  for	  peacekeeping	  deployments,	  and	  the	  purchase	  and	  operating	  costs	  of	  the	  high-­‐tech	  equipment	  Western	  countries	  favor.100	  Additionally,	  in	  the	  post-­‐financial	  crisis	  environment	  more	  Western	  countries	  are	  sticking	  to	  a	  ‘doing	  more	  with	  less’	  model,	  particularly	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  defence.	  Although	  there	  should	  be	  an	  altruistic	  element	  to	  contributing	  troops	  to	  a	  peacekeeping	  mission,	  for	  most	  Western	  contributors	  the	  cost	  is	  too	  high	  for	  an	  activity	  that	  is	  considered	  low	  priority	  against	  the	  national	  interest.	  Conversely,	  countries	  are	  not	  reimbursed	  at	  all	  for	  participation	  in	  NATO	  operations,	  however	  considering	  their	  perceived	  relevance	  to	  Western	  national	  interests	  countries	  are	  prepared	  to	  shoulder	  the	  financial	  consequences.	  Although	  there	  was	  a	  review	  of	  the	  troop	  reimbursement	  system	  in	  2013,101	  and	  a	  new	  rate	  of	  reimbursement	  was	  suggested	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  2014,102	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  23.	  100	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  "Explaining	  the	  National	  Politics	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Contributions.";	  Coleman,	  "Innovations	  in	  'African	  Solutions	  to	  African	  Problems':	  The	  Evolving	  Practice	  of	  Regional	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa."	  101	  United	  Nations,	  "Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General:	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Senior	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Rates	  of	  Reimbursement	  or	  Troop-­‐Contributing	  Countries	  and	  Other	  Related	  Issues,"(2013).	  102	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  "Resolution	  68/281:	  Rates	  of	  Reimbursement	  to	  Troop-­‐Contributing	  Countries,"(2014).	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it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  flat	  rate	  of	  reimbursement	  will	  ever	  come	  close	  to	  covering	  the	  costs	  incurred	  by	  Western	  militaries.	  A	  reimbursement	  rate	  based	  on	  capability	  rather	  than	  numbers	  of	  personnel	  would	  better	  serve	  these	  advanced	  militaries,	  however	  it	  would	  be	  unpopular	  with	  developing	  contributors.	  	  Conclusion	  The	  factors	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  have	  impacted	  each	  Western	  nation	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  however	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  has	  been	  the	  draining	  of	  Western	  troops	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  Many	  of	  these	  troops	  and	  resources	  have	  subsequently	  been	  injected	  into	  non-­‐UN	  led	  peace	  support	  operations,	  which	  have	  proven	  a	  convenient	  excuse	  for	  Western	  countries	  not	  to	  contribute	  troops	  to	  UN	  missions.	  Today	  many	  of	  these	  non-­‐UN	  operations	  are	  coming	  to	  an	  end,	  or	  have	  already	  accomplished	  their	  objectives,	  and	  Western	  governments	  suddenly	  find	  themselves	  with	  troops	  at	  their	  disposal.	  The	  following	  cases	  of	  two	  former	  established	  troop	  contributors	  will	  test	  the	  validity	  of	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  addition,	  the	  exploration	  of	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand’s	  negligible	  troop	  contributions	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  security	  community	  concept	  in	  understanding	  the	  systemic	  decline	  in	  Western	  troop	  contributions,	  despite	  each	  Western	  nation’s	  disparate	  attitudes	  and	  approaches	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	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Chapter	  2	  	  Canada	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contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  came	  in	  1993	  when	  Canadian	  troops	  were	  deployed	  in	  high	  numbers	  to	  UN	  missions	  in	  Yugoslavia	  (UNPROFOR)	  and	  Croatia	  (UNCRO)	  in	  addition	  to	  smaller	  contributions	  to	  seven	  other	  missions,	  with	  a	  total	  of	  3,291	  troops	  deployed	  –	  almost	  4.5	  percent	  of	  the	  CAF.106	  	  	  Peacekeeping,	  and	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  particular,	  are	  part	  of	  Canada’s	  national	  identity.	  Peacekeepers	  are	  honored	  by	  memorials	  across	  the	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  national	  currency:	  a	  female	  blue	  beret	  appears	  on	  the	  ten-­‐dollar	  bill,	  the	  dollar	  coin	  bears	  an	  image	  of	  the	  National	  Peacekeeping	  monument,	  and	  Peacekeeping	  Day	  is	  celebrated	  annually	  on	  August	  9th.107	  Canada	  has	  also	  produced	  some	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  UN	  peacekeepers,	  including	  Major	  General	  Romeo	  Dallaire,	  Force	  Commander	  of	  UNAMIR	  and	  Major	  General	  Lewis	  MacKenzie,	  Force	  Commander	  of	  UNPROFOR,	  who	  have	  both	  published	  accounts	  of	  their	  experiences	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  The	  Canadian	  public	  has	  shown	  strong	  support	  for	  multilateral	  peacekeeping	  for	  decades:	  A	  1943	  Gallup	  poll	  found	  almost	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  Canadians	  supported	  their	  country	  playing	  an	  active	  part	  in	  ensuring	  world	  peace,	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  again	  sending	  troops	  abroad;108	  In	  1988,	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  Canadians	  supported	  playing	  "an	  active	  role	  in	  trying	  to	  promote	  peace;"109	  and	  a	  2003	  poll	  found	  that	  81	  per	  cent	  of	  Canadians	  supported	  “participating	  in	  international	  peacekeeping	  operations.”110  	  As	  Canada’s	  UN	  troop	  contributions	  have	  decreased,	  so	  have	  scholarly	  analyses	  of	  Canada’s	  identity	  as	  a	  peacekeeping	  nation,	  and	  dialogue	  about	  UN	  contributions.	  Although	  some	  commentators	  discussed	  the	  decline	  in	  contributions	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  very	  little	  has	  been	  written	  about	  it	  in	  recent	  years.	  In	  this	  period	  Canadian	  institutions	  dedicated	  to	  peacekeeping	  have	  also	  been	  closed,	  such	  as	  the	  Lester	  B	  Pearson	  Peacekeeping	  Center.	  Although	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  United	  Nations,	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  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	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  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard";	  "Providing	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  -­‐	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  Data".	  107	  Dorn,	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  7.	  108	  Don	  Munton	  and	  Tom	  Keating,	  "Internationalism	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Public,"	  Canadian	  Journal	  
of	  Political	  Science	  /	  Revue	  canadienne	  de	  science	  politique	  34,	  no.	  3	  (2001):	  534.	  109	  Ibid.	  110	  GPC	  International	  poll	  quoted	  in	  Lane	  Anker,	  "Peacekeeping	  and	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  Opinion,"	  Canadian	  
Military	  Journal	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Canadians	  still	  identify	  their	  country	  as	  a	  peacekeeping	  nation,111	  and	  despite	  being	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  financial	  contributors	  to	  the	  peacekeeping	  budget,	  Canada’s	  military	  participation	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  negligible.112	  	  The	  History	  of	  Canada	  and	  Peacekeeping	  Internationalism	  is	  a	  concept	  frequently	  identified	  by	  Canadian	  scholars	  as	  central	  to	  Canada’s	  foreign	  policy	  and	  key	  in	  defining	  Canada’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Internationalism	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  during	  the	  era	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Louis	  Saint	  Laurent	  and	  his	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  External	  Affairs	  and	  successor,	  Lester	  Pearson.	  In	  1948	  St	  Laurent	  declared,	  “The	  UN’s	  vocation	  is	  Canada’s	  vocation.”113	  As	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  External	  Affairs	  Pearson	  served	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  from	  1952-­‐53,	  and	  made	  his	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  peacekeeping	  in	  1956	  during	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  when	  he	  suggested	  that	  “the	  United	  Nations	  send	  an	  international	  force	  to	  the	  area,	  position	  itself	  between	  the	  warring	  parties	  and	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  hostilities.”	  The	  operation	  was	  to	  be	  “a	  truly	  international	  peace	  and	  police	  force…large	  enough	  to	  keep	  these	  borders	  at	  peace	  while	  a	  political	  settlement	  is	  being	  worked	  out.”114	  As	  a	  result	  the	  UN’s	  first	  inter-­‐positional	  peacekeeping	  force,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Emergency	  Force	  (UNEF)	  was	  created,	  and	  stood	  as	  the	  prototype	  for	  peacekeeping	  missions	  of	  the	  future.	  	  	  UNEF	  was	  unlike	  any	  previous	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  that	  its	  purpose	  was	  to	  separate	  fighting	  forces,	  not	  merely	  to	  monitor	  or	  observe	  them.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  first	  mission	  to	  which	  countries	  contributed	  formed	  units	  such	  as	  battalions,	  rather	  than	  individual	  soldiers,	  and	  the	  first	  mission	  in	  which	  peacekeepers	  were	  armed	  (albeit	  lightly).	  A	  Canadian	  force	  commander	  was	  appointed	  to	  lead	  UNEF	  and	  Canadian	  troops	  were	  deployed	  to	  provide	  essential	  enabling	  capacities	  for	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  112	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  Words	  for	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  Zachary	  Abram,	  "In	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  of	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  The	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  of	  Peacekeeping	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  The	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  113	  Dorn,	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  Peacekeeping:	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  9.	  114	  Lester	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the	  start-­‐up	  mission.	  Pearson	  won	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  in	  1957	  for	  his	  UNEF	  initiative	  and	  become	  known	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ‘Fathers	  of	  Peacekeeping’”.115	  With	  this	  history	  of	  commitment	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  innovation	  in	  peacekeeping,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  why	  peacekeeping	  is	  upheld	  as	  part	  of	  the	  national	  identity	  in	  spite	  of	  Canada’s	  decreased	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  	  Despite	  Canada’s	  undeniable	  internationalist	  character,	  before	  Canada’s	  troop	  contributions	  sunk	  to	  their	  current	  level	  there	  was	  lively	  debate	  in	  academic	  circles	  about	  Canada’s	  true	  motivations	  for	  participating	  in	  peacekeeping	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  are	  altruistic.	  Internationalist	  commentators	  take	  the	  view	  that	  Canada	  contributes	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  out	  of	  an	  altruistic	  commitment	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  that	  Canada	  must	  do	  its	  part	  to	  strengthen	  international	  institutions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  global	  peace.	  As	  Paul	  Martin	  Sr.,	  External	  Affairs	  Minister	  from	  1963-­‐68	  and	  famed	  Internationalist	  exclaimed	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  peacekeeping,	  “We	  do	  it	  not	  for	  glory	  but	  as	  our	  duty.”116	  	  Realist	  arguments	  stem	  from	  a	  basic	  belief	  that	  governments	  cannot	  and	  will	  not	  sacrifice	  their	  own	  interests	  for	  those	  of	  other	  countries,	  and	  as	  such	  claim	  that	  Canada’s	  contributions	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  basic	  national	  interest	  rather	  than	  Canadian	  altruism.	  During	  and	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  Canadian	  national	  interest	  involved	  supporting	  Western	  allies,	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  UK	  and	  France.	  Canadian	  historian	  Jack	  Granatstein	  observed	  that,	  “[Canadian]	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  almost	  always	  supported	  western	  interests.	  Certainly	  this	  was	  true	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  Congo,	  Cyprus…and	  Bosnia	  too.”117 Regional	  interests	  have	  also	  played	  a	  role,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  Canada’s	  contributions	  to	  various	  UN	  missions	  in	  Haiti,	  and	  willingness	  to	  support	  US	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  there	  in	  1996.	  Realist	  arguments	  do	  not	  necessarily	  deny	  that	  Canada	  and	  Canadians	  have	  a	  commitment	  to	  multilateralism	  and	  human	  security,	  but	  rather	  assert	  that	  national	  interest	  has	  played	  just	  as	  much	  of	  a	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  decisions	  to	  participate	  in	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  Dorn,	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  10.	  116	  Ibid.,	  19.	  117	  Quoted	  in	  Andrew	  Cooper,	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Old	  Habits	  and	  New	  
Directions(Scarborough:	  Prentice	  Hall	  Allyn	  and	  Bacon,	  1997),	  181.	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peacekeeping,	  and	  that	  in	  fact,	  multilateralism	  can	  be	  in	  a	  country’s	  national	  interest.	  	  Canada’s	  waning	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  increased	  contributions	  to	  NATO	  and	  other	  non-­‐UN	  peacekeeping	  have	  mirrored	  the	  behavior	  of	  many	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  Western	  security	  community,	  which	  indicates	  that	  this	  shift	  has	  not	  happened	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  NATO	  and	  US-­‐led	  peace	  operations	  have	  typically	  had	  more	  robust,	  enforcement	  mandates	  than	  the	  UN’s	  peacekeeping	  mandates,	  and	  Canada	  has	  for	  years	  indicated	  its	  preference	  for	  robust	  mandates.118	  In	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  	   Canada…moved	  away	  from	  being	  the	  moderate	  mediatory	  middle	  power,	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  ‘peace,	  order	  and	  good	  (international)	  government’	  through	  bringing	  conflicting	  parties	  together	  to	  negotiate	  a	  settlement.	  Instead	  it	  not	  only	  joined,	  but	  also	  actively	  led	  the	  ranks	  of	  UN	  member	  states	  pressing	  for	  more	  forceful	  intervention	  even	  against	  formally	  sovereign	  states.119	  	  	  NATO’s	  enforcement	  mandates,	  and	  even	  some	  of	  the	  enforcement	  mandates	  that	  have	  been	  passed	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  are	  part	  of	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  peacekeeping,	  even	  further	  removed	  from	  first	  generation	  ‘observer’,	  or	  second-­‐generation	  ‘inter-­‐positional’	  operations.	  However	  Canada	  is	  not	  only	  eschewing	  UN	  peacekeeping	  for	  non-­‐UN	  missions	  because	  of	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  efficacy	  of	  robust	  mandates.	  By	  participating	  in	  NATO	  peace	  operations	  Canada	  is	  honoring	  its	  traditional	  alliance	  with	  the	  US,	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France	  and	  enjoying	  a	  better	  defined	  military	  structure,	  partner	  nations	  that	  are	  generally	  better	  equipped	  and	  trained	  than	  in	  UN	  missions,120	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  trust	  in	  these	  partners	  built	  through	  interactions	  within	  the	  security	  community.	  	  With	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  at	  such	  low	  ebb,	  there	  is	  debate	  and	  disagreement	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  Canada’s	  UN	  contributions	  will	  ever	  rise	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  Edgar,	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  If	  Anything,	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  112.	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  Dorn,	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again,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  should.	  There	  is	  more	  appetite	  and	  enthusiasm	  for	  UN	  peacekeeping	  among	  academics	  and	  the	  public,	  whereas	  high-­‐ranking	  members	  of	  the	  CAF	  have	  expressed	  doubt	  that	  contributions	  will	  ever	  rise	  and	  a	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  best	  for	  the	  Canadian	  military.	  	  Peacekeeping	  in	  the	  1990s	  	  Canada’s	  early	  leadership	  in	  peacekeeping	  resulted	  in	  its	  strong	  commitment	  to	  providing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  until	  the	  late	  1990s.	  But	  just	  as	  Lester	  Pearson’s	  legacy	  influenced	  early	  peacekeeping	  policies,	  the	  horrors	  and	  failures	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  Rwanda,	  Somalia	  and	  Bosnia	  also	  left	  a	  lasting	  impression	  upon	  Canadian	  strategic	  culture.	  Canadian	  authors	  Jocelyn	  Coulon	  and	  Michael	  Liégeois	  refer	  to	  UN	  missions	  in	  Rwanda,	  Bosnia	  and	  Somalia	  as	  “the	  deadly	  trilogy,	  “121	  and	  some	  in	  the	  defence	  establishment	  refer	  to	  the	  period	  as	  the	  “decade	  of	  darkness.”122	  The	  experiences	  of	  Canadian	  peacekeepers	  in	  UN-­‐led	  operations	  in	  the	  1990s	  had	  a	  profound	  and	  multifaceted	  effect	  on	  Canada’s	  decision	  to	  decrease	  its	  contributions.	  The	  way	  the	  CAF	  has	  reorganized	  itself,	  the	  organizations	  and	  conflicts	  it	  now	  chooses	  to	  contribute	  troops	  to,	  and	  its	  attitude	  towards	  the	  UN,	  are	  all	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  experiences	  in	  Rwanda,	  Bosnia	  and	  Somalia.	  These	  missions	  were	  a	  very	  public	  illustration	  of	  the	  UN’s	  impotence,	  and	  a	  humiliating	  defeat	  for	  Canadian	  peacekeepers.	  The	  experiences	  Canadians	  had	  in	  these	  missions	  resulted	  in	  widespread	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  UN	  from	  many	  in	  the	  political	  and	  military	  establishment.123	  	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  peacekeeping	  missions	  on	  military	  attitudes	  towards	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  evident	  beyond	  Canada.	  The	  failure	  of	  Dutch	  peacekeepers	  to	  prevent	  the	  massacre	  at	  Srebrenica	  and	  the	  resulting	  national	  trauma	  has	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  Netherlands’	  continued	  reticence	  to	  participate	  significantly	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping.124	  Rwanda	  and	  Bosnia	  in	  particular	  had	  a	  strong	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  Canadian	  military,	  as	  both	  missions	  had	  Canadian	  force	  commanders,	  and	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  Whatever	  Happened	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  Peacekeeping?:	  The	  Future	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  12,	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  Peter	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  email	  message	  to	  author,	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their	  well-­‐publicized	  experiences	  cast	  a	  shadow	  over	  Canada’s	  position	  as	  a	  significant	  contributor.	  	  	  
Bosnia	  UNPROFOR’s	  efforts	  to	  facilitate	  demilitarization,	  the	  provision	  of	  humanitarian	  relief,	  return	  of	  refugees,	  and	  myriad	  other	  monitoring	  roles	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Croatia	  failed	  to	  staunch	  conflict	  in	  the	  region.	  Most	  of	  the	  criticism	  of	  UNPROFOR	  was	  leveled	  at	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  its	  mandate,	  rather	  than	  the	  comportment	  of	  its	  troops,	  who	  were	  widely	  praised	  for	  their	  courage	  and	  innovation,	  despite	  isolated	  disciplinary	  issues.125	  Canada	  had	  been	  instrumental	  in	  advocating	  a	  lead	  role	  for	  the	  UN	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  conflict,	  but	  struggled	  under	  UNPROFOR’s	  traditional	  mandate	  to	  prevent	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  targeting	  of	  civilians.	  Canadian	  contingents	  suffered	  casualties	  and	  kidnappings,	  adding	  to	  their	  sense	  of	  impotence.	  Psychiatric	  studies	  in	  the	  1990s	  revealed	  an	  unusually	  high	  incidence	  of	  depression	  and	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  disorder	  among	  Canadian	  peacekeepers	  who	  had	  deployed	  to	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.126	  	  Canada	  learned	  several	  key	  lessons	  from	  its	  involvement	  in	  UNPROFOR,	  the	  first	  being	  that	  political	  objectives	  and	  military	  means	  need	  to	  be	  closely	  coordinated.	  The	  mandates	  produced	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  did	  not	  provide	  troops	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  manage	  the	  conflict	  as	  was	  necessary.	  The	  second	  lesson	  was	  that	  traditional	  peacekeeping	  and	  coercive	  diplomacy	  are	  incompatible;	  belligerents’	  complete	  disregard	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  UNPROFOR	  forces	  illustrated	  that	  diplomacy	  without	  the	  credible	  threat	  of	  force	  is	  futile.	  Canada	  also	  realized	  that	  an	  impartial	  and	  lightly	  armed	  force	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  most	  effective	  means	  of	  facilitating	  humanitarian	  relief,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  can	  prolong	  and	  exacerbate	  conflict.127	  Finally,	  as	  the	  US	  and	  NATO	  took	  a	  more	  assertive	  role	  in	  managing	  the	  conflict	  in	  1995,	  Canada	  was	  left	  without	  a	  voice,	  and	  found	  its	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troops	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  dangerous	  conditions	  without	  any	  influence	  over	  a	  potential	  political	  settlement.	  It	  was	  a	  clear	  indication	  to	  Canada	  that	  sustaining	  political	  and	  military	  relevance	  would	  be	  better	  achieved	  by	  partnering	  with	  the	  US	  and	  working	  within	  the	  NATO’s	  emerging	  conflict	  management	  framework,	  which	  varied	  significantly	  from	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  framework.	  	  
Somalia	  In	  Somalia	  Canadian	  peacekeepers	  experienced	  similar	  danger	  and	  frustrations	  as	  they	  had	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Rwanda.	  However	  it	  was	  the	  unconscionable	  actions	  of	  a	  Canadian	  airborne	  unit	  deployed	  to	  UNOSOM	  in	  1993	  that	  marred	  Canada’s	  engagement	  in	  Somalia	  and	  tarnished	  its	  pristine	  reputation	  as	  a	  peacekeeping	  nation.	  A	  group	  of	  soldiers	  from	  the	  regiment	  caught	  a	  sixteen-­‐year-­‐old	  Somali	  boy	  infiltrating	  their	  compound,	  and	  taking	  him	  for	  a	  looter,	  detained	  him.	  The	  soldiers	  then	  beat	  and	  tortured	  the	  boy	  to	  death	  of	  a	  period	  of	  several	  hours,	  posing	  for	  pictures	  with	  his	  bloodied	  body.128	  The	  outrage	  of	  the	  Canadian	  public	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  incident	  on	  the	  CAF	  drove	  Canada	  to	  be	  far	  more	  cautious	  about	  exposing	  itself	  to	  that	  kind	  of	  risk	  again.	  Following	  what	  came	  to	  be	  dubbed	  ‘the	  Somalia	  Affair’,	  the	  CAF	  went	  through	  a	  period	  of	  introspection	  and	  change,	  focusing	  on	  the	  education	  and	  training	  of	  soldiers,	  as	  well	  as	  improving	  military	  justice	  procedures.129	  The	  lessons	  of	  the	  Somalia	  Affair	  have	  not	  been	  forgotten,	  and	  are	  still	  taught	  in	  Canadian	  military	  colleges,	  but	  despite	  this	  commitment	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  past,	  Canada’s	  UN	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  have	  never	  recovered.130	  	  
Rwanda	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Somalia	  Affair	  was	  unfolding,	  Major	  General	  Dallaire	  found	  himself	  commanding	  UNAMIR,	  a	  small	  peacekeeping	  mission	  in	  Rwanda	  that	  was	  ill	  equipped	  and	  lacked	  the	  mandate	  to	  confront	  ethnic	  tensions	  that	  eventually	  erupted	  into	  genocide.	  Sensing	  that	  if	  a	  political	  settlement	  couldn’t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Sherene	  Razack,	  Dark	  Threats	  and	  White	  Knights:	  The	  Somalia	  Affair,	  Peacekeeping,	  and	  the	  
New	  Imperialism(University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2004).	  129	  David	  J.	  Bercuson,	  "Up	  from	  the	  Ashes:	  The	  Re-­‐Professionalization	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Forces	  after	  the	  Somalia	  Affair,"	  (2009).	  130	  Jane	  Gerster,	  "20	  Years	  after	  Somalia	  Affair	  of	  Tortured	  Teen,"	  (2013),	  http://metronews.ca/news/canada/597698/saturday-­‐marks-­‐anniversary-­‐of-­‐somalia-­‐affair/.	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be	  reached	  something	  catastrophic	  would	  happen,	  Dallaire	  made	  numerous	  appeals	  to	  the	  UN	  Secretariat,	  Security	  Council,	  and	  Canada	  for	  more	  troops,	  better	  intelligence	  support	  and	  a	  more	  robust	  mandate	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  civilians,	  and	  prevent	  the	  escalation	  ethnic	  violence.	  Unfortunately,	  DPKO	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  were	  preoccupied	  by	  crises	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Somalia,	  and	  although	  the	  Canadian	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  supported	  sending	  a	  contingent,131	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  affairs	  did	  not,	  as	  they	  were	  reorienting	  diplomatic	  attentions	  towards	  Europe	  and	  the	  Balkans	  and	  away	  from	  Africa.	  As	  a	  result	  UNAMIR	  had	  to	  stand	  by	  helplessly	  as	  around	  800,000	  Rwandans	  were	  slaughtered	  during	  a	  100-­‐day	  period	  in	  mid-­‐1994.	  As	  in	  Bosnia,	  the	  tragedy	  highlighted	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  peacekeeping	  mandates	  to	  address	  modern	  conflicts.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Security	  Council’s	  preoccupation	  with	  operations	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Somalia	  as	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  raged	  highlighted	  the	  UN’s	  inability	  to	  effectively	  address	  multiple	  crises	  at	  once.	  	  As	  NATO	  took	  over	  operations	  from	  the	  UN	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  world	  reflected	  on	  the	  UN’s	  failures	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  Somalia,	  Robert	  Fowler,	  the	  Canadian	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  1995	  summed	  up	  the	  collective	  Canadian	  (and	  Western)	  sentiment:	  “The	  era	  of	  half-­‐hearted,	  half-­‐baked,	  under-­‐resourced,	  and	  ill-­‐defined	  [UN]	  operations	  should	  now	  be	  over.”132	  Subsequently	  Canada	  was	  involved,	  along	  with	  several	  traditional	  European	  troop	  contributors,	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  UN-­‐associated	  Standby	  High	  Readiness	  Brigade	  (SHIRBRIG)	  and	  commissioned	  a	  study	  on	  ways	  to	  enhance	  UN	  peacekeeping	  rapid	  response	  mechanisms.133	  However	  despite	  the	  period	  of	  peacekeeping	  reform	  that	  followed	  the	  blunders	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  era	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  seemed	  to	  truly	  be	  over	  for	  Canada,	  as	  its	  primary	  focus	  was	  reforming	  the	  CAF	  to	  address	  the	  deficiencies	  and	  inefficiencies	  that	  1990s	  peacekeeping	  had	  made	  glaringly	  clear.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  The	  Canadian	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  believed	  contributing	  a	  contingent	  would	  convince	  other	  member	  states	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  as	  other	  countries	  don’t	  like	  contributing	  troops	  to	  a	  mission	  where	  the	  commanding	  officer’s	  nation	  hasn’t	  committed	  troops	  of	  its	  own.	  132	  Cohen	  and	  Moens,	  "Learning	  the	  Lessons	  of	  UNPROFOR:	  Canadian	  Peacekeeping	  in	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,"	  95.	  133	  Peter	  Langille,	  "Bridging	  the	  Commitment	  Capacity	  Gap:	  A	  Review	  of	  Existing	  Arrangement	  and	  Options	  for	  Enhancing	  UN	  Rapid	  Deployment,"(Wayne:	  Center	  for	  UN	  Reform	  Education,	  2002);	  DFAIT,	  "Towards	  a	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Capability	  for	  the	  United	  Nations,"(Ottowa:	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  International	  Trade,	  1995).	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Due	  to	  Canada’s	  limited	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  today,	  few	  people	  in	  the	  Canadian	  military	  establishment	  are	  aware	  of	  how	  much	  peacekeeping	  mandates	  and	  practices	  have	  changed,	  and	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  late	  1990s	  persist.134	  	  Contributor	  Fatigue	  Canada,	  like	  many	  Western	  countries	  that	  provided	  significant	  contributions	  to	  peace	  operations	  during	  the	  1990s,	  started	  to	  experience	  contributor	  fatigue	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  a	  phenomenon	  compounded	  by	  the	  failures	  and	  inefficiencies	  of	  these	  missions.	  As	  early	  as	  1993,	  a	  special	  Canadian	  House	  of	  Commons	  committee	  report	  on	  peacekeeping	  stated,	  “in	  light	  of	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  other	  operations,	  Canadians	  are	  concerned	  about	  commitments	  that	  are	  exacting	  an	  increasing	  cost	  in	  soldiers	  and	  equipment.”135	  In	  addition	  to	  financial	  and	  casualty	  costs,	  many	  Canadian	  soldiers	  returning	  from	  a	  tour	  of	  duty	  in	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mission	  were	  suffering	  from	  a	  condition	  identified	  by	  military	  psychologists	  as	  “The	  UN	  Soldier’s	  Stress	  Syndrome”.	  This	  syndrome	  resulted	  from	  factors	  unique	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  such	  as	  imposed	  passivity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  threats	  or	  humiliation,	  fear	  of	  losing	  control	  over	  one’s	  aggression	  if	  provoked	  and	  violating	  neutrality,	  and	  fear	  that	  errors	  can	  have	  serious	  political	  consequences.136	  Physical	  and	  psychological	  consequences	  were	  exacerbated	  during	  the	  1990s	  when,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  personnel	  cuts	  and	  corresponding	  overstretch	  many	  soldiers	  were	  forced	  to	  undertake	  multiple	  tours	  of	  duty.	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  the	  stress	  casualty	  rate	  among	  Canadian	  soldiers	  deployed	  to	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  was	  upwards	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  percent.137	  As	  the	  1990s	  came	  to	  a	  close	  the	  CAF	  desperately	  needed	  a	  reprieve	  from	  the	  operational	  intensity	  of	  the	  last	  decade.	  But	  although	  troops	  didn’t	  return	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	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  Fischer	  and	  Derks	  Normandin,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  Canada".	  135	  House	  of	  Commons	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  National	  Defence	  and	  Veterans	  Affairs	  Canada,	  "The	  Dilemmas	  of	  a	  Committed	  Peacekeeper:	  Canada	  and	  the	  Renewal	  of	  Peacekeeping,"(June,	  1995),	  9.	  136	  Major	  C.R.	  Shelley,	  "Ethical	  Decision	  Making	  and	  Responsibility	  in	  Peacekeeping	  Operations,"	  in	  Occasional	  Paper(York	  Centre	  for	  International	  and	  Security	  Studies,	  1997),	  3.	  137	  Louis	  Nastro	  and	  Kim	  Richard	  Nossal,	  "The	  Commitment-­‐Capability	  Gap:	  Implications	  for	  Canadian	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era,"	  Canadian	  Defence	  Quarterly	  27,	  no.	  1	  (1997):	  19.	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significant	  numbers,	  the	  reprieve	  was	  short	  lived	  as	  Canada	  contributed	  to	  the	  NATO	  and	  US-­‐led	  operations	  that	  ramped	  up	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  	  Budget	  Cuts	  Peacekeeping	  was	  originally	  an	  attractive	  option	  for	  the	  Canadian	  military	  because	  it	  did	  not	  require	  nuclear	  weapons,	  expensive	  equipment	  or	  large	  deployments.138	  However	  as	  UN	  peacekeeping	  continues	  to	  grow	  in	  number	  and	  size	  and	  require	  increasingly	  advanced	  technology	  and	  equipment	  to	  fulfill	  their	  multidimensional	  mandates,	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  In	  order	  for	  Canada	  to	  have	  kept	  up	  with	  the	  demand	  and	  requirements	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  it	  would	  have	  required	  commensurate	  increases	  in	  funding;	  however	  the	  Defense	  budget	  was	  cut	  during	  the	  very	  years	  peacekeeping	  began	  to	  evolve.	  Peacekeeping	  was	  the	  primary	  victim	  of	  these	  budget	  cuts	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  National	  Defense	  “sought	  to	  preserve	  its	  leading	  edge	  in	  military	  capability.”139	  Between	  1993-­‐94	  and	  1998-­‐99	  the	  defense	  budget	  had	  been	  slashed	  by	  $2.7	  billion,	  a	  reduction	  of	  over	  twenty	  percent.140	  One	  of	  the	  major	  consequences	  of	  these	  budget	  cuts	  was	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  CAF	  by	  over	  seventeen	  percent	  between	  1993	  and	  1997.141	  The	  reduction	  in	  the	  peacekeeping	  budget	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  CAF	  had	  an	  undeniable	  effect	  on	  Canada’s	  decrease	  in	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1990s.	  Not	  only	  did	  Canada	  have	  fewer	  troops	  to	  contribute,	  but	  also	  with	  NATO	  taking	  on	  a	  peace	  enforcement	  role	  the	  troops	  Canada	  did	  deploy	  were	  largely	  committed	  to	  NATO	  missions.	  	  After	  the	  late	  1990s	  the	  defense	  program’s	  budget	  increased	  steadily	  and	  is	  projected	  to	  increase	  by	  over	  10	  billion	  Canadian	  dollars	  in	  the	  next	  12	  years.142	  But	  despite	  this	  increase	  in	  the	  budget,	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  have	  remained	  low	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  which	  indicates	  that	  resources	  are	  being	  directed	  towards	  activities	  and	  deployments	  that	  the	  CAF	  see	  as	  more	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Jack	  L.	  Granatstein,	  "Canada	  and	  Peacekeeping:	  Image	  and	  Reality,"	  Canadian	  Forum,	  August	  1994,	  14.	  139	  Claire	  Turenne	  Sjolander,	  "Cashing	  in	  on	  the	  'Peace	  Dividend':	  National	  Defence	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  World,"	  in	  How	  Ottowa	  Spends	  1996-­‐97:	  Life	  under	  the	  Knife,	  ed.	  Gene	  Swimmer(Ottowa:	  Carleton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  255.	  140	  Bratt,	  "Niche‐Making	  and	  Canadian	  Peacekeeping,"	  78.	  141	  Ibid.	  142	  Canadian	  Department	  of	  National	  Defence,	  "Canada	  First	  Defence	  Strategy,"(2008),	  11.	  
	   49	  
priority	  than	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  	  Non-­‐UN	  Peace	  Support	  Operations	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  Canada’s	  involvement	  in	  ISAF	  in	  Afghanistan	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  CAF’s	  preference	  for	  taking	  part	  in	  deployments	  that	  have	  some	  US	  involvement,	  as	  the	  two	  militaries	  have	  developed	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  interoperability	  and	  the	  Canadians	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  command	  and	  control	  structures	  of	  this	  partnership.	  Command	  and	  control	  structures	  at	  the	  UN	  had	  been	  a	  problem	  for	  Canadian	  peacekeepers	  for	  years;	  a	  1995	  Canadian	  article	  about	  structural	  problems	  inherent	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  complained,	  	  	   The	  [peacekeeping]	  command	  situation	  will	  be	  chaotic	  and	  cumbersome	  with	  an	  inordinate	  number	  of	  UN	  civilians	  working	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  headquarters.	  Command	  authority	  may	  be	  ambiguous	  and	  subject	  to	  massive	  amounts	  of	  interface	  from	  [UNHQ]	  and	  diplomats	  working	  in	  theater.146	  	  The	  number	  of	  troops	  Canada	  now	  commits	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  is	  not	  the	  only	  sign	  that	  the	  military	  establishment	  is	  abandoning	  traditional	  peacekeeping	  for	  peace	  enforcement	  alongside	  NATO	  and	  its	  allies.	  In	  2008	  Canada	  rejected	  a	  request	  from	  DPKO	  for	  a	  Canadian	  lieutenant	  general	  to	  lead	  its	  peacekeeping	  mission	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  a	  position	  that	  would	  previously	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  great	  honor	  and	  an	  asset	  for	  Canada.	  The	  military	  attaché	  to	  the	  permanent	  mission	  to	  the	  UN	  admitted,	  "Finding	  a	  lieutenant-­‐general	  at	  this	  time	  can	  be	  a	  challenge,	  especially	  with	  Afghanistan	  going	  on.”147	  	  But	  beyond	  being	  a	  reflection	  of	  an	  operational	  preference,	  Canada’s	  move	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  also	  indicative	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  country’s	  security	  priorities.	  In	  the	  post	  9/11	  world	  of	  global	  terrorism	  there	  has	  been	  a	  sharp	  shift	  in	  security	  priorities	  of	  many	  Western	  countries.	  As	  a	  Western	  democracy	  allied	  with,	  and	  geographically	  close	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada	  faces	  the	  threat	  of	  global	  and	  domestic	  terrorism,	  issues	  that	  cannot	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  format	  of	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mission.	  Dorn	  notes,	  “both	  idealist	  and	  realist	  schools	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Sean	  M.	  Maloney,	  "Insights	  into	  Canadian	  Peacekeeping	  Doctrine,"	  Military	  Review	  76,	  no.	  2	  (1996):	  13.	  147	  Allan	  Thompson,	  "Rejecting	  Request	  to	  Lead	  Peacekeepers	  Indicates	  Ottowa	  Abandoning	  Traditional	  Role,	  Ex-­‐Envoy	  Says,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  2	  June	  2008.	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recognize	  that	  Canadian	  security…remains	  linked	  with	  the	  security	  of	  the	  whole	  world.	  What	  ails	  the	  world	  will	  eventually	  cause	  trouble	  for	  Canada.”148	  Therefore	  Canada’s	  current	  troop	  contributions	  bely	  a	  belief	  (which	  appear	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community)	  that	  US	  and	  NATO-­‐led	  peace	  enforcement	  operations	  are	  more	  effective	  and	  important	  in	  the	  face	  of	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  security	  threats	  than	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions.	  	  The	  Rise	  of	  New	  Peacekeepers	  As	  contributions	  from	  Canada	  and	  other	  Western	  countries	  have	  decreased,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  contributions	  from	  non-­‐Western	  countries,	  particularly	  from	  South	  Asian	  and	  African	  countries.	  Each	  of	  these	  ‘newer’	  contributors	  has	  its	  complex	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  to	  contribute,	  but	  with	  countries	  like	  India,	  Pakistan	  and	  Ethiopia	  prepared	  to	  contribute	  thousands	  of	  troops	  across	  multiple	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  there	  is	  less	  pressure	  on	  countries	  like	  Canada	  to	  swell	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  blue	  helmets.	  	  	  The	  rise	  of	  new	  UN	  troop	  contributors	  combined	  with	  increased	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  P5	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  not	  only	  reduced	  the	  international	  pressure	  on	  Canada	  to	  contribute,	  but	  has	  also	  limited	  Canada’s	  traditional	  influence	  over	  peacekeeping	  issues.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  1990s,	  the	  size	  and	  scope	  of	  Canada’s	  troop	  contributions	  meant	  it	  could	  exercise	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  control	  over	  the	  mission	  planning	  process,	  and	  Canadians	  were	  often	  appointed	  to	  high-­‐ranking	  positions	  in	  the	  missions’	  senior	  leadership.	  Being	  unable	  to	  use	  the	  size	  of	  its	  contributions	  to	  retain	  influence,	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  relevant	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  Canada	  has	  to	  leverage	  its	  sought	  after	  capabilities,	  such	  as	  communications	  specialists	  and	  bilingual	  units.	  Although	  Canada	  faces	  some	  pressure	  from	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  to	  make	  more	  troop	  contributions,	  pressure	  applied	  on	  the	  Canadian	  permanent	  mission	  to	  the	  UN	  isn’t	  felt	  strongly	  within	  Canada.149	  Canada	  has	  found	  that	  it	  can	  exercise	  more	  influence	  over	  peace	  support	  operations	  led	  by	  NATO	  or	  the	  US,	  where	  it	  can	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  major	  contributor	  without	  fear	  of	  being	  eclipsed	  by	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  "Canadian	  Peacekeeping:	  Proud	  Tradition,	  Strong	  Future?,"	  20.	  149	  Fischer	  and	  Derks	  Normandin,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  Canada".	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Western	  contributors.	  	  Canada,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  Peacekeeping	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  one	  reason	  Canada’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  developed	  in	  the	  mid	  twentieth	  century	  was	  because	  Canada	  saw	  the	  organization	  as	  a	  vehicle	  through	  which	  it	  could	  pursue	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  outside	  the	  highly	  asymmetric	  North	  American	  context.150	  In	  1994	  Joseph	  Jockel	  contended,	  “peacekeeping	  has	  become	  so	  very	  popular	  in	  Canada	  because	  it	  fulfills	  a	  longing	  for	  national	  distinctiveness,	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  United	  States.”151	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  participation	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  was	  a	  way	  for	  Canada	  to	  differentiate	  itself	  from	  the	  US,	  which	  along	  with	  the	  other	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  excluded	  from	  direct,	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  participation	  due	  to	  its	  Cold	  War	  strategic	  involvement	  in	  most	  disputes	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  Between	  1992	  and	  1996	  the	  US	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  Somalia,	  Haiti	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  however	  apart	  from	  these	  engagements	  their	  contributions	  have	  remained	  low.	  Because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  engagements	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  US	  places	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  exertion	  of	  military	  power	  and	  use	  of	  force	  than	  it	  does	  on	  peacekeeping,	  a	  popular	  myth	  in	  Canada	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  that	  Canada	  was	  a	  peacekeeper	  whereas	  the	  US	  fought	  wars.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  myth	  didn’t	  take	  into	  account	  the	  extensive	  support	  Washington	  provided	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  through	  training,	  logistical	  support	  and	  funding,	  some	  realists	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  Canada’s	  primary	  rationales	  for	  contributing	  at	  the	  time.152	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  2000s	  Canada’s	  national	  interests	  were	  largely	  served	  through	  multilateralism	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  human	  security	  agenda.	  It	  distinguished	  Canada	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  earned	  the	  country	  a	  respected	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Edgar,	  "Canada's	  Changing	  Participation	  in	  International	  Peacekeeping	  and	  Peace	  Enforcement:	  What,	  If	  Anything,	  Does	  It	  Mean?."	  151	  Canada	  and	  International	  Peacekeeping(Toronto:	  Canadian	  Institute	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  1994),	  16.	  152	  Ibid.	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place	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  However,	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  Canada’s	  commitment	  to	  its	  defense	  partner	  appears	  to	  have	  trumped	  concerns	  about	  differentiating	  itself	  from	  the	  US	  through	  engaging	  in	  peace	  operations.	  After	  9/11	  Canada	  shared	  many	  security	  concerns	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community,	  particularly	  the	  US,	  and	  this	  perception	  of	  shared	  external	  threats	  has	  led	  to	  closer	  cooperation	  among	  security	  community	  members	  to	  address	  peace	  and	  security	  concerns.	  Since	  then	  Canada	  has	  contributed	  significantly	  higher	  numbers	  of	  troops	  to	  missions	  that	  the	  US	  has	  led	  or	  had	  a	  strong	  presence	  in	  –	  e.g.	  ISAF	  and	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  in	  Afghanistan,	  NATO’s	  Stabilization	  Force	  (SFOR)	  in	  the	  Bosnia	  and	  Croatia	  and	  Kosovo	  Force	  (KFOR)	  –	  than	  it	  has	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  and	  has	  clearly	  developed	  a	  preference	  for	  contributing	  to	  operations	  that	  include	  US	  involvement.	  The	  perception	  that	  Canada	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  are	  facing	  common	  enemies	  has	  revived	  the	  ‘we-­‐feeling’	  that	  the	  country	  feels	  towards	  their	  southern	  neighbor.	  This	  feeling	  has	  been	  bolstered	  by	  the	  current	  Conservative	  government	  in	  Canada,	  led	  by	  Stephen	  Harper,	  who	  has	  demonstrated	  an	  enthusiasm	  for	  US	  rapprochement.153	  	  	  Canada’s	  Future	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  With	  Canada’s	  engagement	  in	  Afghanistan	  drawing	  down	  there	  has	  been	  discussion	  of	  re-­‐engagement	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  however	  restructuring	  of	  the	  CAF	  post-­‐Afghanistan	  is	  likely	  to	  leave	  little	  room	  for	  new	  or	  larger	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions.154	  Persistent	  institutional	  antipathy,	  and	  psychological	  resistance	  caused	  by	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  current	  UN	  peace	  operations	  means	  that	  the	  Canadian	  military	  is	  unlikely	  to	  strongly	  support	  re-­‐engagement.	  In	  addition,	  although	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  is	  drawing	  to	  a	  close,	  new	  security	  threats	  that	  may	  call	  for	  military	  engagement	  are	  emerging,	  such	  as	  terrorist	  group	  ISIL,	  against	  which	  Canada	  has	  already	  made	  a	  military	  commitment.155	  The	  October	  2014	  attacks	  on	  military	  personnel	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Colin	  Robertson,	  "Stephen	  Harper's	  Management	  of	  the	  Canada-­‐US	  Relationship,"	  	  Policy	  
Options(2012),	  http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/harpers-­‐foreign-­‐policy/stephen-­‐harpers-­‐management-­‐of-­‐the-­‐canada-­‐us-­‐relationship/.	  154	  Fischer	  and	  Derks	  Normandin,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  Canada".	  155	  Yarno	  Ritzen	  and	  Mohsin	  Ali,	  "Interactive:	  Countries	  Countering	  ISIL,"	  AlJazeera,	  http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/10/isil-­‐us-­‐syria-­‐airstrike-­‐coalition-­‐uae-­‐
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Canada	  by	  deranged	  Canadian	  citizens	  pledging	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Islamic	  State	  have	  further	  thrust	  this	  threat	  into	  the	  national	  spotlight,	  and	  will	  ensure	  that	  it	  remains	  Canada’s	  security	  priority	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	  The	  paranoia	  and	  fear	  engendered	  by	  these	  attacks	  could	  ensure	  that	  arguments	  for	  re-­‐engagement	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping	  go	  unheard.	  	  However,	  the	  role	  the	  Canadian	  public	  could	  play	  in	  precipitating	  a	  return	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  There	  is	  far	  more	  support	  for	  UN	  peacekeeping	  from	  the	  Canadian	  public	  than	  from	  the	  Canadian	  military.156	  Canadians	  still	  cling	  to	  their	  identity	  as	  a	  nation	  of	  peacekeepers,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  public’s	  resistance	  to	  Canadian	  involvement	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  due	  to	  the	  government’s	  failure	  to	  pass	  off	  the	  operation	  as	  peacekeeping.157	  The	  public’s	  commitment	  to	  this	  identity	  means	  that	  it	  is	  not	  impossible	  that	  politicians	  could	  use	  a	  return	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  to	  score	  political	  points	  and	  garner	  public	  support.	  However	  in	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  attacks	  against	  Western	  partners	  and	  allies	  have	  diverted	  the	  public’s	  focus	  from	  peacekeeping,	  to	  warfighting.	  This	  has	  been	  welcomed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  military	  establishment,	  who	  fear	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  peacekeeping	  would	  convert	  the	  CAF	  into	  a	  lightly	  armed	  force,	  rendering	  it	  incapable	  of	  complex	  military	  engagement	  and	  high	  tempo	  operations,	  and	  inferior	  to	  their	  NATO	  counterparts.158	  	  Although	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  Canadian	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  will	  ever	  return	  to	  their	  previous	  scale,	  some	  Canadians	  have	  argued	  that	  Canada	  can	  still	  do	  more,	  even	  if	  that	  doesn’t	  involve	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  troop	  contributions.159	  When	  Canadian	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  began	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  Duane	  Bratt	  argued	  that	  Canada	  should	  be	  concerned	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with	  creating	  a	  role	  for	  itself	  as	  a	  niche	  peacekeeper.160	  Today	  Canada	  is	  still	  capable	  of	  developing	  a	  niche	  role	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  bilingual	  troops,	  expertise	  in	  electoral	  reform,	  logistical	  support	  and	  media	  training.	  There	  are	  now	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  that	  can	  and	  do	  contribute	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  soldiers	  that	  the	  UN	  needs,	  but	  these	  countries	  often	  do	  not	  have	  the	  specialized	  units	  and	  enabling	  capacities	  that	  are	  as	  essential	  as	  infantry	  battalions	  to	  the	  success	  of	  a	  peacekeeping	  mission.	  A	  Canadian	  contribution	  of	  this	  kind	  would	  not	  only	  be	  well	  received	  by	  the	  UN,	  but	  would	  also	  give	  some	  truth	  to	  the	  peacekeeping	  nation	  myth	  that	  Canadians	  still	  believe	  in.	  	  Conclusion	  Canada’s	  initial	  rejection	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  maintaining	  peace	  and	  security	  was	  undoubtedly	  triggered	  by	  the	  trauma	  of	  the	  1990s	  peacekeeping	  missions.	  However	  Canada	  could	  have	  taken	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  to	  recover	  from	  contributor	  fatigue,	  push	  for	  peacekeeping	  reforms	  at	  the	  UN,	  focus	  on	  lessons	  learned	  and	  eventually	  return	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  with	  renewed	  dedication	  and	  rigor.	  So	  why	  didn’t	  that	  happen?	  Largely	  because	  just	  as	  Canada	  was	  extracting	  itself	  from	  unpleasant	  UN	  deployments	  in	  Bosnia,	  Somalia	  and	  Rwanda,	  Western	  powers	  were	  pushing	  new	  conflict	  management	  mechanisms,	  namely	  NATO-­‐led	  operations.	  These	  mechanisms	  presented	  an	  alternative	  to	  a	  peacekeeping	  system	  that	  seemed	  irrevocably	  broken.	  In	  addition,	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  presented	  new	  security	  threats,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  asymmetric	  warfare	  waged	  by	  Islamic	  extremists	  against	  the	  West,	  and	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  has	  decided	  to	  use	  coalition	  operations	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  NATO	  military	  alliance	  to	  address	  these	  threats.	  	  	  Unlike	  most	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations,	  NATO	  operations	  use	  offensive	  force	  to	  manage	  conflicts.	  Given	  Canada’s	  long-­‐held	  preference	  for	  robust	  operations	  and	  its	  aversion	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  following	  engagements	  in	  Bosnia,	  Rwanda	  and	  Somalia,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  option	  was	  more	  attractive	  to	  Canada.	  In	  addition,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  NATO,	  Canada	  is	  expected	  and	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  these	  operations.	  Unless	  the	  CAF	  is	  restructured	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  "Niche‐Making	  and	  Canadian	  Peacekeeping."	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post-­‐Afghanistan	  in	  a	  way	  that	  takes	  possible	  peacekeeping	  deployments	  into	  account,	  and	  unless	  Canada	  begins	  to	  feel	  that	  its	  national	  interests	  are	  served	  by	  re-­‐engaging	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  Canada’s	  reputation	  as	  an	  internationalist	  and	  a	  nation	  of	  peacekeepers	  will	  continue	  to	  fade.	  Any	  significant	  re-­‐engagement	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  unlikely	  to	  occur	  as	  long	  as	  Canada,	  and	  other	  Western	  countries	  perceive	  jihadist	  violence	  and	  Islamic	  extremist	  terrorism	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  their	  security.	  However	  if	  the	  political	  will	  exists,	  Canada	  could	  contribute	  key	  enabling	  capacities	  and	  niche	  capabilities	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale	  that	  could	  enhance	  the	  efficacy	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  without	  degrading	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  CAF	  to	  respond	  to	  national	  security	  threats.	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Chapter	  3	  New	  Zealand	  	  
Figure	  3.1161	  	  New	  Zealand	  prides	  itself	  on	  its	  reputation	  as	  a	  good	  global	  citizen	  committed	  to	  international	  organizations,	  principally	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  a	  contributor	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  However	  a	  cursory	  look	  at	  New	  Zealand’s	  current	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  shows	  that	  part	  of	  this	  reputation	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  deserved.	  	  As	  of	  November	  2014	  New	  Zealand	  had	  ten	  military	  personnel	  deployed	  in	  two	  of	  the	  eighteen	  UN	  peace	  operations	  with	  blue	  helmets	  and	  was	  ranked	  as	  the	  101st	  largest	  troop	  contributor	  out	  of	  a	  total	  124	  contributing	  countries.	  Twenty	  years	  earlier,	  in	  November	  1994	  New	  Zealand	  was	  contributing	  a	  total	  of	  281	  military	  personnel	  and	  was	  the	  thirty-­‐ninth	  largest	  troop	  contributor.	  New	  Zealand’s	  highest	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  came	  in	  2000	  when	  a	  large	  contribution	  to	  the	  UN	  Transitional	  Administration	  in	  East	  Timor	  (UNTAET)	  and	  smaller	  contributions	  to	  four	  other	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missions,	  comprised	  a	  total	  deployment	  of	  723	  troops,	  almost	  eight	  percent	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Defence	  Force	  (NZDF).162	  	  New	  Zealand	  has	  contributed	  enabling	  units	  and	  military	  observers	  to	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  since	  the	  1950s,	  and	  has	  made	  major	  combat	  contributions	  to	  two	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  UNPROFOR	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  UNTAET	  in	  East	  Timor.	  Apart	  from	  these	  two	  deployments	  New	  Zealand’s	  contributions	  never	  represented	  a	  significant	  percentage	  of	  the	  NZDF,	  or	  of	  UN	  uniformed	  personnel,	  however	  contributions	  and	  commitment	  were	  consistent	  in	  total	  numbers.	  Until	  1999	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  the	  primary	  organization	  under	  which	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  were	  deployed	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations,163	  but	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  New	  Zealand	  has	  become	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  regional	  peace	  and	  security	  operations	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific	  and	  South	  East	  Asia,	  and	  from	  2002	  commenced	  operations	  with	  NATO-­‐led	  ISAF	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  	   	  Today	  New	  Zealand	  has	  wound	  down	  its	  major	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan,	  East	  Timor	  and	  the	  Solomon	  Islands,	  and	  its	  overall	  contributions	  to	  international	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  are	  at	  a	  low	  point.	  Other	  than	  a	  firm	  commitment	  to	  retain	  the	  military	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  conflict	  and	  unrest	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific,	  the	  current	  government’s	  criteria	  for	  engagement	  in	  UN	  peace	  operations	  are	  vague.164	  As	  a	  non-­‐permanent	  member	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  in	  2015-­‐16,	  New	  Zealand	  may	  find	  that	  pointing	  to	  things	  it	  has	  done	  with	  the	  UN	  in	  the	  past	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  uphold	  its	  reputation	  as	  a	  good	  global	  citizen.	  	  	  The	  History	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Peacekeeping	  In	  1935	  New	  Zealand’s	  first	  Labour	  government	  was	  elected,	  bringing	  with	  it	  a	  liberal	  internationalist	  foreign	  policy,	  characterized	  by	  strong	  dedication	  to	  international	  organizations,	  collective	  security,	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  human	  rights,	  democracy	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  From	  this	  point	  New	  Zealand	  began	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  United	  Nations,	  "United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	  and	  Police	  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard";	  "Providing	  for	  Peacekeeping	  -­‐	  Peacekeeping	  Data".	  163	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  a	  decades-­‐long	  commitment	  to	  the	  Multinational	  Force	  and	  Observers	  in	  the	  Sinai	  Peninsula.	  164	  Criteria	  for	  engagement	  in	  peace	  support	  operations	  are	  detailed	  in	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review."	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distinguish	  itself	  in	  the	  international	  system	  by	  advocating	  commitment	  to	  international	  peace,	  security	  and	  rule	  of	  law,	  over	  commitment	  to	  national	  interest.	  Security	  threats	  have	  at	  times	  steered	  foreign	  policy	  in	  a	  more	  realist	  direction,	  for	  example	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  however	  despite	  the	  current	  security	  climate	  New	  Zealand	  continues	  to	  propagate	  its	  internationalist	  reputation.	  	  Several	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  Prime	  Ministers	  have	  been	  credited	  with	  solidifying	  this	  reputation,	  for	  example	  Peter	  Fraser	  who,	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  1940	  until	  1949	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  New	  Zealand	  was	  opposed	  to	  allowing	  the	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  veto	  status,	  concerned	  that	  this	  would	  affect	  the	  organization’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  aggression,	  and	  allow	  the	  national	  interests	  of	  major	  powers	  to	  dictate	  the	  UN’s	  actions.165	  The	  New	  Zealand	  delegation	  felt	  that	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  tool	  for	  major	  powers	  to	  pursue	  foreign	  policy	  objectives,	  the	  United	  Nations	  should	  play	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  collective	  security	  to	  that	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  prior	  to	  the	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  forcefully	  backed	  the	  collective	  security	  provisions	  enshrined	  in	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  	  Following	  Fraser	  a	  number	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  Prime	  Ministers	  made	  significant	  steps	  towards	  enhancing	  the	  nation’s	  reputation	  as	  an	  internationalist.	  In	  the	  1970s	  Norman	  Kirk	  branded	  New	  Zealand	  “as	  a	  progressive	  small	  state,	  with	  a	  deep	  internationalism	  central	  to	  [its]	  national	  identity,”166	  and	  built	  on	  the	  role	  best	  suited	  to	  the	  small	  country	  –	  good	  international	  citizen.	  Subsequent	  Prime	  Ministers	  have	  continued	  to	  support	  this	  role	  for	  New	  Zealand,	  including	  David	  Lange	  and	  Jim	  Bolger.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  New	  Zealand	  still	  maintains	  this	  position	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  P5	  veto	  power.	  During	  New	  Zealand’s	  campaign	  for	  a	  position	  on	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  in	  2015-­‐2016	  Security	  Council	  reform	  was	  a	  key	  point	  on	  the	  government’s	  agenda.	  This	  included	  ensuring	  that	  no	  new	  rights	  of	  veto	  are	  given	  in	  the	  event	  more	  countries	  are	  awarded	  permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  council,	  and	  curbing	  and	  moderating	  the	  veto	  power	  of	  the	  current	  permanent	  members.	  	  166	  Ken	  Ross,	  "New	  Zealand's	  Global	  Diplomacy	  Story-­‐Book,"	  New	  Zealand	  International	  Review	  39,	  no.	  1	  (2014):	  13.	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Helen	  Clark,	  Labour	  Party	  leader	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  1999	  until	  2008,	  is	  also	  widely	  credited	  for	  advancing	  New	  Zealand’s	  liberal	  internationalist	  agenda.167	  Her	  government’s	  foreign	  policy	  had	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  advancing	  the	  principles	  of	  democracy,	  human	  rights	  and	  self-­‐determination	  around	  the	  world.	  However	  with	  the	  9/11	  terror	  attacks	  coming	  early	  in	  Clark’s	  years	  in	  government,	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy	  was	  inevitably	  influenced	  by	  the	  attacks	  and	  the	  ensuing	  global	  war	  on	  terror.	  It	  was	  Clark’s	  government	  that	  oversaw	  the	  majority	  of	  military	  commitments	  that	  absorbed	  the	  NZDF	  and	  various	  government	  ministries	  from	  the	  late	  1990s	  through	  the	  2000s,	  including	  Afghanistan,	  the	  Solomon	  Islands,	  and	  East	  Timor.168	  Although	  Clark’s	  Labour	  government	  demonstrated	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  UN,	  and	  kicked	  off	  New	  Zealand’s	  2015-­‐16	  UN	  Security	  Council	  bid,	  Clark’s	  commitment	  of	  troops	  to	  NATO-­‐led	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan	  showed	  that	  her	  government	  was	  willing	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  UN	  peacekeeping	  model	  to	  confront	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  However,	  the	  government	  was	  adamant	  that	  these	  operations	  should	  have	  UN-­‐authorization	  before	  committing	  any	  troops	  to	  them.	  New	  Zealand	  still	  sees	  the	  UN	  as	  the	  ultimate	  authority-­‐granting	  body	  for	  peacekeeping	  or	  peace	  enforcement	  operations,	  which	  Helen	  Clark	  made	  clear	  when	  she	  refused	  to	  send	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  to	  assist	  the	  US-­‐led	  operation	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2003.	  It	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  government	  will	  deploy	  troops	  to	  any	  future	  operation	  that	  has	  not	  been	  authorized	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  except	  perhaps	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  joint	  operation	  with	  Australia	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific.	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  first	  contribution	  to	  a	  traditional	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mission	  was	  in	  1952	  when	  three	  military	  observers	  were	  deployed	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Military	  Observer	  Group	  in	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  (UNMOGIP).	  This	  contribution	  satisfied	  New	  Zealand’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  New	  Zealand’s	  duties	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Commonwealth,	  which	  both	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  also	  part	  of.169	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  David	  McCraw,	  "New	  Zealand	  Foreign	  Policy	  under	  the	  Clark	  Government:	  High	  Tide	  of	  Liberal	  Internationalism?,"	  Pacific	  Affairs	  78,	  no.	  2	  (2005).	  168	  Helen	  Clark’s	  predecessor	  Jenny	  Shipley	  and	  her	  National	  party	  government	  made	  the	  initial	  commitment	  of	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  to	  the	  Australian-­‐led	  international	  force	  in	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET)	  in	  September	  1999.	  169	  John	  Crawford,	  In	  the	  Field	  for	  Peace:	  New	  Zealand's	  Contribution	  to	  International	  Peace-­‐
Support	  Operations:	  1950-­‐1995(New	  Zealand:	  New	  Zealand	  Defence	  Force,	  1996).	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Contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  remained	  consistent	  but	  small	  until	  the	  1990s,	  however	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  years	  New	  Zealand	  contributed	  to	  a	  wide	  geographical	  range	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  missions	  had	  direct	  bearing	  on	  national	  interest	  beyond	  advancing	  an	  internationalist	  reputation.	  New	  Zealand	  was	  elected	  to	  a	  temporary	  seat	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  1993,	  and	  it	  was	  during	  this	  period	  that	  New	  Zealand	  decided	  to	  contribute	  a	  combat	  unit	  to	  UNPROFOR	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Croatia.	  At	  the	  time	  it	  was	  the	  largest	  troop	  contribution	  New	  Zealand	  had	  ever	  made	  to	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operation.	  	  Peacekeeping	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  Early	  2000s	  The	  failures	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  the	  1990s,	  particularly	  in	  Bosnia,	  Somalia	  and	  Rwanda,	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  many	  troop	  contributors,	  which	  realized	  that	  the	  mandates	  and	  operational	  procedures	  that	  had	  been	  put	  in	  place	  were	  not	  appropriate	  for	  the	  conflicts	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  resolve.	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  left	  Bosnia	  with	  lessons	  learned,	  the	  NZDF	  did	  not	  experience	  the	  same	  collective	  repudiation	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  as	  some	  other	  Western	  contributors	  did.	  This	  is	  likely	  because	  New	  Zealand’s	  deployments	  were	  smaller	  than	  others,	  and	  it	  played	  less	  of	  a	  role	  in	  the	  command	  and	  control	  of	  missions,	  therefore	  bearing	  less	  responsibility	  for	  operational	  failures.	  In	  addition,	  because	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  were	  located	  in	  areas	  of	  relative	  calm	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  undertook	  non-­‐combat	  functions,	  they	  witnessed	  fewer	  atrocities	  and	  suffered	  less	  from	  the	  inability	  to	  prevent	  them	  than	  the	  Dutch	  at	  Srebrenica	  or	  the	  Canadians	  in	  Rwanda.	  New	  Zealand	  left	  Bosnia	  with	  similar	  lessons	  learned	  as	  Canada,	  namely	  that	  peacekeeping	  mandates	  would	  need	  to	  become	  more	  robust	  to	  deal	  with	  complex	  modern	  conflicts.	  New	  Zealand	  also	  felt	  that	  its	  peacekeeping	  troops	  needed	  robust	  mandates	  behind	  them	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  themselves	  in	  unstable	  and	  unpredictable	  security	  environments.170	  In	  addition,	  New	  Zealand’s	  experience	  in	  UNPROFOR	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  at	  the	  time	  the	  NZDF	  was	  not	  entirely	  appropriately	  equipped	  for	  UN	  operations.	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  NZDF	  Official	  3,	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  author,	  October	  2014	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Bosnia	  New	  Zealand	  managed	  to	  largely	  avoid	  the	  scandals	  that	  swirled	  around	  UNPROFOR	  peacekeepers	  from	  other	  countries,	  however	  Kiwi	  troops	  did	  not	  completely	  avoid	  controversy	  and	  trouble.	  They	  found	  that	  their	  kit	  and	  equipment,	  including	  their	  armed	  personnel	  carriers	  (APCs),	  were	  outdated	  (having	  not	  been	  replaced	  since	  Vietnam),	  which	  was	  highly	  embarrassing.	  One	  New	  Zealand	  peacekeeper	  who	  served	  in	  UNPROFOR	  claims	  that	  the	  Kiwis’	  kit	  was	  so	  woefully	  old	  and	  inadequate	  that	  soldiers	  had	  to	  “borrow	  and	  steal	  all	  over	  Bosnia”	  to	  get	  what	  they	  needed.171	  In	  addition,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  peacekeepers	  suffered	  a	  blow	  to	  reputation	  and	  morale	  when	  one	  of	  their	  outdated	  APCs	  malfunctioned	  and	  ran	  over	  two	  children,	  killing	  them.172	  	  	  Although	  peacekeepers	  endured	  difficult	  conditions	  and	  poor	  equipment,	  one	  senior	  NZDF	  official	  attested,	  “Our	  forces	  returned…confident	  in	  their	  professional	  ability	  and	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  performance.”173	  Despite	  the	  damage	  the	  NZDF’s	  experience	  in	  Bosnia	  might	  have	  done	  to	  its	  perception	  of	  the	  UN	  as	  an	  efficient	  operational	  mechanism	  for	  delivering	  peace	  and	  stability,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  contingents	  deployed	  to	  Bosnia	  were	  considered	  highly	  successful	  in	  their	  peacekeeping	  efforts.	  According	  to	  NZDF	  historian	  John	  Crawford,	  	  	  The	  New	  Zealanders’	  success	  was	  due	  in	  no	  small	  degree	  to	  their	  professional,	  but	  friendly	  and	  outgoing	  manner,	  which	  impressed	  the	  local	  population.	  They	  also	  took	  a	  range	  of	  innovative	  measures	  to	  develop	  better	  relations	  with,	  and	  between,	  the	  local	  Croat	  and	  Muslim	  communities…By	  late	  1995	  the	  New	  Zealand	  area	  of	  responsibility	  was	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  settled	  part	  of	  central	  Bosnia.174	  	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  was	  involved	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  Somalia	  on	  a	  much	  smaller	  scale	  than	  in	  Bosnia,	  these	  peacekeeping	  missions	  also	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  how	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Scott,	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  author.	  172	  David	  S.	  Weissbrodt,	  International	  Human	  Rights:	  Law,	  Policy,	  and	  Process(LexisNexis,	  2009).	  173	  NZDF	  Official	  1,	  email	  message	  to	  author,	  8	  October,	  2014	  174	  Crawford,	  In	  the	  Field	  for	  Peace:	  New	  Zealand's	  Contribution	  to	  International	  Peace-­‐Support	  
Operations:	  1950-­‐1995,	  67.	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New	  Zealand	  government	  and	  the	  NZDF	  have	  approached	  UN	  peacekeeping	  since.	  	  	  
Somalia	  New	  Zealand	  contributed	  army	  and	  air	  force	  personnel	  and	  equipment	  to	  various	  UN	  Operations	  and	  a	  UN-­‐authorized,	  US-­‐led	  multinational	  force	  in	  Somalia	  between	  1992	  and	  1994.	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  made	  important	  contributions	  to	  these	  missions,	  and	  earned	  a	  reputation	  as	  “hard	  workers	  who	  were	  prepared	  to	  go	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  assist	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  force,”175	  they	  could	  not	  claim	  to	  have	  been	  part	  of	  building	  a	  lasting	  peace	  in	  Somalia.	  UNOSOM	  II	  wound	  up	  in	  1995,	  having	  achieved	  its	  goal	  of	  ending	  famine	  in	  Somalia,	  but	  not	  its	  goal	  of	  ending	  the	  violent	  conflict	  ravaging	  the	  failed	  state.	  Like	  Bosnia,	  Somalia	  taught	  New	  Zealand	  that	  the	  UN	  isn’t	  capable	  of	  containing	  and	  resolving	  every	  conflict,	  particularly	  with	  a	  traditional	  approach.	  	  
Rwanda	  During	  the	  same	  period	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  unimpeded	  by	  the	  small	  UN	  mission,	  shocked	  the	  world.	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  didn’t	  contribute	  troops	  to	  UNAMIR,	  it	  did	  have	  a	  temporary	  seat	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  led	  a	  small	  group	  of	  countries	  in	  a	  push	  to	  reinforce	  UNAMIR	  and	  to	  recognize	  the	  events	  unfolding	  in	  Rwanda	  as	  genocide.	  Sadly,	  New	  Zealand’s	  calls	  for	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  end	  the	  genocide	  fell	  upon	  the	  deaf	  ears	  of	  the	  major	  powers	  on	  the	  Security	  Council,	  some	  who	  were	  distracted	  by	  events	  unfolding	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  others	  who	  had	  their	  own	  neo-­‐colonial	  agendas	  where	  Rwanda	  was	  concerned.	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  could	  be	  proud	  of	  its	  conduct	  during	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  proud	  of	  the	  international	  body	  of	  which	  it	  was	  a	  part,	  and	  could	  not	  be	  confident	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  to	  prevent	  such	  atrocities	  in	  the	  future.	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  Ibid.,	  71.	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East	  Timor	  Although	  New	  Zealand’s	  perception	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  was	  damaged	  during	  the	  1990s,	  the	  NZDF’s	  next	  major	  peacekeeping	  deployment	  –	  in	  East	  Timor	  from	  2000	  until	  2013	  –	  was	  a	  more	  positive	  experience	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  more	  effective	  mission	  mandates	  issued	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  however	  the	  NZDF	  had	  also	  taken	  the	  years	  since	  Bosnia	  to	  upgrade	  kit	  and	  equipment,	  and	  to	  improve	  tactics	  and	  procedures.	  In	  addition,	  New	  Zealand’s	  engagement	  in	  East	  Timor	  was	  initiated	  under	  very	  different	  circumstances	  than	  previous	  peace	  operations.	  Due	  to	  the	  rapid	  escalation	  of	  hostilities	  in	  1999	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  authorized	  the	  deployment	  of	  an	  Australian-­‐led	  multinational	  force	  in	  September	  of	  that	  year	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  security	  to	  East	  Timor	  and	  to	  protect	  and	  support	  the	  UN	  Mission	  in	  East	  Timor	  (UNAMET),	  which	  had	  been	  put	  in	  place	  to	  oversee	  a	  referendum	  on	  East	  Timor’s	  independence	  from	  Indonesia.	  INTERFET	  was	  deployed	  quickly,	  and	  was	  able	  to	  stabilize	  East	  Timor	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  months.	  It	  was	  an	  example	  the	  hybrid	  stabilization	  missions	  that	  have	  become	  increasingly	  common	  for	  Western	  militaries	  to	  contribute	  troops	  to.	  In	  February	  2000	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  in	  INTERFET	  were	  re-­‐hatted	  as	  troops	  in	  the	  follow	  on	  UN	  mission,	  UNTAET.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  NZDF’s	  role	  in	  INTERFET,	  it	  played	  a	  much	  greater	  role	  in	  UNTAET	  and	  subsequent	  UN	  missions	  in	  East	  Timor	  than	  it	  had	  in	  Bosnia,	  both	  politically	  and	  operationally,	  which	  increased	  New	  Zealand’s	  ownership	  of	  the	  peacekeeping	  process.	  Despite	  facing	  unfriendly	  environmental	  conditions	  and	  a	  political	  powder	  keg,	  New	  Zealand	  forces	  were	  widely	  commended	  for	  their	  participation	  in	  multinational	  forces	  and	  UN-­‐led	  operations.	  New	  Zealand’s	  role	  as	  a	  defender	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  Pacific	  was	  affirmed,	  and	  despite	  the	  strain	  large	  deployments	  placed	  on	  the	  NZDF	  and	  other	  government	  ministries,	  it	  was	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  NZDF	  to	  gain	  operational	  experience.	  New	  Zealand	  forces	  left	  East	  Timor	  in	  2013	  with	  what	  is	  hoped	  to	  be	  sustainable	  peace,	  and	  unlike	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Somalia,	  the	  feeling	  that	  the	  operations	  had	  accomplished	  their	  missions.	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Contributor	  Fatigue	  Despite	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  participation	  in	  peace	  support	  operations	  in	  East	  Timor,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  intense	  operational	  tempo	  of	  these	  operations,	  combined	  with	  non-­‐UN	  engagements	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  Afghanistan	  during	  the	  2000s,	  resulted	  in	  fatigue	  in	  the	  NZDF,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  current	  low	  number	  of	  personnel	  in	  UN	  peace	  operations.176	  When	  major	  operations	  ended	  in	  East	  Timor	  this	  was	  of	  particular	  concern	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Army,	  which	  had	  rotated	  both	  of	  its	  two	  battalions	  through	  INTERFET	  and	  subsequent	  UN	  missions	  a	  number	  of	  times.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Defence	  Forces	  are	  not	  the	  only	  party	  affected	  by	  the	  large	  deployments	  in	  recent	  years;	  the	  Ministries	  of	  Defence	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  had	  to	  devote	  substantial	  resources	  in	  New	  Zealand	  to	  supporting	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan,	  East	  Timor	  and	  Solomon	  Islands.177	  New	  Zealand’s	  UN	  troop	  contributions	  have	  been	  at	  similar	  levels	  in	  the	  past	  when	  there	  have	  been	  other	  major	  military	  operations	  ongoing,	  for	  example	  in	  1998	  and	  1999	  when	  forces	  were	  deployed	  to	  non-­‐UN	  missions	  in	  Bougainville,	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  Sinai	  Peninsula.	  However	  they	  have	  also	  been	  at	  similar	  levels	  when	  there	  have	  been	  no	  major	  ongoing	  or	  recently	  concluded	  military	  operations,	  such	  as	  in	  1991,	  when	  contributions	  sank	  to	  a	  total	  of	  four	  uniformed	  personnel.178	  So	  although	  the	  fatigue	  the	  NZDF	  and	  other	  government	  ministries	  might	  be	  feeling	  is	  real,	  there	  are	  undoubtedly	  other	  factors	  driving	  down	  contributions.	  	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  Traditional	  Defence	  Partners	  The	  2013	  The	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee’s	  2013	  “Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review”	  indicates	  the	  strong	  preference	  New	  Zealand	  has	  for	  deploying	  alongside	  its	  close	  partners	  to	  these	  kinds	  of	  operations:	  “New	  Zealand	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  NZDF	  Official	  2,	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  author,	  October	  2014	  177	  For	  example,	  an	  MFAT	  civilian	  employee	  headed	  the	  Provincial	  Reconstruction	  Team	  in	  Afghanistan	  from	  2010	  until	  2013,	  and	  this	  position	  was	  in	  turn	  supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  staff	  at	  the	  ministry	  in	  Wellington.	  178	  New	  Zealand	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  Gulf	  War	  until	  April	  1991,	  however	  it	  only	  made	  small	  contributions	  of	  aircraft	  and	  medical	  teams,	  no	  combat	  troops.	  	  Data	  drawn	  from	  "Providing	  for	  Peacekeeping	  -­‐	  Peacekeeping	  Data".	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will	  continue	  to	  look	  for	  opportunities	  to	  work	  with	  close	  partners,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  Canada	  in	  peace	  support	  initiatives.”179	  Given	  this	  preference	  and	  the	  negligible	  troop	  contributions	  from	  these	  partner	  countries	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  New	  Zealand	  has	  been	  deploying	  more	  troops	  to	  non-­‐UN	  operations	  and	  fewer	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  
Australia	  New	  Zealand’s	  defence	  relationships	  have	  consistently	  had	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  influence	  over	  New	  Zealand’s	  decisions	  about	  peace	  support	  operations,	  and	  none	  more	  so	  than	  New	  Zealand’s	  relationship	  with	  Australia.	  The	  countries	  are	  not	  only	  geographically	  and	  culturally	  close,	  but	  their	  militaries	  also	  have	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  inter-­‐operability,	  frequently	  conducting	  joint	  training	  exercises	  and	  operations.	  They	  deployed	  together	  to	  East	  Timor	  and	  in	  the	  Solomon	  Islands,	  restoring	  temporary	  stability	  in	  both	  countries,	  and	  in	  2012	  their	  Defence	  Ministers	  introduced	  an	  Australia/New	  Zealand	  defence	  relationship	  framework	  detailing	  practical	  ways	  for	  the	  neighbors	  to	  strengthen	  defence	  cooperation.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  any	  future	  peace	  operations	  in	  the	  region	  will	  involve	  further	  cooperation	  between	  these	  two	  countries.	  Australia’s	  2013	  Defence	  White	  Paper	  states:	  	   New	  Zealand	  is	  the	  country	  we	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  conduct	  operations	  with	  in	  our	  region...	  The	  Government	  is	  committed	  to	  working	  with	  New	  Zealand	  to	  enhance	  peace,	  security	  and	  stability	  in	  our	  region.	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  must	  align	  our	  defence	  postures	  and	  continue	  to	  coordinate	  our	  approaches	  to	  defence	  cooperation.180	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  2010	  Defence	  White	  Paper	  mentions	  partnership	  with	  Australia	  in	  terms	  of	  regional	  security	  efforts,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  operations	  beyond	  the	  Pacific:	  “New	  Zealand	  will	  also	  work	  closely	  with	  Australia	  to	  identify	  areas	  of	  common	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  peace	  and	  security	  beyond	  our	  region.	  At	  times	  this	  might	  mean	  that	  New	  Zealand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review,"	  5.	  180	  Australian	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  "Defence	  White	  Paper,"(2013),	  63.	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will	  combine	  with	  Australia	  in	  an	  extra-­‐regional	  action.”181	  However	  recent	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Australian	  military	  has	  not	  involved	  UN	  peacekeeping	  at	  all.	  Australia	  has	  made	  little	  more	  than	  token	  troop	  contributions	  to	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  since	  it’s	  involvement	  in	  East	  Timor	  ended	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  It	  has,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  contributed	  far	  higher	  numbers	  to	  NATO	  and	  US-­‐led	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan.	  	  	  Despite	  New	  Zealand’s	  preference	  for	  working	  alongside	  Australia,	  and	  although	  any	  military	  engagement	  in	  the	  Pacific	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  undertaken	  together,	  New	  Zealand	  has	  in	  the	  past	  taken	  different	  approaches	  to	  military	  operations	  outside	  of	  its	  immediate	  region,	  and	  may	  do	  so	  in	  the	  future.182	  Australia’s	  disregard	  for	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  may	  influence	  New	  Zealand’s	  troop	  contributions,	  but	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  determine	  them.	  	  
The	  United	  States	  Especially	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  and	  a	  half,	  the	  US	  has	  had	  some	  degree	  of	  influence	  over	  New	  Zealand’s	  military	  deployments.	  In	  1985	  New	  Zealand	  declared	  itself	  a	  nuclear	  free	  zone,	  denying	  foreign	  ships	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  carry	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  dock	  in	  its	  harbors,	  and	  causing	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  US-­‐New	  Zealand	  security	  relationship.	  A	  period	  of	  considerably	  cool	  relations	  with	  the	  US	  followed.	  The	  relationship	  began	  to	  improve	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  which	  shocked	  New	  Zealanders	  and	  prompted	  an	  outpouring	  of	  public	  and	  political	  support	  for	  the	  US.	  New	  Zealand	  decried	  the	  attack	  on	  Western	  values	  and	  stood	  strongly	  beside	  its	  former	  ally,	  although	  the	  government	  later	  refused	  to	  commit	  New	  Zealand	  forces	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  in	  Iraq	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  UN	  Security	  Council	  mandate.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  since	  9/11	  the	  relationship	  has	  continued	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  "Defence	  White	  Paper	  2010,"(Wellington2010),	  28.	  182	  Unlike	  New	  Zealand,	  Australia	  did	  not	  make	  any	  significant	  troop	  contribution	  in	  Bosnia.	  New	  Zealand	  did	  not	  contribute	  troops	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  UN	  Security	  Council	  mandate,	  whereas	  Australia	  contributed	  over	  2000	  troops	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  war.	  Australia	  has	  made	  larger	  troop	  contributions	  than	  New	  Zealand	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  campaign	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  has	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  air	  campaign	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Levant,	  whereas	  New	  Zealand	  has	  only	  considered	  pledging	  training	  support.	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blossom,	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  Helen	  Clark183	  and	  current	  Prime	  Minister	  John	  Key.	  The	  Wellington	  and	  Washington	  Declarations,	  signed	  in	  2010	  and	  2012	  respectively,	  have	  been	  key	  in	  strengthening	  the	  defence	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  and	  demonstrating	  a	  shared	  commitment	  to	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  development	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  contributions	  to	  NATO	  and	  US-­‐led	  operation	  in	  Afghanistan	  have	  also	  gone	  a	  long	  way	  in	  improving	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  These	  contributions	  are	  a	  sign	  that	  New	  Zealand	  is	  not	  only	  willing	  to	  deploy	  alongside	  the	  United	  States	  military,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  NZDF	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  comfort	  doing	  so.	  Combat-­‐focused	  joint	  military	  exercises	  have	  been	  ramping	  up	  since	  2012,184	  which	  is	  further	  evidence	  that	  the	  NZDF	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  operational	  harmony	  with	  the	  United	  States	  military,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  trust.	  New	  Zealand’s	  2010	  Defense	  White	  Paper	  refers	  to	  the	  US	  as	  a	  ‘close	  security	  partner’	  and	  outlines	  the	  benefits	  of	  New	  Zealand	  being	  “an	  engaged,	  active	  and	  stalwart	  partner	  of	  the	  US.”185	  The	  development	  of	  this	  relationship	  could	  lead	  to	  further	  military	  cooperation	  in	  the	  coming	  years,	  although	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  give	  the	  US’s	  attitude	  towards	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  operations.	  	  
NATO	  In	  addition	  to	  fortifying	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  US,	  New	  Zealand	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  its	  ties	  with	  NATO,	  which	  considers	  New	  Zealand	  as	  one	  of	  its	  core	  partners.	  New	  Zealand’s	  relationship	  with	  NATO	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  the	  country’s	  historical	  commitment	  to	  collective	  security	  and	  its	  ties	  to	  key	  members	  like	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  Canada.	  It	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  number	  of	  NATO-­‐led	  peace	  operations	  since	  troops	  were	  re-­‐hatted	  from	  UNPROFOR	  to	  IFOR	  in	  1995.	  But	  the	  more	  recent	  improvement	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  organization	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  security	  environment,	  which	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  See"Wikileaks	  Cable:	  Scene-­‐Setter	  for	  Helen	  Clark's	  US	  Visit,"	  (2010),	  http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10693849.	  184	  Audrey	  Young,	  "Military	  Combat	  Exercise	  with	  US	  First	  for	  27	  Years,"	  (2012),	  http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10798003.	  185	  New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  "Defence	  White	  Paper	  2010,"	  19.	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has	  strengthened	  solidarity	  among	  members	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community.	  New	  Zealand’s	  participation	  in	  NATO	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  its	  support	  for	  Western	  partners	  that	  had	  been	  targeted	  by	  terrorist	  groups	  harbored	  within	  the	  country.	  	  	  In	  2012	  John	  Key	  pledged	  even	  closer	  security	  cooperation	  with	  NATO	  after	  signing	  a	  new	  partnership	  cooperation	  accord	  that	  formalized	  ties	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  Alliance.	  NATO	  Secretary	  General	  Anders	  Fogh	  Rasmussen’s	  comments	  and	  the	  text	  of	  the	  accord	  make	  frequent	  reference	  to	  the	  shared	  norms	  and	  understandings	  that	  bind	  New	  Zealand	  and	  members	  of	  the	  alliance	  into	  the	  Western	  security	  community:	  “We	  may	  be	  far	  away	  geographically,	  but	  we	  are	  linked	  by	  common	  values	  and	  commitment.”186	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  New	  Zealand’s	  troops	  in	  Afghanistan	  were	  “making	  a	  real	  difference	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  our	  shared	  security.”187	  The	  accord	  itself	  refers	  to	  a	  partnership	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  NATO	  “built	  upon	  a	  foundation	  of	  shared	  principles:	  common	  democratic	  values,”	  makes	  reference	  to	  “common	  challenges,”	  and	  mentions	  efforts	  to	  “increase	  interoperability	  and	  cooperation	  between	  NATO	  and	  New	  Zealand	  forces.”188	  This	  partnership,	  built	  on	  a	  foundation	  of	  shared	  values	  and	  reinforced	  by	  New	  Zealand’s	  experiences	  deploying	  alongside	  NATO	  partners,	  could	  result	  in	  a	  continued	  preference,	  or	  sense	  of	  duty	  to	  deploy	  to	  NATO	  peace	  support	  operations	  over	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  NATO,	  "NATO	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Sign	  New	  Partnership	  Accord,"	  (2012),	  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_88122.htm.	  187	  "Joint	  Press	  Point	  by	  NATO	  Secretary	  General	  Anders	  Fogh	  Rasmussen	  and	  John	  Key,	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  New	  Zealand,"(YouTube,	  2012).	  188	  NATO	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  "Individual	  Partnership	  and	  Cooperation	  Programme	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  NATO"	  (Brussels,	  4	  June	  2012).	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contributor	  to	  the	  mission,	  and	  the	  two	  militaries	  cooperated	  closely	  throughout.	  Australia’s	  presence	  and	  the	  trust	  between	  the	  two	  militaries	  gave	  New	  Zealand	  the	  confidence	  to	  deploy	  such	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  its	  forces.	  Had	  Australia	  not	  been	  involved	  in	  operations	  in	  East	  Timor	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  New	  Zealand	  would	  have	  made	  such	  a	  substantial	  troop	  contribution,	  if	  any	  at	  all.	  	  To	  say	  that	  New	  Zealand	  has	  an	  operational	  preference	  for	  deploying	  peacekeeping	  troops	  alongside	  its	  allies	  or	  traditional	  defence	  partners	  by	  no	  means	  implies	  that	  New	  Zealanders	  do	  not	  work	  well	  with	  other	  countries	  and	  troops.	  New	  Zealanders	  frequently	  point	  out	  that	  their	  peacekeeping	  troops	  have	  a	  reputation	  for	  working	  well	  in	  peace	  operations	  that	  require	  cultural	  sensitivity	  and	  understanding	  both	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  locals	  and	  peacekeepers	  from	  other	  countries.190	  One	  NZDF	  official	  attested,	  	  	   We	  are	  a	  capable,	  professional	  force	  and	  we	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  slot	  relatively	  seamlessly	  into	  a	  multi-­‐national	  force	  environment.	  ...Most	  of	  all	  we	  are	  trusted	  –	  as	  a	  nation,	  as	  a	  defence	  force	  and	  as	  individuals…Kiwis’	  ‘cultural	  empathy’	  with	  most	  people	  regardless	  of	  background,	  religion	  or	  ethnicity,	  opens	  doors	  which	  others	  can’t,	  and	  greatly	  assists	  our	  effectiveness	  as	  peace-­‐keepers.191	  	  However,	  for	  a	  country	  with	  a	  small	  military	  and	  limited	  defence	  capabilities,	  a	  preference	  for	  deploying	  alongside	  partners	  with	  which	  it	  has	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  operational	  harmony	  is	  not	  surprising.	  The	  Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review”	  proposes	  that	  officials	  consider	  the	  question:	  “Are	  any	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  traditional	  security	  partners	  contributing	  to	  the	  mission…?”192	  when	  formulating	  advice	  for	  ministers	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  potential	  peace	  support	  operation	  contributions.	  With	  relationships	  built	  on	  shared	  values	  and	  culture,	  as	  well	  as	  similar	  military	  training	  standards	  and	  operational	  methods,	  New	  Zealand	  can	  trust	  partners	  within	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  to	  provide	  additional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Robert	  Ayson,	  "New	  Zealand:	  Armed	  to	  Make	  a	  Difference?,"	  in	  Forces	  for	  Good:	  Cosmopolitan	  
Militaries	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century(Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Crawford,	  
In	  the	  Field	  for	  Peace:	  New	  Zealand's	  Contribution	  to	  International	  Peace-­‐Support	  Operations:	  
1950-­‐1995.	  NZDF	  Official	  1,	  email	  message	  to	  the	  author;	  NZDF	  Official	  2,	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  author.	  191	  NZDF	  Official	  1,	  email	  message	  to	  author.	  192	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review,"	  5.	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security	  for	  its	  troops.	  Most	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  deployments	  to	  peace	  operations	  are	  small	  and	  do	  not	  include	  force	  protection	  elements,	  and	  therefore	  must	  rely	  on	  operational	  partners	  to	  provide	  protection.	  For	  the	  New	  Zealand	  government	  the	  safety	  of	  troops	  deployed	  to	  peace	  operations	  is	  paramount:	  the	  “Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review”	  declares,	  “A	  high	  premium	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  New	  Zealand	  personnel	  deployed	  on	  PSOs	  and	  officials	  will	  continue	  to	  take	  all	  possible	  steps	  to	  manage	  the	  risks.”193	  	  For	  a	  small	  country	  like	  New	  Zealand	  the	  political	  benefits	  or	  consequences	  of	  contributing	  to	  one	  peace	  operation	  or	  another	  are	  an	  undeniable	  factor	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Whereas	  UN	  peacekeeping	  was	  widely	  popular	  in	  the	  West	  during	  and	  immediately	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  therefore	  contributions	  had	  high	  political	  capital,	  today	  Western	  major	  powers	  see	  contributions	  to	  NATO	  or	  other	  coalition	  efforts	  as	  more	  valuable	  than	  UN	  contributions,	  and	  therefore	  countries	  like	  New	  Zealand	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  feel	  pressure	  from	  their	  peers	  to	  contribute	  to	  these	  types	  of	  operations.	  Ultimately	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  consequences	  of	  turning	  down	  a	  request	  for	  troops	  from	  UNDPKO	  are	  far	  less	  grave	  than	  the	  consequences	  of	  turning	  down	  a	  request	  from	  a	  defence	  partner	  like	  the	  US	  could	  be.	  Although	  New	  Zealand’s	  refusal	  to	  send	  troops	  in	  the	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  shows	  it	  is	  not	  afraid	  to	  defy	  the	  US,	  the	  current	  National	  government	  has	  been	  quick	  to	  highlight	  the	  economic	  and	  security	  benefits	  of	  maintaining	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  US.	  	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific	  and	  the	  UN	  in	  Africa	  In	  addition	  to	  which	  organizations	  and	  operations	  New	  Zealand	  now	  chooses	  to	  contribute	  troops	  to,	  another	  factor	  that	  has	  impacted	  the	  country’s	  dwindling	  number	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  and	  that	  may	  influence	  future	  troop	  contributions,	  is	  where	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  taking	  place;	  the	  majority	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers	  are	  now	  in	  Africa.194	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  has	  sent	  military	  observers	  and	  staff	  officers	  to	  African	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  the	  past,	  it	  has	  not	  made	  more	  than	  a	  small	  number	  of	  token	  contributions	  in	  Africa	  since	  it	  sent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  Ibid.,	  6.	  194	  Eighty	  percent	  of	  UN	  troops	  and	  military	  experts	  are	  deployed	  in	  nine	  African	  peacekeeping	  missions.	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a	  forty-­‐three	  person	  supply	  platoon	  to	  Somalia	  in	  1993.	  Today	  the	  only	  contribution	  in	  Africa	  is	  three	  staff	  officers	  in	  the	  UN	  Mission	  in	  South	  Sudan	  (UNMISS).	  	  	  Despite	  New	  Zealand’s	  insistence	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  international	  citizen,	  the	  bulk	  of	  its	  UN	  peacekeeping	  contributions	  have	  been	  to	  missions	  in	  Europe,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  East	  Timor	  –	  regions	  where	  either	  New	  Zealand	  or	  its	  traditional	  defence	  partners	  have	  had	  strategic	  national	  interests.	  Placing	  national	  interest	  over	  good	  global	  citizenship	  is	  increasingly	  reflected	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  policies	  on	  UN	  peacekeeping.195	  In	  addition,	  Africa	  is	  not	  only	  geographically	  distant	  from	  New	  Zealand,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  few	  cultural	  or	  diplomatic	  ties	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  African	  countries.	  As	  a	  result,	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  this	  region	  is	  not	  New	  Zealand’s	  greatest	  concern,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  so	  many	  of	  the	  UN’s	  resources	  are	  devoted	  to	  African	  conflicts.	  Even	  if	  New	  Zealand	  did	  want	  to	  contribute	  a	  formed	  unit	  to	  one	  of	  these	  missions,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  it	  would	  do	  so	  without	  the	  company	  of	  one	  of	  its	  traditional	  defence	  partners.	  	  The	  New	  Zealand	  government	  and	  the	  NZDF	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  playing	  a	  conflict	  management	  or	  peacebuilding	  role	  in	  the	  immediate	  region.	  The	  “Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review”	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  South	  Pacific	  is	  New	  Zealand’s	  priority,	  and	  “that	  discretionary	  peace	  support	  operations	  further	  afield	  should	  not	  affect	  New	  Zealand’s	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  an	  emerging	  crisis”196	  in	  this	  region.	  However,	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  stability	  restored	  to	  East	  Timor	  and	  the	  Solomon	  Islands,	  any	  engagement	  in	  the	  Pacific	  is,	  for	  now,	  hypothetical.	  There	  are	  many	  conflicts	  raging	  around	  the	  world	  that	  are	  not,	  and	  to	  which	  New	  Zealand	  could,	  but	  doesn’t	  contribute	  troops.	  With	  less	  than	  a	  dozen	  NZDF	  personnel	  deployed	  to	  UN	  missions,	  and	  roughly	  another	  100	  deployed	  to	  non-­‐UN	  peace	  support	  operations	  it	  seems	  that	  New	  Zealand	  could	  be	  doing	  a	  lot	  more	  without	  compromising	  its	  regional	  commitment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Michael	  Field	  and	  Michael	  Fox,	  "NZ	  Reviews	  Peacekeeping,"	  	  Stuff.co.nz(2014),	  http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10168029/NZ-­‐could-­‐give-­‐up-­‐UN-­‐peacekeeping.	  196	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Minute	  of	  Decision:	  Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review,"(Wellington2013),	  1.	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For	  New	  Zealand	  to	  maintain	  its	  reputation	  as	  a	  good	  international	  citizen	  it	  should	  be	  contributing	  where	  assistance	  is	  needed	  most,	  not	  just	  waiting	  for	  something	  to	  go	  wrong	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific.	  Based	  on	  its	  current	  low	  number	  of	  contributions	  to	  peace	  operations	  (less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  NZDF	  personnel),	  the	  NZDF	  should	  be	  able	  to	  deploy	  more	  military	  experts	  and	  staff	  officers,	  or	  even	  a	  specialized	  unit,	  and	  still	  maintain	  the	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  crises	  in	  their	  region.	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Campaign	  New	  Zealand	  has	  been	  elected	  to	  serve	  a	  two-­‐year	  term	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  from	  2015-­‐2016,	  which	  has	  raised	  questions	  about	  its	  peacekeeping	  contributions.	  During	  the	  campaign	  New	  Zealand	  traded	  on	  its	  past	  reputation	  as	  a	  contributor	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  and	  the	  role	  it	  played	  in	  trying	  to	  recognize	  and	  contain	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  when	  it	  had	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  council	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  However	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Murray	  McCully	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  New	  Zealand	  would	  not	  attempt	  to	  buy	  votes:	  “Both	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  I	  laid	  down	  two	  very	  clear	  conditions:	  we	  would	  not	  attempt	  to	  buy	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  Security	  Council,	  either	  by	  spending	  New	  Zealand	  taxpayers’	  dollars	  or	  by	  changing	  New	  Zealand	  policy	  positions.”197	  The	  commitment	  to	  sticking	  to	  policy	  positions	  included	  policies	  on	  UN	  peacekeeping	  engagement:	  New	  Zealand’s	  troop	  contributions	  did	  not	  see	  any	  significant	  increase	  throughout	  the	  ten-­‐year	  campaign,	  nor	  were	  troops	  deployed	  in	  any	  significant	  numbers	  to	  new	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  	  	  New	  Zealand’s	  Future	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Given	  New	  Zealand’s	  upcoming	  role	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  and	  if	  New	  Zealand	  will	  decide	  to	  re-­‐engage	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  Despite	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  South	  Pacific,	  New	  Zealand	  still	  has	  the	  numbers	  and	  the	  capabilities	  to	  make	  meaningful	  contributions	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  through	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Hon.	  Murray	  McCully,	  "Speech	  to	  New	  Zealand	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs:	  NZ's	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Campaign	  and	  Reform,"	  news	  release,	  12	  June,	  2012,	  https://www.national.org.nz/news/news/media-­‐releases/detail/2012/06/12/speech-­‐to-­‐new-­‐zealand-­‐institute-­‐of-­‐international-­‐affairs-­‐nz-­‐s-­‐un-­‐security-­‐council-­‐campaign-­‐and-­‐reform.	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UN.	  Despite	  the	  insistence	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  that	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  council	  won’t	  necessarily	  mean	  increasing	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions,198	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  New	  Zealand	  may	  feel	  the	  pressure	  to	  increase	  troops	  contributions.199	  However,	  in	  recent	  years	  there	  have	  been	  temporary	  Security	  Council	  members,	  including	  Australia,	  which	  have	  not	  increased	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  at	  all	  while	  on	  the	  Council.	  In	  fact,	  Australia’s	  troop	  contributions	  decreased	  during	  its	  term	  on	  the	  Security	  Council.	  200	  	  Another	  factor	  that	  may	  affect	  future	  contributions	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  contribution	  to	  coalition	  efforts	  to	  combat	  ISIL.	  Although	  John	  Key’s	  government	  is	  currently	  considering	  troops	  in	  a	  training	  role	  rather	  than	  a	  combat	  one,201	  the	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  is	  unpredictable,	  and	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  New	  Zealand	  will	  ultimately	  be	  involved.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  government	  will	  use	  its	  expected	  participation	  in	  the	  coalition	  against	  ISIL	  as	  an	  excuse	  to	  hold	  back	  from	  engaging	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  Many	  New	  Zealanders	  also	  fear	  that	  even	  a	  training	  role	  in	  Iraq	  will	  be	  perceived	  by	  Islamic	  extremist	  terrorists	  as	  joining	  the	  war,	  and	  could	  make	  New	  Zealand	  a	  target	  for	  terrorism.	  Concern	  for	  domestic	  security	  may	  make	  the	  New	  Zealand	  government	  and	  public	  less	  receptive	  to	  deploying	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  New	  Zealand	  gets	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State,	  it	  will	  never	  be	  able	  or	  expected	  to	  contribute	  large	  numbers	  of	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  However,	  with	  one	  of	  the	  best-­‐trained	  militaries	  in	  the	  world,	  there	  are	  numerous	  areas	  in	  which	  a	  small	  but	  specialized	  contribution	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Charlie	  Greenhalgh,	  "Ambassador	  to	  UN	  Says	  Troops	  Won't	  Be	  Caught	  in	  Crossfire,"	  	  Newstalk	  
ZB(2014),	  http://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/news/national/ambassador-­‐to-­‐un-­‐says-­‐troops-­‐wont-­‐be-­‐caught-­‐in-­‐crossfire/.	  199	  Vernon	  Small,	  "Security	  Council	  Seat	  Would	  Bring	  Pressures,"	  	  Stuff.co.nz(2013),	  http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-­‐post/news/politics/8709430/Security-­‐Council-­‐seat-­‐would-­‐bring-­‐pressures.	  200	  United	  Nations,	  "United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping:	  Troop	  and	  Police	  Contributors	  Data	  Dashboard".	  201	  ONE	  News,	  "Iraqi	  Minister	  Tipped	  to	  Seek	  NZ's	  Help	  N	  Tackling	  ISIS,"	  (2015),	  http://tvnz.co.nz/national-­‐news/iraqi-­‐minister-­‐tipped-­‐seek-­‐nz-­‐s-­‐help-­‐in-­‐tackling-­‐isis-­‐6233737?autoStart=true.	  
	   76	  
make	  a	  significant	  impact.202	  In	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  one	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  peacekeeping	  niches	  was	  de-­‐mining,	  with	  NZDF	  personnel	  deployed	  to	  assist	  in	  demining	  campaigns	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  Afghanistan,	  Angola,	  Cambodia,	  and	  Mozambique.203	  The	  NZDF	  no	  longer	  has	  a	  de-­‐mining	  program,	  however	  it	  was	  an	  example	  of	  a	  specialized	  contribution	  that	  required	  small	  deployments	  and	  had	  a	  major	  impact.	  Current	  niche	  capabilities	  that	  the	  NZDF	  could	  contribute	  include	  expertise	  in	  Disarmament,	  Demobilization	  and	  Reintegration	  (DDR),	  post-­‐conflict	  nation-­‐building,	  military	  observers,	  community	  policing,	  and	  gender	  issues.	  	  New	  Zealand	  is	  also	  involved	  in	  capacity	  building	  and	  training	  for	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  and	  although	  these	  efforts	  are	  valuable,	  they	  are	  relatively	  risk-­‐free	  for	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  therefore	  easier	  to	  make	  than	  troop	  contributions.	  The	  challenge	  for	  the	  UN	  these	  days	  is	  to	  find	  countries	  willing	  to	  make	  contributions	  to	  efforts	  on	  the	  ground.	  So	  although	  New	  Zealand	  can	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  contributing	  in	  other	  ways	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  these	  contributions	  simply	  serve	  to	  further	  divide	  the	  countries	  willing	  to	  put	  their	  soldiers	  in	  harms	  way	  to	  secure	  peace,	  and	  those	  who	  are	  not.	  Contributing	  troops	  to	  a	  peace	  operation	  remains	  the	  most	  visible,	  and	  therefore	  most	  recognized	  contribution	  a	  country	  can	  make	  to	  peace	  operations.	  	  Conclusion	  As	  a	  smaller,	  less	  powerful	  member	  of	  Western	  security	  community,	  New	  Zealand’s	  peacekeeping	  agenda	  has	  been	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  of	  major	  powers	  and	  close	  partners	  like	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK.	  New	  Zealand	  has	  followed	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  in	  contributing	  primarily	  to	  non-­‐UN	  peace	  operations	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  its	  significant	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UNTAET,	  however	  the	  mission	  was	  consistent	  with	  New	  Zealand’s	  regional	  focus,	  and	  followed	  on	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Greener,	  "Contributor	  Profile:	  New	  Zealand";	  Peter	  Kennedy,	  "After	  the	  Missions:	  Predicting	  New	  Zealand's	  Security	  Future:	  Peter	  Kennedy	  Reports	  on	  a	  Recent	  Symposium	  in	  Wellington,"	  
New	  Zealand	  International	  Review,	  July-­‐August	  2013;	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  External	  Relations	  and	  Defence	  Committee,	  "Peace	  Support	  Operations	  Review."	  203	  Crawford,	  In	  the	  Field	  for	  Peace:	  New	  Zealand's	  Contribution	  to	  International	  Peace-­‐Support	  
Operations:	  1950-­‐1995.	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multinational	  operation	  INTERFET.	  Despite	  its	  self-­‐propagated	  identity	  as	  a	  good	  global	  citizen	  with	  an	  independent	  foreign	  policy,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  deploying	  its	  military	  New	  Zealand	  has	  always	  preferred	  to	  do	  so	  with	  traditional	  defence	  partners,	  and	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  increasingly	  influenced	  by	  its	  close	  friends	  in	  the	  Western	  security-­‐community	  	  This	  commitment	  to	  and	  reliance	  on	  its	  traditional	  defence	  partners	  combined	  with	  New	  Zealand’s	  strong	  focus	  on	  the	  South	  Pacific,	  has	  inadvertently	  pulled	  New	  Zealand	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  the	  regions	  where	  it	  is	  most	  common.	  Given	  their	  excellent	  training	  and	  ability	  to	  provide	  niche	  capabilities,	  it	  is	  a	  shame	  that	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  are	  not	  contributing	  to	  UN	  missions	  that	  are	  in	  need	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  support.	  But	  for	  New	  Zealand	  to	  re-­‐engage	  in	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way,	  either	  its	  partners	  will	  have	  to	  return	  to	  UN	  operations,	  or	  New	  Zealand	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  to	  put	  its	  confidence	  in	  new	  partners.	  In	  addition	  New	  Zealand	  will	  have	  to	  reevaluate	  what	  sort	  of	  capacity	  is	  actually	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  conflict	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific,	  and	  become	  less	  wary	  of	  deploying	  troops	  to	  conflicts	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world.
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Chapter	  4	  Conclusions	  	  The	  argument	  that	  has	  been	  put	  forth	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  systemic	  decline	  in	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  from	  the	  West	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  by	  using	  the	  security	  community	  concept.	  There	  are	  a	  myriad	  of	  factors	  that	  have	  driven	  contribution	  patterns	  and	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  but	  the	  reason	  that	  every	  country	  in	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  has	  followed	  the	  same	  general	  trend	  in	  contributions	  is	  due	  to	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  this	  community.	  The	  community	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  way	  it	  responds	  to	  threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  from	  within,	  but	  also,	  as	  troop	  contributions	  patterns	  show,	  from	  the	  outside.	  Today,	  the	  community’s	  way	  of	  responding	  militarily	  to	  these	  threats	  generally	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  NATO	  or	  like-­‐minded	  coalition	  operations.	  Their	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  are	  financial	  or	  involve	  capacity	  building	  and	  other	  non-­‐military	  support.	  Troop	  contributions	  are	  insignificant	  compared	  to	  the	  numbers	  committed	  by	  South	  Asian	  and	  African	  countries.	  But	  if	  there	  ever	  is	  a	  change	  in	  the	  position	  of	  Western	  countries	  on	  contributing	  troops	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  that	  change	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  seen	  across	  the	  security	  community.	  	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand:	  Differences	  and	  Similarities	  As	  members	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community,	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand’s	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  have	  decreased	  along	  with	  the	  contributions	  of	  other	  Western	  nations.	  But	  although	  these	  two	  countries	  have	  that	  and	  more	  in	  common,	  as	  the	  previous	  chapters	  show,	  their	  relationships	  with	  UN	  peacekeeping	  are	  complex	  and	  unique;	  colored	  by	  their	  historical	  experiences,	  national	  political	  climate	  and	  defence	  policies.	  	  	  Canada	  has	  always	  contributed	  to	  a	  wider	  geographic	  range	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  missions	  than	  New	  Zealand	  has.	  Of	  New	  Zealand’s	  two	  largest	  UN	  deployments	  one	  was	  its	  immediate	  region,	  i.e.	  East	  Timor,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bosnia,	  a	  region	  of	  strategic	  interest	  to	  key	  defence	  partners.	  Canada,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  contributed	  troops	  to	  a	  myriad	  of	  missions	  outside	  its	  own	  region	  and	  NATO’s	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areas	  of	  influence.	  Canada	  has	  also	  had	  a	  more	  consistently	  high	  percentage	  of	  its	  troops	  deployed	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  than	  New	  Zealand	  has.	  As	  a	  result	  Canada	  has	  a	  stronger	  identity	  as	  a	  nation	  of	  peacekeepers	  than	  New	  Zealand	  does.	  Although	  New	  Zealand	  often	  boasts	  about	  its	  peacekeeping	  record,204	  in	  reality	  apart	  from	  significant	  deployments	  to	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  East	  Timor,	  in	  the	  periods	  before,	  between,	  and	  after	  these	  engagements	  its	  contributions	  have	  been	  consistent,	  yet	  consistently	  low.	  	  Canada	  was	  never	  as	  particular	  about	  deploying	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  alongside	  traditional	  defence	  partners	  as	  New	  Zealand	  is.	  The	  reason	  is	  twofold:	  Firstly,	  Canada’s	  formed	  contingent	  contributions	  were	  usually	  sizeable	  enough	  that	  they	  could	  be	  self-­‐reliant	  for	  force	  protection	  and	  support.	  Secondly,	  Canada’s	  long	  history	  of	  peacekeeping	  troop	  contributions	  also	  meant	  that	  until	  the	  1990s	  Canada	  exercised	  significant	  influence	  and	  control	  over	  the	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	  peacekeeping	  missions,	  including	  by	  securing	  Force	  Commander	  appointments,	  allowing	  it	  a	  level	  of	  comfort	  when	  deploying	  troops.	  New	  Zealand	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  usually	  required	  support	  and	  protection	  from	  other	  peacekeepers	  because	  of	  the	  size	  of	  its	  contingent	  contributions.	  In	  addition,	  New	  Zealand	  lacks	  Canada’s	  illustrious	  peacekeeping	  record,	  and	  therefore	  never	  had	  as	  much	  influence	  over	  peacekeeping	  matters,	  and	  although	  well	  liked	  and	  respected,	  New	  Zealanders	  have	  not	  occupied	  as	  many	  key	  positions	  in	  peacekeeping	  missions	  as	  Canadians	  have.	  In	  order	  to	  feel	  a	  degree	  of	  comfort	  and	  control	  in	  its	  deployments	  New	  Zealand	  has	  preferred	  to	  work	  alongside	  militaries	  it	  can	  trust,	  and	  therefore	  it	  was	  the	  migration	  of	  Western	  powers	  from	  UN	  to	  non-­‐UN	  peace	  support	  operations	  that	  instigated	  New	  Zealand’s	  shift.	  	  	  But	  it	  is	  thanks,	  in	  part,	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  smaller	  contributions	  and	  lower	  level	  of	  influence	  in	  peacekeeping	  missions	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  pass	  through	  peacekeeping	  in	  the	  1990s	  without	  too	  much	  damage.	  Although	  Bosnia	  brought	  home	  some	  important	  lessons	  for	  the	  NZDF,	  and	  exposed	  troops	  to	  tough	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Ibid.;	  New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  "Security:	  Peace	  Support	  Operations,"	  	  http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-­‐Relations/1-­‐Global-­‐Issues/International-­‐Security/4-­‐Peacekeeping-­‐Operations.php;	  Phil	  Goff,	  "NZ's	  Role	  in	  Peacekeeping	  and	  in	  Afghanistan"	  (Wellington,	  10	  November	  2005).	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conditions	  and	  ineffective	  mandates,	  New	  Zealand	  was	  by	  and	  large	  proud	  of	  its	  contributions.	  Canada	  and	  Canadian	  peacekeeping,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  badly	  damaged	  by	  the	  experiences	  in	  Bosnia,	  Rwanda	  and	  Somalia.	  The	  more	  illustrious	  the	  reputation,	  the	  more	  senior	  positions	  occupied,	  the	  more	  shameful	  these	  missions	  were	  for	  contributors.	  Apart	  from	  the	  Somalia	  Affair,	  Canadians	  comported	  themselves	  well	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  missions,	  but	  what	  they	  witnessed,	  and	  what	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  live	  through,	  has	  had	  lasting	  effects	  not	  only	  on	  individuals	  but	  also	  on	  the	  entire	  military	  establishment.	  Seeing	  their	  soldiers	  kidnapped	  and	  killed,	  dealing	  with	  the	  extensive	  mental	  health	  issues	  of	  returning	  peacekeepers,	  and	  feeling	  that	  all	  these	  sacrifices	  had	  been	  in	  vain	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  Canadian	  rejection	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  Unlike	  New	  Zealand,	  Canada	  was	  frightened	  away	  from	  UN	  peacekeeping	  by	  the	  catastrophes	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  peacekeepers.	  Canada	  ran	  away	  from	  UN	  operations,	  whereas	  New	  Zealand	  was	  led	  away.	  	  Although	  they	  might	  still	  claim	  to	  be	  internationalists,	  the	  peacekeeping	  policies	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Canada	  today	  barely	  give	  credence	  to	  this	  label.	  They	  may	  not	  have	  made	  conscious	  choices	  to	  abandon	  this	  identity	  –	  the	  evolving	  security	  environment	  and	  policies	  of	  major	  Western	  powers	  have	  precipitated	  the	  change	  –	  however	  the	  way	  that	  both	  countries	  contribute	  troops	  and	  resources	  to	  peace	  support	  operations	  today	  hardly	  signifies	  a	  commitment	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping.	  The	  way	  that	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand	  currently	  contribute	  is	  more	  indicative	  of	  their	  national	  security	  concerns	  than	  ever	  before.	  Whereas	  it	  used	  to	  be	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  of	  middle	  states	  to	  be	  internationalists,	  today	  it	  is	  in	  their	  national	  interest	  to	  protect	  themselves,	  even	  if	  that	  means	  eschewing	  UN	  peacekeeping	  for	  NATO	  peace	  enforcement.	  	  	  Despite	  having	  decreased	  their	  troop	  contributions	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  to	  fifteen	  years,	  Canada	  and	  New	  Zealand	  are	  as	  unique	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN	  as	  any	  other	  troop-­‐contributing	  country.	  However,	  the	  evolving	  approach	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  to	  perceived	  external	  threats	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  both	  countries.	  Whereas	  Canada	  had	  already	  all	  but	  abandoned	  UN	  peacekeeping	  and	  was	  happy	  to	  jump	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on	  the	  NATO	  and	  US	  coalition	  bandwagon,	  as	  a	  smaller	  state	  New	  Zealand’s	  choices	  about	  UN	  peacekeeping	  participation	  were	  shaped	  by	  changing	  attitudes	  within	  the	  security	  community.	  	  So	  beyond	  the	  unique	  experiences	  and	  domestic	  factors	  that	  influence	  countries’	  contributions,	  the	  shared	  norms	  and	  values	  of	  the	  Western	  security	  community	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  way	  the	  West	  responds	  to	  conflict	  and	  contributes	  military	  personnel	  to	  peace	  support	  operations.	  Through	  the	  constant	  interactions	  and	  transactions	  that	  occur	  between	  community	  members,	  a	  collective	  identity	  and	  collective	  interests	  are	  formed,	  and	  by	  extension	  shared	  external	  threats.	  Common	  national	  interests	  and	  shared	  threats	  will	  continue	  to	  result	  in	  a	  relatively	  unified	  approach	  to	  addressing	  peace	  and	  security	  issues,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  or	  other	  means.	  	  	  Possibilities	  for	  Future	  Western	  Engagement	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  	  After	  the	  Cold	  War,	  conflict	  changed,	  and	  the	  UN	  struggled	  to	  adapt.	  But	  as	  the	  organization	  learned	  to	  respond	  effectively	  to	  intrastate,	  ethnic	  conflicts,	  the	  global	  security	  environment	  changed	  again	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11.	  The	  UN	  is	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  adapting	  to	  this	  latest	  change,	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  it	  will	  never	  be	  the	  world’s	  one-­‐stop-­‐shop	  for	  the	  fight	  against	  global	  terrorism	  and	  it	  was	  not	  created	  for	  this	  purpose.	  It	  could,	  however,	  be	  a	  much	  more	  effective	  instrument	  in	  this	  campaign	  if	  Western	  powers	  decided	  to	  use	  it	  as	  such,	  providing	  much	  needed	  multilateral	  support	  for	  political	  peace	  processes,	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  state-­‐building,	  including	  effective	  security	  sector	  reform	  and	  rule	  of	  law.	  The	  further	  the	  West	  strays	  from	  the	  UNs	  institutional	  framework,	  the	  more	  the	  UN’s	  ultimate	  authority	  will	  be	  questioned,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  less	  effective	  it	  will	  become.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  essential,	  especially	  post-­‐Afghanistan,	  that	  Western	  militaries	  look	  for	  a	  way	  to	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  UN	  peacekeeping	  through	  troop	  contributions.	  	  While	  the	  Western	  world	  has	  tended	  to	  the	  threats	  against	  it,	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  system	  that	  Western	  contributors	  once	  dominated	  has	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  Other	  countries	  have	  taken	  the	  title	  and	  responsibility	  of	  top	  contributors,	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and	  their	  valued	  contributions	  cannot	  and	  would	  not	  be	  swept	  aside	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  Western	  return	  to	  peacekeeping.	  The	  UN	  now	  needs	  the	  West	  to	  provide	  troops	  with	  specialized	  training	  and	  enabling	  capacities	  that	  many	  non-­‐Western	  contributors	  cannot	  provide.	  The	  UN	  no	  longer	  needs	  Western	  countries	  to	  provide	  the	  bulk	  of	  blue	  helmets,	  but	  there	  are	  niches	  these	  contributors	  can,	  and	  need	  to	  fill.	  	  The	  UN	  will	  need	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  West	  to	  contribute	  troops	  again,	  however	  it	  will	  struggle	  with	  the	  competing	  interests	  of	  Western	  and	  non-­‐Western-­‐contributors.	  Although	  the	  idea	  is	  unpopular	  with	  most	  non-­‐Western	  troop	  contributors,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  and	  fair	  ways	  to	  welcome	  back	  Western	  contributions	  would	  be	  to	  adopt	  a	  capability-­‐driven	  approach	  to	  resourcing	  peacekeeping	  missions.	  At	  the	  moment	  contributors	  are	  focused	  on	  providing	  the	  number	  of	  troops	  DPKO	  asks	  for	  (and	  is	  willing	  to	  reimburse	  for)	  rather	  than	  the	  capabilities	  a	  mission	  needs.	  A	  former	  DPKO	  Force	  Generation	  official	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  size	  of	  a	  standard	  UN	  battalion,	  “A	  TCC	  may	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  the	  UN’s	  requirements	  with	  less	  than	  850	  personnel…but	  why	  would	  they	  do	  that	  knowing	  that	  they	  would	  be	  short-­‐changing	  themselves	  in	  reimbursements?”205	  In	  order	  for	  a	  capabilities-­‐driven	  approach	  to	  be	  successful	  the	  troop	  reimbursement	  system	  would	  need	  to	  be	  based	  on	  capabilities	  as	  well,	  i.e.	  what	  kind	  of	  personnel	  contribution	  is	  provided,	  rather	  than	  the	  number	  of	  personnel	  provided.	  Complicated	  as	  it	  might	  be	  to	  calculate,	  if	  countries	  were	  reimbursed	  based	  on	  the	  usefulness	  of	  their	  troop	  contributions	  in	  achieving	  the	  mission’s	  mandate,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  size	  of	  their	  troop	  contributions,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  major	  incentive	  for	  Western	  militaries	  to	  contribute.	  Whether	  they	  actually	  would	  is	  another	  question	  altogether.	  	  The	  current	  number	  of	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  and	  the	  historically	  high	  number	  of	  blue	  helmets	  doesn’t	  provide	  any	  indication	  that	  UN	  peacekeeping	  is	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  In	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  most	  peacekeeping	  operations	  have	  established	  rule	  of	  law,	  brokered	  political	  settlements,	  protected	  civilians,	  facilitated	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  aid,	  encouraged	  national	  institutions	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Watters,	  email	  message	  to	  author.	  
	   83	  
enabled	  security	  sector	  reform	  in	  countries	  afflicted	  with	  conflict,	  and	  they	  have	  done	  so	  without	  significant	  troop	  contributions	  from	  the	  West.	  However	  one	  has	  to	  wonder	  how	  much	  more	  effective	  these	  operations	  could	  have	  been	  with	  broader	  troop	  participation.	  	  	  The	  UN	  will	  have	  to	  continue	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  conflict,	  and	  peacekeeping	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  progressively	  robust	  and	  increasingly	  challenging.	  For	  the	  UN	  to	  succeed	  in	  current	  and	  future	  operations	  it	  will	  need	  the	  advanced	  technology	  and	  specialized	  capabilities	  of	  Western	  militaries.	  If	  not,	  UN	  peacekeeping	  operations	  risk	  being	  unable	  to	  deliver	  upon	  the	  very	  mandates	  that	  Western	  powers	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  crafting,	  and	  the	  divide	  between	  non-­‐UN	  and	  UN	  operations	  risks	  becoming	  a	  divide	  between	  the	  West	  and	  the	  rest.
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Annex	  I	  	  List	  of	  Western	  Countries	  Albania	  Australia	  Austria	  Belgium	  Bulgaria	  Canada	  Croatia	  Republic	  of	  Cyprus	  Czech	  Republic	  Denmark	  Estonia	  Finland	  France	  Germany	  Greece	  Hungary	  Ireland	  Iceland	  Italy	  Japan	  Latvia	  Lithuania	  Luxembourg	  Malta	  Netherlands	  New	  Zealand	  Norway	  Poland	  Portugal	  Romania	  Slovakia	  Slovenia	  Spain	  Sweden	  Turkey	  United	  Kingdom	  United	  States	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